The Process of Family Reconstruction after DNA Testing for Huntington Disease

The needs of families to reconstruct their relationships in response to the DNA testing for Huntington disease of one or more of their asymptomatic members are presented. Data were collected from family interviews with 18 families, and from their responses on a post interview questionnaire. Findings are that families need to (a) address unfinished business associated with the decision for testing; (b) bring family members, peripheral in the decision for testing, into the loop; (c) reorganize patterns of communication and roles altered by the testing and heal ruptures in family membership; and (d) revise family stories about illness to provide a meaning for HD and explain the test results in a way that leaves them with a sense of mastery. Findings suggest that families should be more involved in the initial decision for testing of a member and that protocols should be established to provide help for their ongoing adjustment.     

Neural synergy between kinetic vision and touch

Ambiguous visual information often produces unstable visual perception. In four psychophysical experiments, we found that unambiguous tactile information about the direction of rotation of a globe whose three-dimensional structure is ambiguous significantly influences visual perception of the globe. This disambiguation of vision by touch occurs only when the two modalities are stimulated concurrently, however. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we discovered that touching the rotating globe, even when not looking at it, reliably activates the middle temporal visual area (MT+), a brain region commonly thought to be crucially involved in registering structure from motion. Considered together, our results show that the brain draws on somatosensory information to resolve visual conflict.     

Hume's Utilitarian Theory of Right Action

A theory of right action is implicit in Hume's delineation of the virtues. It gives qualified priority to 'rules of justice' as Hume's remarks on 'that species of utility which attends this virtue' require. It is a useful actual-rule, not an ideal possible-rule, purely utilitarian theory that discounts rules of justice in 'extraordinary cases', has a problem when rules conflict, and invites the question 'Why not hark directly to the supreme law of utility in every case?'. It does not reflect contractarian considerations of mutuality of interests evident in Hume's texts, which while sometimes relevant to what is reasonable, are in his view never also relevant to what is moral.     

Lies,lies, and more lies: A plea for propositions

To resolve putative liar paradoxes it is sufficient to attend to the distinction between liar-sentences and the propositions they would express, and to exercise the option of turning would-be deductions of paradox (of contradictions) into reductios of the existence of those propositions. Defending the coherence of particular resolutions along these lines, leads to recognition of the non-extensionality of some liarsentences. In particular, it turns out that exchanges of terms for identicals in the open-sentence — does not expression a true proposition are not invariably truth-preserving because they are not invariably proposition-expression preserving. All of this recommends propositions as fruitful subjects of interesting renewed research.     

Children's beliefs about the fantasy/reality status of hypothesized machines

Four-year-olds, 6-year-olds, and adults were asked to make judgments about the reality status of four different types of machines: real machines that children and adults interact with on a daily basis, real machines that children and adults interact with rarely (if at all), and impossible machines that violated a real-world physical or biological causal law. Adults generally categorized all of the machines accurately. Both groups of children categorized familiar possible machines as real, but were agnostic as to the fantasy status of unfamiliar possible machines. Children generally responded that both kinds of impossible machines were make-believe, but 4-year-olds were more likely to make these accurate judgments for the physical than biological items, different from the older children and adults (whose responses were similar). These data suggest that children's judgments about the possibility of machines are not strictly limited by first-hand experience. Young children's domain-specific causal knowledge interacts with their understanding of the fantasy/reality distinction to constrain their inferences in a rational way.     

Rationales in children’s causal learning from others’ actions

Shown commensurate actions and information by an adult, preschoolers’ causal learning was influenced by the pedagogical context in which these actions occurred. Four-year-olds who were provided with a reason for an experimenter’s action relevant to learning causal structure showed more accurate causal learning than children exposed to the same action and data accompanied by an inappropriate rationale or accompanied by no explanatory information. These results suggest that children’s accurate causal learning is influenced by contextual factors that specify the instructional value of others’ actions.     

Non-dominance,third person and non-action Newcomb problems,and metatickles

It is plausible that Newcomb problems in which causal maximizers and evidential maximizers would do different things would not be possible for ideal maximizers who are attentive to metatickles. An objection to Eells's first argument for this makes welcome a second. Against it I argue that even ideal evidential and causal maximizers would do different things in some non-dominance Newcomb problems; and that they would hope for different things in some third-person and non-action problems, which is relevant if a good theory of rational choices of acts should fit smoothly into a good theory of rational desires for facts.This paper elaborates on Section V of Sobel. forthcoming.