Hindsight bias around the world

Hindsight bias refers to the tendency to overestimate in hindsight what one has known in foresight. Recently, two experiments extended the research to include samples from different cultures (Choi & Nisbett, 2000; Heine & Lehman, 1996). Asking their participants what they would have guessed before they knew the outcome ("hypothetical design"), Choi and Nisbett (2000) found that Koreans, in comparison to North Americans, exhibited more hindsight bias. Heine and Lehman (1996), however, reported that Japanese people in comparison to Canadians showed marginally less hindsight bias. In a second study, in which participants were asked to recall what they had estimated before they knew the outcome ("memory design"), the latter authors found no difference in hindsight bias between Japanese people and Canadians. We extended these studies with 225 Internet participants, in a hypothetical design, from four different continents (Asia, Australia, Europe, and North America). Hindsight bias was large and similar for all samples except for German and Dutch participants who showed no hindsight bias at all. While the latter effect may be based on peculiarities of the material and of the participants, the former underscores the worldwide stability of the phenomenon. In addition a follow-up surprise rating (paper and pencil) in China (35 participants) and Germany (20 participants) revealed that only less surprising items led to hindsight bias while more surprising ones did not. We suggest that the basic cognitive processes leading to hindsight bias are by-products of the evolutionary-evolved capacity of adaptive learning. On top of these basic processes, individual meta-cognitions (e.g., elicited by surprise) or motives (e.g., a self-serving motive) may further moderate the amount of bias, thus explaining the diverging results of Choi and Nisbett (2000), Heine and Lehman (1996), and our own study.     

Linguistic Basicness and Colour Information Processing

Berlin and Kay's notion of basicness was defined by a combination of linguistic and psychological criteria, but they suggested that the psychological criteria might be extended. The experiments reported here were designed to explore a possible extension by searching for perceptual effects of basicness. Russian speakers who have two basic terms for the blue region of colour space were compared with English speakers who have only one basic term for the same region on two perceptual tasks. The first two experiments sought for greater Stroop interference for the Russians than for the English for the critical “blue” stimuli, and the third experiment sought greater perceptual differentiation for the Russians in the blue region. All experiments clearly replicated standard findings, but all singularly failed to find the predicted differences between the two groups. It is argued that whilst the results are consistent with there being no psychological effect of basicness, it is necessary to search for possible effects in other domains, such as recognition memory, before accepting this conclusion.     

Well-being in major depression and social phobia with and without comorbidity

Background/Objective: Lower levels in well-being have been observed in individuals with Major Depression (MDD) and Social Phobia (SP), but well-planned direct comparisons with control individuals, not suffering from a mental disorder, are lacking. Furthermore, MDD is highly comorbid with anxiety disorders, and SP with depressive disorders. This study is among the first to examine differences in well-being in individuals with a clinical diagnosis of MDD or SP compared to individuals with no such diagnosis and to test differences in well-being within the combined diagnostic categories respective with and without anxiety-depressive comorbidity. Method: Participants were 119 individuals with a diagnosis of MDD, 47 SP and 118 controls. Results: Results revealed that overall well-being as well as emotional, psychological, and social well-being were lower in the MDD and SP group compared to the control group. Individuals with comorbidity reported lower well-being than individuals without comorbidity. Conclusions: These findings have clinical implications as presence of comorbidity may require a different therapeutic approach than with no comorbidity.     

Another Test of Gender Differences in Assignments to Precarious Leadership Positions: Examining the Moderating Role of Ambivalent Sexism

Women face significant hurdles in the attainment of leadership positions. When they do attain them such positions tend to be riskier than those attained by men, a form of bias called glass cliff. This study investigates ambivalent sexism as an individual difference that influences the occurrence of glass cliff. Little research examines individual differences contributing to glass cliff. It is proposed that individuals with high hostile and benevolent sexism are more likely to perceive women to be suitable for leadership of a poorly‐performing organization and men to be suitable for leadership of a well‐performing organization. The sample of our experimental study consisted of 378 students who rated either a female or a male candidate under a poor or good performance condition. We tested our hypotheses using a moderated regression analysis. Both components of sexism impacted how individuals evaluated male and female leaders under different organizational performance conditions. Hostile sexism was the dimension that led to glass cliff. Benevolent sexism had an unexpected effect on leadership choice. The differences between the two types of sexism and the different role each type plays in preference for masculine and feminine leadership are discussed. Leader gender and perceiver's sexist attitudes influence evaluations for leadership positions.     

Intuition and Reasoning: A Dual-Process Perspective

A lay definition of intuition holds that it involves immediate apprehension in the absence of reasoning. From a more technical point of view, I argue also that intuition should be seen as the contrastive of reasoning, corresponding roughly to the distinction between Type 1 (intuitive) and Type 2 (reflective) processes in contemporary dual process theories of thinking. From this perspective, we already know a great deal about intuition: It is quick, provides feelings of confidence, can reflect large amounts of information processing, and is most likely to provide accurate judgments when based on relevant experiential learning. Unlike reasoning, intuition is low effort and does not compete for central working memory resources. It provides default responses which may—or often may not—be intervened upon with high effort, reflective reasoning. Intuition has, however, been blamed for a range of cognitive biases in the psychological literatures on reasoning and decision making. The evidence indicates that with novel and abstract problems, not easily linked to previous experience, intervention with effortful reasoning is often required to avoid such biases. Hence, although it seems that intuition dominates reasoning most of the time—both in the laboratory and the real world—it can indeed be a false friend.     

Motive Arousal Without Pictures? An Experimental Validation of a Hybrid Implicit Motive Test

Pictures are widely used as stimuli in implicit motive tests. Hybrid forms of such tests present pictures and declarative statements underneath pictures. Some authors have argued that explicitly declaring agreement with motive-related statements presented underneath pictures might shift the validity of such tests from capturing less implicit motives to more explicit motives. If that is the case, pictures as elicitors of implicit motives might become less relevant. Adopting the views on validity presented by Borsboom, Mellenbergh, and van Heerden (2004 Borsboom, D., Mellenbergh, G. J., &; van Heerden, J. (2004). The concept of validity. Psychological Review, 111, 1061–1071. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.111.4.1061[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and Bornstein (2011 Bornstein, R. F. (2011). Toward a process-focused model of test score validity: Improving psychological assessment in science and practice. Psychological Assessment, 23, 532–544. doi:10.1037/a0022402[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), as well as item generation theory, we investigated whether the availability of pictures in hybrid motive tests causally affects test scores. To this end, we administered the Multi-Motive Grid (MMG; Sokolowski, Schmalt, Langens, &; Puca, 2000 Sokolowski, K., Schmalt, H.-D., Langens, T. A., &; Puca, R. M. (2000). Assessing achievement, affiliation, and power motives all at once: The Multi-Motive-Grid (MMG). Journal of Personality Assessment, 74, 126–145. doi:10.1207/S15327752JPA740109[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), as an example of a hybrid motive test, either with or without pictures to 108 participants. Results revealed that the availability of pictures had no effect on 3 out of 6 test scores. Furthermore, eliminating pictures had only inconsistent effects on correlations with a test of explicit motives. We conclude that pictures might not unanimously elicit motives in implicit motive tests that use declarative statements as response options.