Imagination links with schizotypal beliefs,not with creativity or learning

Imagination refers to creating mental representations of concepts, ideas, and sensations that are not contemporaneously perceived by the senses. Although it is key to human individuality, research on imagination is scarce. To address this gap, we developed here a new psychometric test to assess individual differences in imagination and explored the role of imagination for learning, creativity, and schizotypal beliefs. In a laboratory‐based (N = 180) and an online study (N = 128), we found that imagination is only weakly associated with learning achievement and creativity, accounting for 2–8% of the variance. By contrast, imagination accounted for 22.5% of the variance in schizotypal beliefs, suggesting overall that imagination may be more indicative of cognitive eccentricities rather than benefit the accumulation of knowledge or production of novel and useful ideas.     

Comparison of task interspersal ratios on efficiency of learning and problem behavior for children with autism spectrum disorder

The current study extends the literature on task interspersal (TI) by comparing the effects of four different TI ratios on the efficiency of skill acquisition and on levels of problem behavior in children with autism spectrum disorder and related disorders. The four ratios of TI were 3:1, 1:1, 1:3, and 0:1 mastered‐to‐acquisition tasks. An adapted alternating treatments design was implemented to compare the cumulative number of stimuli mastered, mean training time to mastery, rate of acquisition, and the level of problem behavior. The results showed that the 0:1 condition was the most efficient intervention procedure for all four participants. In addition, TI did not lead to a greater reduction in levels of problem behavior.     

The Disappearance of Change: Towards a Process Account of Persistence

This paper aims to motivate a new beginning in metaphysical thinking about persistence by drawing attention to the disappearance of change in current accounts of persistence. I defend the claim that the debate is stuck in a dilemma which results from neglecting the constructive role of change for persistence. Neither of the two main competing views, perdurantism and endurantism, captures the idea of persistence as an identity through time. I identify the fundamental ontological reasons for this, namely the shared commitment to what I call ‘thing ontology’: an ontology that gives the ontological priority to static things. I conclude by briefly indicating how switching to a process ontological framework that takes process and change to be ontologically primary may allow for overcoming the dilemma of persistence.     

Flexible voices: Identity perception from variable vocal signals

Human voices are extremely variable: The same person can sound very different depending on whether they are speaking, laughing, shouting or whispering. In order to successfully recognise someone from their voice, a listener needs to be able to generalize across these different vocal signals (‘telling people together’). However, in most studies of voice-identity processing to date, the substantial within-person variability has been eliminated through the use of highly controlled stimuli, thus focussing on how we tell people apart. We argue that this obscures our understanding of voice-identity processing by controlling away an essential feature of vocal stimuli that may include diagnostic information. In this paper, we propose that we need to extend the focus of voice-identity research to account for both “telling people together” as well as “telling people apart.” That is, we must account for whether, and to what extent, listeners can overcome within-person variability to obtain a stable percept of person identity from vocal cues. To do this, our theoretical and methodological frameworks need to be adjusted to explicitly include the study of within-person variability.

     

Adaptation of the Mullen Scales of Early Learning for use among infants aged 5‐ to 24‐months in rural Gambia

Infants in low‐resource settings are at heightened risk for compromised cognitive development due to a multitude of environmental insults in their surroundings. However, the onset of adverse outcomes and trajectory of cognitive development in these settings is not well understood. The aims of the present study were to adapt the Mullen Scales of Early Learning (MSEL) for use with infants in a rural area of The Gambia, to examine cognitive development in the first 24‐months of life and to assess the association between cognitive performance and physical growth. In Phase 1 of this study, the adapted MSEL was tested on 52 infants aged 9‐ to 24‐months (some of whom were tested longitudinally at two time points). Further optimization and training were undertaken and Phase 2 of the study was conducted, where the original measures were administered to 119 newly recruited infants aged 5‐ to 24‐months. Infant length, weight and head circumference were measured concurrently in both phases. Participants from both phases were split into age categories of 5–9 m (N = 32), 10–14 m (N = 92), 15–19 m (N = 53) and 20–24 m (N = 43) and performance was compared across age groups. From the ages of 10–14 m, Gambian infants obtained lower MSEL scores than US norms. Performance decreased with age and was lowest in the 20–24 m old group. Differential onsets of reduced performance were observed in the individual MSEL domains, with declines in visual perception and motor performance detected as early as at 10–14 months, while reduced language scores became evident after 15–19 months of age. Performance on the MSEL was significantly associated with measures of growth.     

Transgender women’s experiences and beliefs about hormone therapy through and beyond mid-age: An exploratory UK study

Background: Little is known about transgender women’s beliefs and experiences of hormone therapy (HT), as part of their transition process, and particularly as they grow older. Aims: This study aimed to investigate: (i) transgender women’s experiences and attitudes to HT, and (ii) expectations of what might occur and/or what occurred after they reached “menopausal age.” Methods: Participants were recruited through invitations to an online survey sent to 138 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender plus (LGBT+) support groups across the UK. Sixty-seven transgender women consented and completed the questionnaire; responses were analyzed using a mixed-methods approach. The beliefs about medicines questionnaire (BMQ) was used to assess beliefs about HT, while an inductive thematic qualitative approach was used to explore participants’ personal expectations and experiences of HT and their views about the menopause. Results: Participants were aged on average 49 years ranging from 20 to 79 years old. Most (96%) were taking HT. BMQ scores revealed strong beliefs about the necessity of HT and some concerns. Positive views about HT were expressed, with themes including treatment importance, personal and mental health benefits, but concerns about long-term effects, side effects, and maintaining access to the treatment were also mentioned. Views about menopause included uncertainty and questioning of its relevance; some mentioned changes to HT dosage, but most expected to use HT indefinitely. Discussion: This study provides exploratory qualitative and quantitative information about transgender women’s views about HT and menopause. Practical implications include improving access to HT and provision of evidence-based information about long-term use.     

A Patchier Picture Still: Biases,Beliefs and Overlap on the Inferential Continuum

It has been proposed that, whilst implicit attitudes, alike beliefs, are propositionally structured (Mandelbaum Noûs, 50(3), 629–658, 2016), the former respond to evidence and modulate other attitudes in a fragmented manner, and so constitute a sui generis class, the “patchy endorsements” (Levy Noûs, 49(4), 800–823, 2015). In the following, I demonstrate that the patchy endorsements theorist is committed to the truth of two claims: (i) no implicit attitude is responsive to content to the same extent as any belief; and (ii) there is a significant gap between the most responsive implicit attitude and the least responsive belief. I argue that both (i) and (ii) fail to hold. Many implicit attitudes respond to evidence and modulate other attitudes. Meanwhile, at least some ordinary beliefs exhibit lower evidence-responsiveness and inferential efficacy than at least some implicit attitudes, defeating (i) and (ii). A better interpretation is that attitudes may be ordered along a continuum according to their responsiveness to content. At one extreme end, we find attitudes usually identified as implicit, and at the other, attitudes usually identified as beliefs, but in the middle, there is an area of overlap. I consider the consequences of the continuum view for existing folk psychological concepts.