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51.
A scale assessing generalized false self‐perceptions (Perceptions of False Self, POFS) was developed and tested across three studies involving a total of 331 adolescents (11–16 years). In Study 1, interviews were conducted to develop items for the scale. In Study 2, psychometric techniques were used to derive a scale composed of 16 items. Study 2 also assessed the validity of the scale: depressive symptoms were found to increase POFS across 10 weeks, whereas false self‐perceptions had a reciprocal effect on anxiety. In Study 3, the convergent validity of the POFS scale was established. Overall, the evidence suggests that the POFS scale is a reliable and valid measure of generalized false self‐perceptions. 相似文献
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STONE L 《The Psychoanalytic quarterly》1951,20(2):215-236
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Angela M. Smith 《Journal of applied philosophy》2015,32(2):115-132
There is an apparent tension in our everyday moral responsibility practices. On the one hand, it is commonly assumed that moral responsibility requires voluntary control: an agent can be morally responsible only for those things that fall within the scope of her voluntary control. On the other hand, we regularly praise and blame individuals for mental states and conditions that appear to fall outside the scope of their voluntary control, such as desires, emotions, beliefs, and other attitudes. In order to resolve this apparent tension, many philosophers appeal to a tracing principle to argue that agents are morally responsible (only) for those attitudes whose existence can be traced back, causally, to a voluntary action or omission in the past. My aim in this article is to critically evaluate this tracing strategy and to argue that it gives us a misguided picture of when and why we are morally responsible for our attitudes. I argue that we should accept a ‘judgment sensitivity’ condition of moral responsibility rather than a ‘voluntary control’ condition, and defend this account against various objections. 相似文献
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