Bridging the gap: Causality-at-a-distance in children's categorization and inferences about internal properties

Previous research has shown that preschoolers extend labels and internal properties of objects based on those objects’ causal properties, even when the causal properties conflict with the objects’ perceptual appearance [Nazzi, T., & Gopnik, A. (2000). A shift in children's use of perceptual and causal cues to categorization. Developmental Science, 3, 389–396; Sobel, D. M., Yoachim, C. M., Gopnik, A., Meltzoff, A. N., & Blumenthal, E. J. (2007). The blicket within: Preschoolers’ inferences about insides and causes. Journal of Cognition and Development, 8, 159–182]. These studies, however, only presented causal relations that acted on contact. In two studies, contact causality was replaced by distance causality. In contrast to the contact causality case, 4- and 5-year-olds extended labels to objects with similar perceptual properties over objects with similar causal properties when those properties acted at a distance. When children were asked to make inferences about object's internal properties, they were more likely to make causal responses, with 5-year-olds doing so to a greater extent than 4-year-olds. In a second study, 4-year-olds registered causal properties that acted at a distance and used them to make inferences when no perceptual conflict was present. These results support a hypothesis that young children develop an understanding of the specific mechanisms that link causal relations.     

Training in clinical child psychology: doing it right

Discusses (a) what roles the specialty of clinical child psychology fulfills and how societal and professional changes have enhanced the need for the specialty, (b) how the field defines itself, (c) how models of training are conceptualized for the specialty, and (d) how some training programs implement specialty training with broad, interdisciplinary components. Clinical child psychology is a professional field of research and practice that, when adequate training is provided, properly deserves a places as a specialty. The dangers of overspecialization and narrowness are more likely present in traditional clinical (adult) psychology than in clinical child psychology, especially when the clinical child training is done in a broadly comprehensive and integrated manner.     

A subset selection technique for scoring items on a multiple choice test

On a multiple-choice test in which each item hask alternative responses, the test taker is permitted to choose any subset which he believes contains the one correct answer. A scoring system is devised that depends on the size of the subset and on whether or not the correct answer is eliminated. The mean and variance of the score per item are obtained. Methods are derived for determining the total number of items that should be included on the test so that the average score on all items can be regarded as a good measure of the subject's knowledge. Efficiency comparisons between conventional and the subset selection scoring procedures are made. The analogous problem ofr > 1 correct answers for each item (withr fixed and known) is also considered.The authors are grateful to M. Aitkin, C. Coombs, F. Lord, and the reviewers for their comments and suggestions.     

Risky assessments: participant suicidality and distress associated with research assessments in a treatment study of suicidal behavior

The purpose of this study was to examine patterns of self-reported suicidality and distress during research assessments in a sample of 63 women meeting criteria for borderline personality disorder and current and chronic suicidality. The risk management protocol we used during the two-year study period (University of Washington Risk Assessment Protocol; UWRAP) is described. Results indicated that changes in suicidality following assessments were small and relatively infrequent, and were just as likely to reflect decreases in suicidality as increases (17.5% versus 16.4% of sessions, respectively). Further, longitudinal analyses indicated that changes in suicidality became increasingly rare over the course of the 2-year study. Ratings of distress were more changeable than suicidality, underscoring the need for separate measurement of these constructs when assessing risk. With the aid of the UWRAP, our assessors judged 15 participants as high-risk status in 28 assessment sessions (3.7% of all sessions). In comparison to the rest of the sample, these individuals were of significantly greater clinical severity as measured by the HRSD 17-item, GAF scores, number and severity of previous suicide attempts, and number of previous psychiatric hospitalizations. Low-intensity risk intervention strategies (e.g., validating participant's feelings) were typically sufficient to reduce risk in these participants. Overall, our findings indicate that research with highly suicidal individuals can be done safely with the use of well-trained assessors and an appropriate crisis management protocol.     

Blickets and babies: the development of causal reasoning in toddlers and infants

Previous research has suggested that preschoolers possess a cognitive system that allows them to construct an abstract, coherent representation of causal relations among events. Such a system lets children reason retrospectively when they observe ambiguous data in a rational manner (e.g., D. M. Sobel, J. B. Tenenbaum, & A. Gopnik, 2004). However, there is little evidence that demonstrates whether younger children possess similar inferential abilities. In Experiment 1, the authors extended previous findings with older children to examine 19- and 24-month-olds' causal inferences. Twenty-four-month-olds' inferences were similar to those of preschoolers, but younger children lacked the ability to make retrospective causal inferences, perhaps because of performance limitations. In Experiment 2, the authors designed an eye-tracking paradigm to test younger participants that eliminated various manual search demands. Eight-month-olds' anticipatory eye movements, in response to retrospective data, revealed inferences similar to those of 24-month-olds in Experiment 1 and preschoolers in previous research. These data are discussed in terms of associative reasoning and causal inference.     

Can You Do It? How Preschoolers Judge Whether Others Have Learned

Two experiments investigated how preschoolers judge whether learning has occurred. Experiment 1 showed that 3- and 4-year-olds used an individual's ability to demonstrate knowledge to judge whether he/she had learned something, regardless of that individual's claim about whether he/she had learned. Experiment 2 considered whether children responded based on just the character's demonstrative ability or whether children integrate various pieces of mental state knowledge to make a judgment about learning. Using a similar procedure, preschoolers were first told that the character claimed to be ignorant and then that they learned or did not learn a piece of information. In these cases, judgments of learning changed when the characters' claims and demonstrative abilities conflicted. These results suggest that children's understanding of learning involves the integration of various pieces of mental state knowledge. This process starts in the preschool years, but these data also suggest that crucial developments are taking place after age 4.     

Children’s developing understanding of the relation between variable causal efficacy and mechanistic complexity

Two experiments investigated 3–4-year-olds’ ability to infer the causal mechanisms for a pair of lights. In both experiments the exterior of the two lights appeared identical. In Experiment 1, one light displayed a stable activation pattern of a single color while the other light displayed a variable pattern of activation by cycling through a series of different colors (i.e., a more varied effect). Children were asked to judge which light had a more complex internal structure. Four-year-olds were more likely to match the light with the more variable effect with a more complex internal mechanism and the light with the more stable effect with a less complex mechanism. Three-year-olds’ responses were at chance. Experiment 2 replicated this finding when the activation patterns of the two lights were described verbally but never demonstrated. Taken together, these results suggest that 4-year-olds appreciate that the variability of an object’s causal efficacy is related to the complexity of its internal mechanistic structure.     

Adolescent suicide and defensive style.

This empirical study investigated the relation between ego defense mechanisms, diagnoses, and suicidality among 200 adolescent psychiatric patients ages 12 to 16 years. Based on a structured diagnostic interview, adolescents were divided into three groups: suicide attempters, suicidal ideators, and nonsuicidal patients. Using the Defense Mechanisms Inventory (DMI), suicidal adolescents scored higher on the defense of turning-against-self and lower on reversal, as compared to nonsuicidal adolescents. Although suicide was significantly more common among adolescents with an affective disorder, turning-against-self remained significantly associated with suicide attempt even when diagnosis was controlled for. Results demonstrate the importance of defense mechanisms in understanding adolescent suicidal behavior.     

An associative model of geometry learning: a modified choice rule

In a recent article, the authors (Miller & Shettleworth, 2007) showed how the apparently exceptional features of behavior in geometry learning ("reorientation") experiments can be modeled by assuming that geometric and other features at given locations in an arena are learned competitively as in the Rescorla-Wagner model and that the probability of visiting a location is proportional to the total associative strength of cues at that location relative to that of all relevant locations. Reinforced or unreinforced visits to locations drive changes in associative strengths. Dawson, Kelly, Spetch, and Dupuis (2008) have correctly pointed out that at parameter values outside the ranges the authors used to simulate a body of real experiments, our equation for choice probabilities can give impossible and/or wildly fluctuating results. Here, the authors show that a simple modification of the choice rule eliminates this problem while retaining the transparent way in which the model relates spatial choice to competitive associative learning of cue values.