Book reviews

Horowitz, M. J. (Ed.) (1988). Psychodynamics and cognition. Chicago: University of Chicago press. Pp. 389. ISBN 0226-35368-0. £ 21.95

Ellis A. W. & Young, A. W. (1988). Human cognitive neuropsychology. Hove: Lawrencve erlbaum Associates Ltd. Pp. 358. ISBN 0-86377-033-9, £ 21.95 9 (hardback), 0-86377-034-7, £ 11.95 (paperback).

Humphreys, G. W., & Bruce, V.(1989). Visual cognition: Computational, experimental and neuropsychological perspectives. Hove & London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd. Pp. 330. ISBN 0-86277-124-6, £ 19.95 (hardback), 0-86377-125-4, £ 9.95 (paperback)     

On the Control Over Stereotype Activation and Stereotype Inhibition

Stereotypes are known to influence how we think about (judge, feel, plan, attend to, remember), and act toward, others. Stereotyping is typically described as pervasive in society for a variety of reasons, one of which being that the cognitive processes that initiate stereotyping occur effortlessly, without conscious intent, and without awareness. That is, upon encountering members of stereotyped groups, we ‘uncontrollably’ have stereotypes of those groups retrieved and held accessible in a state of perceptual readiness. This occurs without our knowledge or awareness of the stereotype’s ‘primed’ status, and thus our lacking awareness of its potential to influence how we respond. The current article explores various ways this implicit process of stereotype activation is controlled. Despite the fact that stereotype activation happens with ease, and outside of awareness, control processes also operate with ease, and outside of awareness. The review illustrates a variety of ways in which a stereotype may not be triggered (and thus downstream stereotyping of a person controlled) upon encountering a person. The dominant response to a person, stereotypic or not, is determined by the goals the individual perceiver has upon entering the interpersonal encounter. Many goals relevant to interpersonal interaction promote stereotyping. However, stereotype promotion is a form of stereotype control, and if control can be exhibited in the form of promotion, it should also be demonstrable in the form of prevention. Indeed, goals that are incompatible with stereotyping yield dominant responses to having encountered a member of a stereotyped group that does not involve activation of, and may involve inhibition of, stereotypes.     

Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief

An analytic cognitive style denotes a propensity to set aside highly salient intuitions when engaging in problem solving. We assess the hypothesis that an analytic cognitive style is associated with a history of questioning, altering, and rejecting (i.e., unbelieving) supernatural claims, both religious and paranormal. In two studies, we examined associations of God beliefs, religious engagement (attendance at religious services, praying, etc.), conventional religious beliefs (heaven, miracles, etc.) and paranormal beliefs (extrasensory perception, levitation, etc.) with performance measures of cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. An analytic cognitive style negatively predicted both religious and paranormal beliefs when controlling for cognitive ability as well as religious engagement, sex, age, political ideology, and education. Participants more willing to engage in analytic reasoning were less likely to endorse supernatural beliefs. Further, an association between analytic cognitive style and religious engagement was mediated by religious beliefs, suggesting that an analytic cognitive style negatively affects religious engagement via lower acceptance of conventional religious beliefs. Results for types of God belief indicate that the association between an analytic cognitive style and God beliefs is more nuanced than mere acceptance and rejection, but also includes adopting less conventional God beliefs, such as Pantheism or Deism. Our data are consistent with the idea that two people who share the same cognitive ability, education, political ideology, sex, age and level of religious engagement can acquire very different sets of beliefs about the world if they differ in their propensity to think analytically.     

Intergroup disgust sensitivity as a predictor of islamophobia: The modulating effect of fear

The present research investigated whether intergroup disgust sensitivity (ITG-DS) predicts greater Islamophobia, and whether this positive association is modulated (strengthened or weakened) by the experience of concurrent incidental non-disgust emotions (fear, sadness, anger, happiness). In Study 1 (N = 225) participants completed measures of ITG-DS (an emotionally charged individual difference variable reflecting heightened tendency to experience disgust and revulsion reactions toward ethnic outgroup encounters) and dispositional measures of fear, sadness, anger, and happiness. Results revealed that among those experiencing greater (vs. lower) fear or sadness, the positive relation between ITG-DS and Islamophobia was significantly stronger. In Study 2 (N = 174), fear, sadness, and happiness were experimentally induced. Among those induced to experience fear, the positive relation between ITG-DS and prejudice toward Muslims was significantly strengthened relative to control. Overall, specific negative emotions, especially fear, interacted with individual differences in intergroup-relevant disgust sensitivity to inform outgroup evaluations.     

Stoicism and Sensation Seeking: Male Vulnerabilities for the Acquired Capability for Suicide

Our aim was to investigate two personality traits (i.e., stoicism and sensation seeking) that may account for well-established gender differences in suicide, within the framework of the interpersonal theory of suicide. This theory proposes that acquired capability for suicide, a construct comprised of pain insensitivity and fearlessness about death, explains gender differences in suicide. Across two samples of undergraduates (N = 185 and N = 363), men demonstrated significantly greater levels of both facets of acquired capability than women. Further, we found that stoicism accounted for the relationship between gender and pain insensitivity, and sensation seeking accounted for the relationship between gender and fearlessness about death. Thus, personality may be one psychological mechanism accounting for gender differences in suicidal behavior.     

Post-stop-signal slowing: strategies dominate reflexes and implicit learning

Control adjustments are necessary to balance competing cognitive demands. One task that is well-suited to explore control adjustments is the stop-signal paradigm, in which subjects must balance initiation and inhibition. One common adjustment in the stop-signal paradigm is post-stop-signal slowing. Existing models of sequential adjustments in the stop-signal paradigm suggest that post-stop-signal slowing may be based solely on the events of the previous trial, suggesting that post-stop-signal slowing is a reflexive byproduct of a stop signal. Alternatively, post-stop-signal slowing could be the result of implicit learning or strategic adjustment. The authors report three experiments that manipulated the probability of stop trial repetition and found that these contingencies eliminate, reverse, or greatly increase post-stop-signal slowing. When the contingency was not instructed or cued, modest adjustments of post-stop-signal slowing occurred, suggesting implicit learning. When the contingency was cued, performance adjustments occurred on the next trial, suggesting that strategies dominated post-stop-signal slowing. These results show that post-stop-signal slowing is not a reflexive byproduct of the stop signal. The large changes in strategy accompany large changes in task factors, suggesting that the modest post-stop-signal slowing usually observed may be a result of the relatively static task environment that does not encourage large strategic changes.