Relational learning with and without awareness: Transitive inference using nonverbal stimuli in humans

Learning complex relationships among items and representing them flexibly have been shown to be highly similar in function and structure to conscious forms of learning. However, it is unclear whether conscious learning is essential for the exhibition of flexibility in learning. Successful performance on the transitive inference task requires representational flexibility. Participants learned four overlapping premise pairs (A > B, B > C, C > D, D > E) that could be encoded separately or as a sequential hierarchy (A > B > C > D > E). Some participants (informed) were told prior to training that the task required an inference made from premise pairs. Other participants (uninformed) were told simply that they were to learn a series of pairs by trial and error. Testing consisted of unreinforced trials that included the non-adjacent pair, B versus D, to assess capacity for transitive inference. Not surprisingly, those in the informed condition outperformed those in the uninformed condition. After completion of training and testing, uninformed participants were given a postexperimental questionnaire to assess awareness of the task structure. In contrast with expectations, successful performance on the transitive inference task for uninformed participants does not depend on or correlate with postexperimental awareness. The present results suggest that relational learning tasks do not necessarily require conscious processes.     

Analogical priming via semantic relations

Research on semantic memory has often tacitly treated semantic relations as simple conduits for spreading activation between associated object concepts, rather than as integral components of semantic organization. Yet conceptual relations, and the role bindings they impose on the objects they relate, are central to such cognitive tasks as discourse comprehension, inference, problem solving, and analogical reasoning. The present study addresses the question of whether semantic relations and their bindings can influence access to semantic memory. The experiments investigated whether, and under what conditions, presenting a prime pair of words linked by 1 of 10 common semantic relations would facilitate processing of a target pair of words linked by the same relation. No effect was observed when participants merely read the prime; however, relational priming was observed under instructions to note and use the semantic relations. Participants were faster at making a lexical decision or naming a word on a related pair of target words when that pair was primed with an analogously related pair of words than when the prime pair consisted of either two unrelated words or two words linked by some other relation. This evidence of analogical priming suggests that under an appropriate strategic set, lexical decisions and naming latencies can be influenced by a process akin to analogical mapping.     

Calibration trumps confidence as a basis for witness credibility

Confident witnesses are deemed more credible than unconfident ones, and accurate witnesses are deemed more credible than inaccurate ones. But are those effects independent? Two experiments show that errors in testimony damage the overall credibility of witnesses who were confident about the erroneous testimony more than that of witnesses who were not confident about it. Furthermore, after making an error, less confident witnesses may appear more credible than more confident ones. Our interpretation of these results is that people make inferences about source calibration when evaluating testimony and other social communication.     

Priming interdependence affects processing of context information in causal inference—But not how you might think

Cultural mindset is related to performance on a variety of cognitive tasks. In particular, studies of both chronic and situationally-primed mindsets show that individuals with a relatively interdependent mindset (i.e., an emphasis on relationships and connections among individuals) are more sensitive to background contextual information than individuals with a more independent mindset. Two experiments tested whether priming cultural mindset would affect sensitivity to background causes in a contingency learning and causal inference task. Participants were primed (either independent or interdependent), and then saw complete contingency information on each of 12 trials for two cover stories in Experiment 1 (hiking causing skin rashes, severed brakes causing wrecked cars) and two additional cover stories in Experiment 2 (school deadlines causing stress, fertilizers causing plant growth). We expected that relative to independent-primed participants, those interdependent-primed would give more weight to the explicitly-presented data indicative of hidden alternative background causes, but they did not do so. In Experiment 1, interdependents gave less weight to the data indicative of hidden background causes for the car accident cover story and showed a decreased sensitivity to the contingencies for that story. In Experiment 2, interdependents placed less weight on the observable data for cover stories that supported more extra-experimental causes, while independents' sensitivity did not vary with these extra-experimental causes. Thus, interdependents were more sensitive to background causes not explicitly presented in the experiment, but this sensitivity hurt rather than improved their acquisition of the explicitly-presented contingency information.     

A Brief,Hospital-Initiated Motivational Interviewing and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy Intervention to Link Postpartum Mothers Who Use Illicit Drugs With Treatment and Reproductive Care: A Case Report

Maternal substance use during the prenatal period often results in infants with compromised health outcomes. The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology recommends screening, brief motivational interviewing, and referral to existing treatment for women who use illicit substances prenatally. However, many of these women do not present for prenatal care and are not identified as using substances until delivery of their infants, many of whom are admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit (ICU). We describe a case from a novel, hospital-initiated intervention study, Moms in ACTion (MIACT) that combines motivational interviewing (MI) and acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) to target new mothers with an infant in the neonatal ICU who screen positive for illicit substance use prenatally or at delivery. The MIACT program consists of an adaptive intervention that includes up to three sessions. Initiation of substance use treatment and reproductive care via a gynecological visit are the primary targets of the intervention. Urine samples were collected at 2- and 6-month follow-up visits. The participant successfully completed the program, achieved both treatment outcomes, and had negative urine drug screens at follow-up visits. Improvements in readiness to change and psychological flexibility were also observed. The present case report of a new mother who used substances demonstrated feasibility for combining MI and ACT treatments and the potential for MIACT to increase treatment and contraception initiation, ultimately preventing future substance-exposed pregnancies.     

Accuracy, confidence, and calibration: how young children and adults assess credibility

Do children and adults use the same cues to judge whether someone is a reliable source of information? In 4 experiments, we investigated whether children (ages 5 and 6) and adults used information regarding accuracy, confidence, and calibration (i.e., how well an informant's confidence predicts the likelihood of being correct) to judge informants' credibility. We found that both children and adults used information about confidence and accuracy to judge credibility; however, only adults used information about informants' calibration. Adults discredited informants who exhibited poor calibration, but children did not. Requiring adult participants to complete a secondary task while evaluating informants' credibility impaired their ability to make use of calibration information. Thus, children and adults may differ in how they infer credibility because of the cognitive demands of using calibration.     

Discounting and conditionalization

When people are asked to judge the strengths of two potential causes of an effect, they often demonstrate discounting--devaluing the strength of a target cause when it is judged in the presence of a strong (relative to a weak) alternative cause. Devaluing the target cause sometimes results from conditionalization--holding alternative causes constant while evaluating the target cause. Yet discounting not attributable to conditionalization also occurs. We sought to dissociate conditionalization and discounting (beyond that accounted for by conditionalization) by having subjects perform either a spatial or a verbal working memory task while learning a causal relation. Conditionalization was disrupted by the verbal task but not the spatial task; however, discounting was disrupted by the spatial task but not the verbal task. Conditionalization and discounting are therefore cognitively dissociable processes in human causal inference.     

ACTING AS INTUITIVE SCIENTISTS:

Abstract— In judging the efficacy of multiple causes of an effect, human performance has been found to deviate from the "normative"Δ P contingency rule However, in cases of multiple causes, that rule might not be normative, scientists and philosophers, for example, know that when judging a potential cause, one must control for all other potential causes. In an experiment in which they were shown trial-by-trial effects of two potential causes (which sometimes covaried), subjects used conditional rather than unconditional contingencies to rate the efficacy of the causes. A conditional contingency analysis may explain various "nonnormative" cue-integration effects (e.g., discounting) found in the literature and is relevant to how people unravel Simpson's paradox.     

Credible testimony in and out of court

Assessing informants’ credibility is critical to several aspects of the legal process (e.g., when police interrogate suspects or jurors evaluate witnesses). There is a large body of research—from various areas of psychology and allied fields—about how people evaluate each others’ credibility. We review the literature on lie detection and interpersonal perception to demonstrate that inferences regarding credibility may be multiply determined. Specifically, characteristics of the informant, of the listener, and of the situation affect people’s perceptions of informants’ credibility. We conclude with a discussion of research on calibration (i.e., an informant’s confidence-accuracy relation) because it offers fruitful avenues for future credibility research in the legal domain.     

The benefits of knowing what you know (and what you don’t): How calibration affects credibility

People tend to believe, and take advice from, informants who are highly confident. However, people use more than a mere “confidence heuristic.” We believe that confidence is influential because—in the absence of other information—people assume it is a valid cue to an informant’s likelihood of being correct. However, when people get evidence about an informant’s calibration (i.e., her confidence-accuracy relationship) they override reliance on confidence or accuracy alone. Two experiments in which participants choose between two opposing witnesses to a car accident show that neither confidence nor accuracy alone explains judgments of credibility; rather, whether a person is seen as credible ultimately depends on whether the person demonstrates good calibration. Credibility depends on whether sources were justified in believing what they believed.