A Taxonomy of Part-Whole Relations

A taxonomy of part-whole or meronymic relations is developed to explain the ordinary English-speaker's use of the term “part of” and its cognates. The resulting classification yields six types of meronymic relations: 1. component-integral object (pedal-bike), 2. member-collection (ship-fleet), 3. portion-mass (slice-pie), 4. stuff-object (steel-car), 5. feature-activity (paying-shopping), and 6. place-area (Everglades-Florida). Meronymic relations ore further distinguished from other inclusion relations, such as spatial inclusion, and class inclusion, and from several other semantic relations: attribution, attachment, and ownership. This taxonomy is then used to explain cases of apparent intransitivity in merological syllogisms, and standard form syllogisms whose premises express different inclusion relations. The data suggest that intransitivities arise due to equivocations between different types of semantic relations. These results are then explained by means of the relation element theory which accounts for the character and behavior of semantic relations in terms of more primitive relational elements. The inferential phenomena observed are then explained by means of a single principle of element matching.     

Attitudes,Tracing, and Control

There is an apparent tension in our everyday moral responsibility practices. On the one hand, it is commonly assumed that moral responsibility requires voluntary control: an agent can be morally responsible only for those things that fall within the scope of her voluntary control. On the other hand, we regularly praise and blame individuals for mental states and conditions that appear to fall outside the scope of their voluntary control, such as desires, emotions, beliefs, and other attitudes. In order to resolve this apparent tension, many philosophers appeal to a tracing principle to argue that agents are morally responsible (only) for those attitudes whose existence can be traced back, causally, to a voluntary action or omission in the past. My aim in this article is to critically evaluate this tracing strategy and to argue that it gives us a misguided picture of when and why we are morally responsible for our attitudes. I argue that we should accept a ‘judgment sensitivity’ condition of moral responsibility rather than a ‘voluntary control’ condition, and defend this account against various objections.     

The Public and Private Use of Consensus-Raising Excuses

ABSTRACT Two experiments tested the proposition that people use consensus-raising excuses more in private than in public when the audience has information that could refute subjects' claims about others In Experiment 1, subjects received success or failure feedback and made public or private attributions to ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck In Experiment 2, subjects received positive or negative feedback and evaluated themselves and others on the trait Task difficulty attributions and evaluations of others are consensus-raising measures Consistent with our hypothesis, subjects receiving negative feedback in Experiment 1 claimed that the task was more difficult, and in Experiment 2 evaluated the other more negatively in private than in public.     

Socializing Attribution: Generalization to “Real” Social Environments1

Social status variables have been shown to influence attributional judgments, but their effects have been demonstrated almost entirely in experimental settings. The influence of such statuses in experimental settings may differ from their influence in natural settings. We examined the influence on attributional judgments of the status characteristics of both subjects and actors in conjunction with variations in the degree of “real world” characteristics of both subjects and social context. These comparisons were drawn through a partial replication of earlier research investigating the effects of a social status variable, victim sex, and a situational variable—type of assault—on attributions about an assault victim. The social status characteristic, victim sex, had less influence on attributions in an adult juror sample than in a student sample and testimony-related characteristics were more influential in the adult juror sample than in the student sample. Thus, the categories of variables that influence attributions appear to depend on the context of judgment and on the breadth of subjects' life experience. These findings are discussed and we conclude with the caution that careful identification of the differences produced by context and subject characteristics is necessary to support generalization of laboratory-based research.     

From appraisal to emotion: Differences among unpleasant feelings

Recent research has indicated strong relations between people's appraisals of their circumstances and their emotional states. The present study examined these relations across a range of unpleasant situations in which subjects experienced complex emotional blends. Subjects recalled unpleasant experiences from their pasts that were associated with particular appraisals and described their appraisals and emotions during these experiences. Situations defined by particular appraisals along the human agency or situational control dimensions were reliably associated with different levels of anger, sadness, and guilt, as predicted. However, predicted differences in emotion were not observed for situations selected for appraisals along the certainty or attention dimensions. Most subjects reported experiencing blends of two or more emotions, and correlation/regression analyses indicated that even in the context of these blends, patterns of appraisal similar to those observed previously (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987) characterized the experience of the individual emotions. The regressions further indicated that appraisals along some dimensions were more important to the experience of particular emotions than were appraisals along other dimensions. Thesecentral appraisals are compared with the adaptive functions their associated emotions are believed to serve, and the implications of these findings are discussed.This research was supported in part by a Stanford University graduate fellowship and in part by a National Institute of Mental Health training grant to Craig Smith. Part of the writing was done while Phoebe Ellsworth was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and by the James McKeen Cattell Fund.     

Does spreading activation summate?

Summary Network models of semantic memory assume implicitly or explicitly that the degree of activation of a node is a monotonic function of the total amount of excitation reaching that node from all sources. For example, the activation level of the node representing apple should be greater if it is receiving excitation due to the activation of the nodes for fruit and pear than if only one of these neighboring nodes is activated. This notion was tested by presenting semantic primes 80 ms or 320 ms before a letter string (e.g., apple or ipple) requiring a lexical decision. The prime stimuli consisted of a pair of simultaneous items that were identical in the single prime condition (e.g., fruit/fruit or pear/pear) or different in the double prime condition (e.g., fruit/pear or pear/fruit), and were either related (target = apple) or unrelated (target = copper) to the target, or neutral. As predicted by the summation of semantic activation assumption of network models there was a larger priming effect (in the 320 ms SOA condition) following the simultaneous activation of two related nodes than following the activation of only one node.This research was supported by grants to the first author from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada.     

The masculinity—Irrationality relationship explored: Searching for a common denominator

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relative empirical support for two alternative ways of interpreting the relationship between masculinity and irrationality. The common denominator in this particular relationship was theoretically assumed to either reflect a person's locus of control expectations or his/her level of self-esteem.Two separate empirical studies were performed with groups of undergraduate university students. Both studies replicated earlier results, thus supporting the masculinity hypothesis as the one accounting for the relationship between sex-role orientation and irrationality.Of the two possible common denominators explaining this relationship, level of self-esteem was the one receiving the strongest empirical support. Some interesting gender differences concerning these two possible common denominators were also found.Ole Johan Hovland, Cand.paed., is Assistant professor of Personality Assessment at the Department of Personality Psychology, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway, and maintains a small private practice in Laksevåg, Bergen, Norway. FranÇoise De Lange Alsaker, Cand.psychol., is a Research fellow in the field of personality development at the Department of Personality Psychology, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway. Fred Vollmer, Mag.art., is Senior Lecturer in personality psychology at the University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway.