Markets in Votes and the Tyranny of Wealth

A standard objection to a market in political votes is that it will enable the rich politically to dominate the poor. If a market in votes was allowed then the poor would be the most likely sellers and the rich the most likely buyers. The rich would thus accumulate the votes of the poor, and so the candidates elected and the policies passed would represent only their interests and not those of the electorate as a whole. To ensure that the poor do not become de facto disenfranchised, then, markets in votes should be disallowed. This objection seems so straightforward and compelling that it has received almost no critical scrutiny. This is unfortunate, for close examination reveals that this argument is not as straightforward as it initially appears. Indeed, there are (at least) four different ways of understanding this objection. It could be understood as expressing: (1) the concern that markets in votes would enable candidates to win elections who would otherwise lose them; (2) the concern that they would enable the election of candidates opposed by the majority of the electorate; (3) the concern that they would lead to the poor having disproportionately low political influence; and (4) the concern that they would lead to the rich having disproportionately high political influence. I will argue in this paper that only (3) and (4) could plausibly ground objections to markets in votes. Moreover, these will only plausibly ground objections to unrestricted markets in votes; they will not ground objections to markets in votes per se. Thus, if we are to continue to object to markets in political votes we will have to do this on grounds other than that were they to be allowed the rich will politically dominate the poor.     

Simply Satisfied: The Role of Psychological Need Satisfaction in the Life Satisfaction of Voluntary Simplifiers

Low consumption lifestyles have the potential to impact positively on the environment and mental health. Past research indicates that individuals who engage in a low consumption lifestyle known as voluntary simplicity have higher levels of life satisfaction. This investigation aimed to test the role of psychological needs as proposed by Ryan and Deci’s (Am Psychol 55(1):68–78, 2000. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68) self-determination theory, in the relationship between voluntary simplicity and life satisfaction in a sample of 571 adults who may or may not identify as voluntary simplifiers. Self-report data was analysed using structural equation modeling to test a hypothesised path from simplifying behaviours to life satisfaction via gratification of the three proposed psychological needs. Consistent with previous research, simplifying behaviours were associated with increased life satisfaction. The proposed pathway: simplicity—psychological need gratification—life satisfaction was supported in the empirical test of the structural equation model suggesting psychological need satisfaction plays a mediating role in the increased life satisfaction of voluntary simplifiers.     

The relationship between distress tolerance and antisocial personality disorder among male inner-city treatment seeking substance users

There is currently limited research on the potential mechanisms underlying the development of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). One such mechanism, distress tolerance (defined as an individual's behavioral persistence in the face of emotional distress) may underlie the development of ASPD and its associated behavioral difficulties. It was hypothesized that substance users with ASPD would evidence significantly lower levels of distress tolerance than substance users without ASPD. To test this relationship, we assessed 127 inner-city males receiving residential substance abuse treatment with two computerized laboratory measures of distress tolerance. The mean age of the sample was 40.1 years (SD = 9.8) and 88.2% were African American. As expected, multiple logistic regression analyses indicated that distress intolerance significantly predicted the presence of an ASPD diagnosis, above and beyond key covariates including substance use frequency and associated Axis I and II psychopathology. Findings suggest that distress tolerance may be a key factor in understanding the development of ASPD, setting the stage for future studies expanding on the nature of this relationship, as well as the development of appropriate interventions for this at-risk group.     

Culture, trust, and social networks

Although the role of trust in group processes has been well established, less is known about the role of trust in social network processes. Trust, conceptualized to have generalized and particularistic aspects, was measured by generalized trust (people can be trusted in general) and relationism (people can be trusted if one has relationships), and their relations with social network characteristics of network homogeneity (extent to which one has a number of friends with similar attitudes) and network closure (extent to which one's social network is closed) were examined in three Western (Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom) and two East Asian countries (Japan and Korea). Although generalized trust was shown to be positively related to network closure across the five countries, generalized trust and relationism had different relations with network homogeneity in different cultures. The results were interpreted in terms of social institutional and cultural differences.     

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Annalen der Philosophie -     

Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment

Subject‐sensitive invariantism posits surprising connections between a person's knowledge and features of her environment that are not paradigmatically epistemic features. But which features of a person's environment have this distinctive connection to knowledge? Traditional defenses of subject‐sensitive invariantism emphasize features that matter to the subject of the knowledge‐attribution. Call this pragmatic encroachment. A more radical thesis usually goes ignored: knowledge is sensitive to moral facts, whether or not those moral facts matter to the subject. Call this moral encroachment. This article argues that, insofar as there are good arguments for pragmatic encroachment, there are also good arguments for moral encroachment.