Health-related behavioural change—a test of a new model

Abstract

Numerous studies have demonstrated that planned health education and health promotion interventions are not particularly successful in bringing about behavioural change. It is suggested that the reasons for this are the fallacious theoretical assumptions underlying many intervention strategies and the failure to place sufficient emphasis on the context in which health-related behaviours occur. Studies of self-initiated behavioural change suggest that the antecedents of change are often events or processes which bring a previously routinised and unremarked behaviour into new focus.

This paper describes a preliminary test of a new model of behavioural change in which a group of lay people were recruited to act as paid interviewers on a food survey in their own area. The survey was particularly concerned with the consumption of high fibre foods. he and post-test measures of the interviewers' own food habits as compared with those of a control group indicated modest support for the proposed model. Implications of this study for health education and promotion are discussed.     

The cognitive and hedonic costs of dwelling on achievement-related negative experiences: implications for enduring happiness and unhappiness

Increasing evidence suggests that multiple cognitive and motivational processes underlie individual differences in happiness (Lyubomirsky, 2001, 2008). One behavior that is associated with (un)happiness is self-reflection or dwelling. We hypothesized that unhappy individuals would be inclined to dwell about themselves, and that this behavior would have a variety of adverse consequences. Three studies tested the prediction that, unlike their happier peers, unhappy participants would be sensitive to unfavorable achievement feedback, likely to dwell about its implications and, hence, show impaired attention during important academic tasks. The results of Studies 1 and 2 showed that unhappy participants who had "failed" relative to peers subsequently displayed increased interfering thoughts; spent the most time performing a portion of the graduate record examination; and later demonstrated impaired reading comprehension. Study 3 experimentally induced versus inhibiting dwelling and found that the manipulation only impacted unhappy students. Implications of our results for the consequences of dwelling for work and social functioning, as well as for detracting from enduring happiness, are discussed.     

Religious Involvement, Psychosocial Resourcefulness, and Health

A stratified randomized sample of 525 middle age (35?C64?years old) men was used to study the relationships between self-reported level of church attendance (CA), self-reported religious faith (SRRF), religious well-being (RWB), existential well-being (EWB), self-actualization (SA), health, lifestyle, and participation in physical activity (PA). Religious measures (RWB, CA, and SRRF) were found to be dependent on psychosocial variables in terms of their relationships with PA, lifestyle, and health. On the other hand, psychosocial resourcefulness (SA, EWB, social support, and stress management) showed independent relationships with lifestyle, PA, and health. These findings indicate that the positive associations of psychological and sociological constructs with health are not related to or dependent upon ego syntonic religious identity.     

Contrasting effects of age of acquisition in lexical decision and letter detection

Two experiments studied attention in beginning and skilled readers of Dutch to letter information in function words and content words. Early and late acquired nouns and function words were presented to third-grade students and skilled adolescent readers. Target words were presented in short story contexts, as in the study of Greenberg, Koriat, and Vellutino (1998). Target nouns were matched on word frequency. Predictions of the structural account hypothesis of letter detection (Koriat, Greenberg, & Goldshmid, 1991) were confirmed. No age-of-acquisition effect was found. In contrast, a separately conducted lexical decision experiment using the same content word stimulus sets showed shorter decision latencies for early acquired words. The combined results suggest that during silent reading, when attention is focused on meaning, phonological processes may play a less prominent role than in lexical decision tasks that demand explicit control of phonological codes. The letter detection results confirmed predictions of the structural account hypothesis for both beginning and skilled readers. Taken together, these studies demonstrate that phonological processes in silent reading may play a less prominent role and that the structural account of letter processing is valid for languages other than Hebrew and English but probably is not the unique mechanism involved in letter detection.     

Characterization of music-evoked autobiographical memories

Despite music's prominence in Western society and its importance to individuals in their daily lives, very little is known about the memories and emotions that are often evoked when hearing a piece of music from one's past. We examined the content of music-evoked autobiographical memories (MEAMs) using a novel approach for selecting stimuli from a large corpus of popular music, in both laboratory and online settings. A set of questionnaires probed the cognitive and affective properties of the evoked memories. On average, 30% of the song presentations evoked autobiographical memories, and the majority of songs also evoked various emotions, primarily positive, that were felt strongly. The third most common emotion was nostalgia. Analyses of written memory reports found both general and specific levels of autobiographical knowledge to be represented, and several social and situational contexts for memory formation were common across many memories. The findings indicate that excerpts of popular music serve as potent stimuli for studying the structure of autobiographical memories.     

Is It Possible to Become Happier? (And If So,How?)

Although some theory suggests that it is impossible to increase one's subjective well-being (SWB), our 'sustainable happiness model' ( Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade, 2005 ) specifies conditions under which this may be accomplished. To illustrate the three classes of predictor in the model, we first review research on the demographic/circumstantial, temperament/personality, and intentional/experiential correlates of SWB. We then introduce the sustainable happiness model, which suggests that changing one's goals and activities in life is the best route to sustainable new SWB. However, the goals and activities must be of certain positive types, must fit one's personality and needs, must be practiced diligently and successfully, must be varied in their timing and enactment, and must provide a continued stream of fresh positive experiences. Research supporting the model is reviewed, including new research suggesting that happiness intervention effects are not just placebo effects.     

Keep ‘hoping’ for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox

We formalise a notion of dynamic rationality in terms of a logic of conditional beliefs on (doxastic) plausibility models. Similarly to other epistemic statements (e.g. negations of Moore sentences and of Muddy Children announcements), dynamic rationality changes its meaning after every act of learning, and it may become true after players learn it is false. Applying this to extensive games, we “simulate” the play of a game as a succession of dynamic updates of the original plausibility model: the epistemic situation when a given node is reached can be thought of as the result of a joint act of learning (via public announcements) that the node is reached. We then use the notion of “stable belief”, i.e. belief that is preserved during the play of the game, in order to give an epistemic condition for backward induction: rationality and common knowledge of stable belief in rationality. This condition is weaker than Aumann’s and compatible with the implicit assumptions (the “epistemic openness of the future”) underlying Stalnaker’s criticism of Aumann’s proof. The “dynamic” nature of our concept of rationality explains why our condition avoids the apparent circularity of the “backward induction paradox”: it is consistent to (continue to) believe in a player’s rationality after updating with his irrationality.