Decision-makers use social information to update their preferences but choose for others as they do for themselves

People's risky decisions are susceptible to the social context in which they take place. Across three experiments using different paradigms, we investigated the influence of three social factors upon participants' decisions: the recipient of the decision-making outcome (self, other, or joint), the nature of the relationship with the other agent (friend, stranger, or teammate), and the type of information that participants received about others' preferences: none at all, general information about how previous participants had decided, or information about a specific partner's preference. We found that participants' decisions about risk did not differ according to whether the outcome at stake was their own, another agent's, or a joint outcome, nor according to the type of information available. Participants did, however, adjust their preferences for risky options in light of social information.     

Ethical Decision Making in Autonomous Vehicles: The AV Ethics Project

Science and Engineering Ethics - The ethics of autonomous vehicles (AV) has received a great amount of attention in recent years, specifically in regard to their decisional policies in accident...     

Corporate Social Responsibility Practices of Colombian Companies as Perceived by Industrial Engineering Students

Science and Engineering Ethics - This work describes the perceptions that Industrial Engineering students have regarding Colombian firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices. It...     

Stroop interference is a composite phenomenon: Evidence from distinct developmental trajectories of its components

Only one previous developmental study of Stroop task performance (Schiller, 1966) has controlled for differences in processing speed that exist both within and between age groups. Therefore, the question of whether the early developmental change in the magnitude of Stroop interference actually persists after controlling for processing speed needs further investigation; work that is further motivated by the possibility that any remaining differences would be caused by process(es) other than processing speed. Analysis of data from two experiments revealed that, even after controlling for processing speed using z‐transformed reaction times, early developmental change persists such that the magnitude of overall Stroop interference is larger in 3rd‐ and 5th graders as compared to 1st graders. This pattern indicates that the magnitude of overall Stroop interference peaks after 2 or 3 years of reading practice (Schadler & Thissen, 1981). Furthermore, this peak is shown to be due to distinct components of Stroop interference (resulting from specific conflicts) progressively falling into place. Experiment 2 revealed that the change in the magnitude of Stroop interference specifically results from joint contributions of task, semantic and response conflicts in 3rd‐ and 5th graders as compared to a sole contribution of task conflict in 1st graders. The specific developmental trajectories of different conflicts presented in the present work provide unique evidence for multiple loci of Stroop interference in the processing stream (respectively task, semantic and response conflict) as opposed to a single (i.e. response) locus predicted by historically – favored response competition accounts.     

Ethnic-racial identity,relatedness, and school belonging for adolescent New Zealanders: does student gender make a difference?

Social Psychology of Education - Attitudes toward ethnic and racial identity have been linked to both wellbeing and maladaptive outcomes that affect belonging at school. Further, relatedness (or...     

Does classroom social comparison bias students’ evaluation of their own competence?

Social Psychology of Education - Overestimation and underestimation of students’ own competence result from social comparison in the classroom. There is some evidence that secondary school...     

Cut-free sequent and tableau systems for propositional Diodorean modal logics

We present sound, (weakly) complete and cut-free tableau systems for the propositional normal modal logicsS4.3, S4.3.1 andS4.14. When the modality is given a temporal interpretation, these logics respectively model time as a linear dense sequence of points; as a linear discrete sequence of points; and as a branching tree where each branch is a linear discrete sequence of points.Although cut-free, the last two systems do not possess the subformula property. But for any given finite set of formulaeX the superformulae involved are always bounded by a finite set of formulaeX* _L depending only onX and the logicL. Thus each system gives a nondeterministic decision procedure for the logic in question. The completeness proofs yield deterministic decision procedures for each logic because each proof is constructive.Each tableau system has a cut-free sequent analogue proving that Gentzen's cut-elimination theorem holds for these latter systems. The techniques are due to Hintikka and Rautenberg.Presented byDov M. Gabbay     

Personality factors in relation to violent crimes

The personalities of a group of 54 persons (51 men and 3 women), imprisoned for the perpetration of violent crimes, were evaluated. The results were then compared to a normative group. This study considers personality factors and dimensions on three levels: (a) Basic factors: the "Big Five", (b) Personality disorders and clinical syndromes, (c) Personality dimensions related to personal wellbeing and social adaptation said to define a psychologically healthy individual. The results of the study show that it is not possible to define a basic personality profile for this group of violent delinquents based on the "Big Five" factors. It is, however, possible to find two habitual patterns of behaviour if the Millon Model (1990) is applied. These two behaviour patterns and attitudes towards life situations will be named "Dependent with compulsive traits" and "Psychopath tendencies". Both relate to indicators of mental health.     

Thinking Without Words: An Overview for Animal Ethics

In Thinking without Words I develop a philosophical framework for treating some animals and human infants as genuine thinkers. This paper outlines the aspects of this account that are most relevant to those working in animal ethics. There is a range of different levels of cognitive sophistication in different animal species, in addition to limits to the types of thought available to non-linguistic creatures, and it may be important for animal ethicists to take this into account in exploring issues of moral significance and the obligations that we might or might not have to non-human animals. I am grateful for comments on an earlier version from Robert Francescotti and Clare Palmer.