Toward a Perceptual Account of Mindreading

A number of philosophers argue that consistent with the phenomenology of everyday mindreading, appropriately endowed observers are sometimes able to visually perceive that someone is angry. Call this view the Perceptual Account of Mindreading (PA). The paper starts by exploring the merits and limits of the main strategies that have been employed to defend PA. The second aim is to present and defend a version of PA, according to which some mental properties can be observational properties. Providing support for this thesis includes a shift of focus to properties presented in perceptual experience and a systematic examination of a body of recent empirical material on animacy perception and visual aftereffects.     

Defining mental disorder. Exploring the 'natural function' approach

Due to several socio-political factors, to many psychiatrists only a strictly objective definition of mental disorder, free of value components, seems really acceptable. In this paper, I will explore a variant of such an objectivist approach to defining metal disorder, natural function objectivism. Proponents of this approach make recourse to the notion of natural function in order to reach a value-free definition of mental disorder. The exploration of Christopher Boorse's 'biostatistical' account of natural function (1) will be followed an investigation of the 'hybrid naturalism' approach to natural functions by Jerome Wakefield (2). In the third part, I will explore two proposals that call into question the whole attempt to define mental disorder (3). I will conclude that while 'natural function objectivism' accounts fail to provide the backdrop for a reliable definition of mental disorder, there is no compelling reason to conclude that a definition cannot be achieved.     

Demarcating the Realm of Cognition

The Extended Mind Hypothesis has given rise to stimulating philosophical debates about the boundaries of the realm of the cognitive. This paper first investigates the usefulness of a “mark of the cognitive,” and then focuses on two accounts that aim to provide such a mark, put forward by Fred Adams and Rebecca Garrison on one side and Mark Rowlands on the other. The paper provides a critical assessment of these accounts and uses empirical work on emotion regulation in infants to unearth some crucial challenges that any attempt at offering a mark of the cognitive should address.     

Autonomous Self-Expression and Meritocratic Dignity

While “dignity” plays an increasingly important role in contemporary moral and political debates, there is profound dispute over its definition, meaning, and normative function. Instead of concluding that dignity’s elusiveness renders it useless, or that it signals its fundamental character, this paper focuses on illuminating one particular strand of meritocratic dignity. It introduces a number of examples and conceptual distinctions and argues that there is a specific strand of “expressive” meritocratic dignity that is not connected to holding a special office or rank, but that is ascribed to individuals who are able to engage in autonomous self-expression.