Responses to the AAR‐Teagle White Paper: “The Religious Studies Major in a Post‐9/11 World”

In October 2008 The American Academy of Religion published the findings of an eighteen month study (conducted with funding from the Teagle Foundation) on “The Religious Studies Major in a Post–9/11World: New Challenges, New Opportunities.” Re‐published here, this AAR‐Teagle White Paper provides the opportunity for four respondents to raise issues and questions about the teaching of religion in their own institutional contexts. First, Jane Webster describes how the White Paper's “five characteristics of the religion major” find expression in her biblical literature course. Then James Buckley suggests some of the general level teaching issues provoked by the study and analyzes how well the White Paper aligns with how the teaching of religion is conceived in his Catholic university context. Tim Jensen draws comparisons between the White Paper and the higher education structures and goals from his university context in Denmark, raising questions about what motivates students to major in religious studies, the “utility” of a religious studies major, and whether students' religious and spiritual concerns ought to enter the classroom. And finally Stacey Floyd‐Thomas finds surprising similarities between the state of the religion major and the various crises facing contemporary North American theological education.     

In the worst rather than the best of times: effects of salient intergroup ideology in threatening intergroup interactions

Three studies demonstrated that a salient multicultural ideology increases hostile treatment of threatening outgroup interaction partners. The effect of multiculturalism on hostile behavior was evident regardless of whether threat was operationalized in terms of disagreement with an outgroup partner on important social issues (Studies 1 and 3) or rejection by the partner (Study 2). Moreover, the results clearly point to the learning orientation fostered by multiculturalism--as opposed to other factors such as enhanced other-focus, group-level attributions, or focus on differences--as the critical mediator of its effect on hostile behavior under threat. Thus, it appears that multiculturalism enhances the expression of hostility because it prompts individuals to really engage with and attach meaning and importance to threatening behaviors exhibited by outgroup members. The effects of multiculturalism were distinct from those of anti-racism and color-blindness, which set in motion processes that in many respects are directly opposite to those instantiated by multiculturalism. The findings highlight that the behavioral implications of multiculturalism may be quite different in conflictual interactions than they have previously been demonstrated to be in less threatening exchanges.     

Further evidence of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory’s validity problems: A meta-analytic investigation—Response to Miller, Maples, and Campbell (this issue)

Miller, Maples, and Campbell (this issue) present evidence that Rosenthal and Hooley’s (2010) concerns regarding the Narcissistic Personality Inventory’s (NPI) relation to psychological health may be unwarranted. To resolve this issue empirically, we conducted a meta-analysis (k = 54, N = 38,932). Meta-analytic results revealed that a subset of NPI items were indeed problematic; items that function poorly at differentiating narcissists from non-narcissists accounted entirely for the NPI’s connection to psychological health. These items were also strongly associated with self-esteem, but unrelated to aggression/anger. In contrast, the remaining NPI items were unrelated to psychological health, but associated with aggression/anger. We conclude that although the NPI measures narcissism, its poorest functioning items also link it to outcomes unrelated to narcissism.     

An effort based analysis of the paradoxical effects of incentives on decision‐aided performance

This study examines the effect of incentives on decision‐aided performance. In particular, the study provides further insight into whether, when, and how incentives affect task performance in the presence of decision aids by (1) replicating previous research showing the negative effects of incentives on performance; (2) investigating whether this effect generalizes to a more realistic scenario in which decision makers have access to additional contextual information not captured by the decision aid; and (3) applying an effort‐based framework to explain the link between incentives and performance. In contrast to the findings of prior research, our study shows that incentives do not necessarily decrease performance in the presence of decision aids. Rather, we demonstrate that the effect of incentives on decision‐aided performance depends on other contextual factors such as the absence or presence of additional contextual information. By further specifying the conditions under which incentives result in increases or decreases to decision‐aided task performance, our results have implications for both future research and the design of incentive systems in practice. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The pitfalls of empathy as a default intergroup interaction strategy: Distinct effects of trying to empathize with a lower status outgroup member who does versus does not express distress

This experiment examined the hypothesis that trying to be empathic during intergroup interaction has positive effects on behavior when an outgroup interaction partner discloses significant hardships and thus expresses a need for support, but negative effects in the absence of a call for help. The results from an ostensible interaction study supported this hypothesis, and revealed that worries regarding negative evaluation partially accounted for the moderating role of partner hardship. Specifically, previous research indicates that trying to be empathic during intergroup interaction prompts individuals to reflect on their own evaluation by their outgroup partner, which for lower-prejudice individuals leads to positive metaperceptions and complacency and for higher-prejudice individuals leads to negative metaperceptions and enhanced effort. In the present study, having the outgroup partner disclose difficulties and distress increased the perceived likelihood of negative evaluation and appeared to trigger stronger efforts to convey positive signals for lower- and higher-prejudice individuals alike.     

For love or money? What motivates people to know the minds of others?

Mood affects social cognition and "theory of mind", such that people in a persistent negative mood (i.e., dysphoria) have enhanced abilities at making subtle judgements about others' mental states. Theorists have argued that this hypersensitivity to subtle social cues may have adaptive significance in terms of solving interpersonal problems and/or minimising social risk. We tested whether increasing the social salience of a theory of mind task would preferentially increase dyspshoric individuals' performance on the task. Forty-four dysphoric and 51 non-dysphoric undergraduate women participated in a theory of mind decoding task following one of three motivational manipulations: (i) social motivation (ii) monetary motivation, or (iii) no motivation. Social motivation was associated with the greatest accuracy of mental state decoding for the dysphoric group, whereas the non-dysphoric group showed the highest accuracy in the monetary motivation condition. These results suggest that dysphoric individuals may be especially, and preferentially, motivated to understand the mental states of others.     

Promotionalism, Motivationalism and Reasons to Perform Physically Impossible Actions

In this paper I grant the Humean premise that some reasons for action are grounded in the desires of the agents whose reasons they are. I then consider the question of the relation between the reasons and the desires that ground them. According to promotionalism, a desire that p grounds a reason to φ insofar as A’s φing helps promote p. According to motivationalism a desire that p grounds a reason to φ insofar as it explains why, in certain circumstances, A would be motivated to φ. I then give an argument favouring motivationalism, namely that promotionalism entails that agents have reasons to perform physically impossible actions, whereas motivationalism entails that there are no such reasons. Although this is a version of the ‘Too Many Reasons’ objection to promotionalism, I show that existing responses to that problem do not transfer to the case of reasons to perform physically impossible actions. In the penultimate section I consider and reject some objections to motivationalism made by promotionalists. The conclusion is that Humeans about reasons for action should prefer motivationalism.     

THE MORAL BELIEF PROBLEM

The moral belief problem is that of reconciling expressivism in ethics with both minimalism in the philosophy of language and the syntactic discipline of moral sentences. It is argued that the problem can be solved by distinguishing minimal and robust senses of belief, where a minimal belief is any state of mind expressed by sincere assertoric use of a syntactically disciplined sentence and a robust belief is a minimal belief with some additional property R. Two attempts to specify R are discussed, both based on the thought that beliefs are states that aim at truth. According to the first, robust beliefs are criticisable to the extent that their content fails to match the state of the world. This sense fails to distinguish robust beliefs from minimal beliefs. According to the second, robust beliefs function to have their content match the state of the world. This sense succeeds in distinguishing robust beliefs from minimal beliefs. The conclusion is that the debate concerning the cognitive status of moral convictions needs to address the issue of the function of moral convictions. Evolutionary theorising may be relevant, but will not be decisive, in answering this question.