Lion Kings or puppies: the influence of fantasy on children’s understanding of pretense

Many have thought that children have an early appreciation of the mind in the case of pretend play. Results from several experiments are against this. However, an experiment by Lillard (Body or mind: children’s categorizing of pretense, Child Development, 67 (1996), 1717-1734, Experiment 4) suggested that when a pretense is about a fantasy character, instead of a real entity, children might have a better understanding of the mind’s involvement. The present experiment tested this, and found that indeed, when pretending to be a fantasy character is at issue, 4-year-olds are significantly more apt to indicate the mind’s involvement. Several possible reasons for this result are discussed.     

How context influences predominance during binocular rivalry

Variations in the predominance of an object engaged in binocular rivalry may arise from variations in the durations of dominance phases, suppression phases, or both. Earlier work has shown that the predominance of a binocular rival target is enhanced if that target fits well-via common color, orientation, or motion-with its surrounding objects. In the present experiments, the global context outside of the region of rivalry was changed during rivalry, to learn whether contextual information alters the ability to detect changes in a suppressed target itself. Results indicate that context will maintain the dominance of a rival target, but will not encourage a suppressed target to escape from suppression. Evidently, the fate of the suppressed stimulus is determined by neural events distinct from those responsible for global organization during dominance. To reconcile diverse findings concerning rivalry, it may be important to distinguish between processes responsible for selection of one eye's input for dominance from processes responsible for the implementation and maintenance of suppression.     

Causal learning mechanisms in very young children: two-, three-, and four-year-olds infer causal relations from patterns of variation and covariation

Three studies investigated whether young children make accurate causal inferences on the basis of patterns of variation and covariation. Children were presented with a new causal relation by means of a machine called the "blicket detector." Some objects, but not others, made the machine light up and play music. In the first 2 experiments, children were told that "blickets make the machine go" and were then asked to identify which objects were "blickets." Two-, 3-, and 4-year-old children were shown various patterns of variation and covariation between two different objects and the activation of the machine. All 3 age groups took this information into account in their causal judgments about which objects were blickets. In a 3rd experiment, 3- and 4-year-old children used the information when they were asked to make the machine stop. These results are related to Bayes-net causal graphical models of causal learning.     

Individual differences in working memory capacity and visual search: The roles of top-down and bottom-up processing

Individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) have been implicated in a variety of top-down, attention-control tasks: Higher WMC subjects better ignore irrelevant distractions and withhold habitual responses than do lower WMC subjects. Kane, Poole, Tuholski, and Engle (2006) recently attempted to extend these findings to visual search, but found no relation between WMC and search efficiency, even in difficult tasks yielding steep search slopes. Here we used a visual search task that isolated the contributions of top-down versus bottom-up mechanisms, and induced a habitual response via expectation. Searches that relied primarily on bottom-up mechanisms did not vary with WMC, but searches that relied primarily on top-down mechanisms showed an advantage for higher over lower WMC subjects.     

Which one made it go? The emergence of diagnostic reasoning in preschoolers

We evaluate the hypothesis that children's diagnostic causal reasoning becomes more sophisticated as their understanding of uncertainty advances. When the causal status of candidate causes was known, 3- and 4-year-olds were capable of diagnostic inference (Experiment 1) and could revise their beliefs when told their initial diagnosis was incorrect (Experiment 2). In Experiments 3 and 4, only 4-year-olds made successful inferences when the causal status of candidate causes was uncertain. The results suggest that by age 3, children appreciate that an effect can have multiple candidate causes, but it is not until age 4 that they begin to reason correctly when the causal status of candidate causes is unknown.     

“They Danced Around in My Head and I Learned Them”: Children's Developing Conceptions of Learning

Two studies examined how 3–6-year-olds understand the process of learning. In study 1 examined how children spontaneously talk about learning via a CHILDES language analysis. Talk about the learning process increased between the ages of 3–5. Talk specifically about learning in terms of desire decreased during this period. This suggests the possibility that desire is important to children's initial understanding of learning, and children develop an understanding that various mental states including desire, attention, and intention, play a role in the learning process. In Study 2, we presented 4- and 6-year-olds with a set of stories designed to test their understanding of the role of these mental states. In both their judgments about whether someone learns and their justifications of their responses, younger children relied more on the character's desires whereas older children were more likely to integrate desire, attention, and intention together. These data suggest that children's understanding of the process of learning is developing during the early elementary school years.     

Fostering Children’s Reasoning about Disagreements through an Inquiry-based Curriculum

ABSTRACT

We investigated how young children evaluate disagreements between two people and whether formal education affects this capacity. We compared 120 first graders tested during the 2014–2015 academic year, who received a direct instruction-based curriculum, with 112 first graders tested in the same school system during the 2016–2017 academic year, who received an inquiry-based curriculum. All children were given a belief reasoning task that tested their ability to evaluate disagreements about matters of fact, matters of interpretation, and matters of preference. Children’s evaluations of disagreements about interpretations or preferences did not differ depending on curriculum. Children who received an inquiry-based curriculum were more likely to resolve disagreements concerning facts correctly than children who received a direct instruction-based curriculum. When asked to justify their responses to disagreements about facts, children who received the inquiry-based curriculum relied more on an examination of the state of the world. We suggest that an inquiry-based curriculum fosters a greater appreciation for how first-hand experiences can create knowledge.     

Preschoolers’ Compliance With Others’ Violations of Fairness Norms: The Roles of Intentionality and Affective Perspective Taking

ABSTRACT

Young children are remarkably compliant with social norms, especially those governing fairness and equality. Yet children also frequently observe and face opportunities to violate those social norms, particularly in situations in which doing so is self-beneficial. In 3 studies, we investigated the conditions under which children adhere to social norms using a novel resource distribution paradigm in which children met an experimenter who expressed either a norm-consistent (equal distribution) or norm-inconsistent (unequal distribution) intention. In Experiment 1, we found that preschoolers generally complied with an experimenter’s intention, regardless of its norm consistency. In Experiment 2, the experimenter again expressed a norm-consistent or norm-inconsistent intention but accidentally placed resources in the opposite distribution of that intended. Preschoolers mostly defaulted to the social norm of fairness. However, they were less likely to do so (and more likely to comply with the norm-violating experimenter) when the inequality was self-benefitting. The likelihood of norm defiance in the face of self-benefit appeared to relate to children’s affective perspective taking. In Experiment 3, we found that training preschoolers in affective perspective taking increased the likelihood children would defy a norm-violating experimenter’s unfair intention. Thus, although preschoolers were generally compliant, both fairness norms and affective perspective taking served as important mechanisms to help children selectively defy adults’ instructions and intentions.     

Bridging the gap: Causality-at-a-distance in children's categorization and inferences about internal properties

Previous research has shown that preschoolers extend labels and internal properties of objects based on those objects’ causal properties, even when the causal properties conflict with the objects’ perceptual appearance [Nazzi, T., & Gopnik, A. (2000). A shift in children's use of perceptual and causal cues to categorization. Developmental Science, 3, 389–396; Sobel, D. M., Yoachim, C. M., Gopnik, A., Meltzoff, A. N., & Blumenthal, E. J. (2007). The blicket within: Preschoolers’ inferences about insides and causes. Journal of Cognition and Development, 8, 159–182]. These studies, however, only presented causal relations that acted on contact. In two studies, contact causality was replaced by distance causality. In contrast to the contact causality case, 4- and 5-year-olds extended labels to objects with similar perceptual properties over objects with similar causal properties when those properties acted at a distance. When children were asked to make inferences about object's internal properties, they were more likely to make causal responses, with 5-year-olds doing so to a greater extent than 4-year-olds. In a second study, 4-year-olds registered causal properties that acted at a distance and used them to make inferences when no perceptual conflict was present. These results support a hypothesis that young children develop an understanding of the specific mechanisms that link causal relations.