Got Pain? Racial Bias in Perceptions of Pain

In the days of slavery, White people assumed that Black people felt less pain than did White people. This belief was used to justify slavery; it was also used to justify the inhumane treatment of Black men and women in medical research. Today, White Americans continue to believe that Black people feel less pain than do White people although this belief has changed from its historical, explicitly racist form. Racial attitudes do not moderate the bias, suggesting that racial bias in perceptions of others' pain is not rooted (solely) in racial prejudice. Moreover, Black Americans too believe that Black people feel less pain than do White people, suggesting that the bias is no longer grounded in intergroup dynamics. Rather, contemporary forms of this bias stem from assumptions that Black people face more hardship and “thus” can withstand more pain and assumptions that Black people's bodies are not only different but also superhuman. Although this new instantiation of the pain perception bias is decidedly more “benevolent”, it can nonetheless lead to negative outcomes. Here, we consider how racial bias in perceptions of others' pain may affect racial disparities in health care and intergroup relations more generally. We also discuss potential avenues for interventions aimed at preventing this bias among children and reducing this bias among adults.     

Mirror Neuron System and Mentalizing System connect during online social interaction

Two sets of brain areas are repeatedly reported in neuroimaging studies on social cognition: the Mirror Neuron System and the Mentalizing System. The Mirror System is involved in goal understanding and has been associated with several emotional and cognitive functions central to social interaction, ranging from empathy to gestural communication and imitation. The Mentalizing System is recruited in tasks requiring cognitive processes such as self-reference and understanding of other’s intentions. Although theoretical accounts for an interaction between the two systems have been proposed, little is known about their synergy during social exchanges. In order to explore this question, we have recorded brain activity by means of functional MRI during live social exchanges based on reciprocal imitation of hand gestures. Here, we investigate, using the method of psychophysiological interaction, the changes in functional connectivity of the Mirror System due to the conditions of interest (being imitated, imitating) compared with passive observation of hand gestures. We report a strong coupling between the Mirror System and the Mentalizing System during the imitative exchanges. Our findings suggest a complementary role of the two networks during social encounters. The Mirror System would engage in the preparation of own actions and the simulation of other’s actions, while the Mentalizing System would engage in the anticipation of the other’s intention and thus would participate to the co-regulation of reciprocal actions. Beyond a specific effect of imitation, the design used offers the opportunity to tackle the role of role-switching in an interpersonal account of social cognition.     

The Bilingual Therapist and Transference to Language: Language use in Therapy and its Relationship to Object Relational Context

Through the concept of transference to language, this paper examines the clinical impact of language-related selves of a bilingual therapist, the origin of which is based on the idea that language develops in an object relation context.     

The development of co-representation effects in a joint task: Do children represent a co-actor?

When two adults jointly perform a task, they often show interference effects whereby the other’s task interferes with their own performance (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). The current study investigated whether these co-representation effects can be observed in young children. This phenomenon can be used as a criterion for adult-like joint action in children, which has been under debate in existing literature due to the difficulty in identifying what mechanisms underlie the behaviours observed (Brownell, 2011). In Experiment 1, two children performed an adapted Bear Dragon task (Kochanska, Murray, Jacques, Koenig, & Vandegeest, 1996), where children were required to point to a picture when instructed to do so by one puppet and to inhibit pointing when instructed to by the other. In the Same Task condition, both children in a pair were asked to respond to the same puppet, whereas in the Different Task condition, they were asked to respond to different puppets. Children made more errors in the Different Task condition than the Same Task, suggesting that they were experiencing interference from their partner’s task rule. In Experiment 2 children in Different and Same task conditions began with the same task as in Experiment 1 and then switched which puppet to respond to. Switch costs were lower in the Different task condition, consistent with children having already represented the alternative task rule on behalf of their partner during the pre-switch phase. Experiment 3 replicated the effect of Task in a novel computer-based paradigm with children between 4 and 5 years, but not younger. These data provide the first direct evidence that children as young as 4 years co-represent a partner's task during a joint activity, and that younger children may not be capable of co-representation.     

A New Interpretation of the Weighted Kappa Coefficients

Reliability and agreement studies are of paramount importance. They do contribute to the quality of studies by providing information about the amount of error inherent to any diagnosis, score or measurement. Guidelines for reporting reliability and agreement studies were recently provided. While the use of the kappa-like family is advised for categorical and ordinal scales, no further guideline in the choice of a weighting scheme is given. In the present paper, a new simple and practical interpretation of the linear- and quadratic-weighted kappa coefficients is given. This will help researchers in motivating their choice of a weighting scheme.     

The Interplay of Parental Response to Anger,Adolescent Anger Regulation,and Externalizing and Internalizing Problems: A Longitudinal Study

Research on Child and Adolescent Psychopathology - Numerous studies have reported substantive correlations between anger socialization, children’s anger regulation, and...     

Social justifications for moral emotions: when reasons for disgust are less elaborated than for anger

In the present research, we tested the unreasoning disgust hypothesis: moral disgust, in particular in response to a violation of a bodily norm, is less likely than moral anger to be justified with cognitively elaborated reasons. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to explain why they felt anger and disgust toward pedophiles. Participants were more likely to invoke elaborated reasons, versus merely evaluative responses, when explaining their anger, versus disgust. Experiment 2 used a between-participants design; participants explained why they felt either anger or disgust toward seven groups that either violated a sexual or nonsexual norm. Again, elaborated reasons were less prevalent when explaining their disgust versus anger and, in particular, when explaining disgust toward a group that violated a sexual norm. Experiment 3 further established that these findings are due to a lower accessibility of elaborated reasons for bodily disgust, rather than inhibition in using them when provided. From these findings, it can be concluded that communicating external reasons for moral disgust at bodily violations is made more difficult due to the unavailability of those reasons to people.     

Moral anger, but not moral disgust, responds to intentionality

We propose that, when people judge moral situations, anger responds to the contextual cues of harm and intentionality. On the other hand, disgust responds uniquely to whether or not a bodily norm violation has occurred; its apparent response to harm and intent is entirely explained by the coactivation of anger. We manipulated intent, harm, and bodily norm violation (eating human flesh) within a vignette describing a scientific experiment. Participants then rated their anger, disgust, and moral judgment, as well as various appraisals. Anger responded independently of disgust to harm and intentionality, whereas disgust responded independently of anger only to whether or not the act violated the bodily norm of cannibalism. Theoretically relevant appraisals accounted for the effects of harm and intent on anger; however, appraisals of abnormality did not fully account for the effects of the manipulations on disgust. Our results show that anger and disgust are separately elicited by different cues in a moral situation.