Repetition Priming of the Recognition of Familiar Proper Names

Three experiments examined repetition priming of the recognition of printed proper names of familiar people by the prior exposure of those names in their correct form or with their letters re-arranged as anagrams. Experiment 1 found that, compared with response times to previously unseen names, name familiarity decisions were made more rapidly if the subject had seen and identified the famous name in the pre-training stage, irrespective of whether they saw the intact name or an anagram. Priming was not demonstrated if the name was not recognized in the pre-training stage. The results of Experiment 2 suggested that if anagrams were not solved spontaneously in the pre-training stage, being prompted to their identity by the experimenter would not yield reliable priming at test, a result that reflected previous work using face stimuli (Brunas-Wagstaff, Young, & Ellis, 1992; Johnston, Barry, & Williams, 1996). In Experiment 3, prompts were given for all names and anagrams presented at pretraining. Subsequent priming was demonstrated only for names identified spontaneously, which showed that, as with face recognition, it was the situation in which the prime was given that was critical in determining whether priming of name recognition occurred. The findings are used to develop proposed extensions of the Bruce and Young (1986) model such as that offered by Burton, Bruce, and Johnston (1990).     

Pet dogs (Canis familiaris) re-engage humans after joint activity

Animal Cognition - Joint intentionality, the mutual understanding of shared goals or actions to partake in a common task, is considered an essential building block of theory of mind in humans....     

THE LIMITS OF NEO-ARISTOTELIAN PLENITUDE (AND ITS CONCEPTUAL NEIGHBORS)

Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude is the thesis that, necessarily, any property that could be had essentially by something or other is had essentially by something or other if and only if and because it is instantiated; any essentializable property is essentialized iff and because it is instantiated. In this paper, I develop a partial nonmodal characterization of ‘essentializable' and show it cannot be transformed into a full characterization. There are several seemingly insurmountable obstacles that any full characterization of essentializability must overcome. Moreover, these obstacles threaten other views in the conceptual neighborhood such as Counterpart Theoretic Plenitude and Conceptualist Plenitude.