Counterexamples in sentential reasoning

How do logically naive individuals determine that an inference is invalid? In logic, there are two ways to proceed: (1) make an exhaustive search but fail to find a proof of the conclusion and (2) use the interpretation of the relevant sentences to construct a counterexample—that is, a possibility consistent with the premises but inconsistent with the conclusion. We report three experiments in which the strategies that individuals use to refute invalid inferences based on sentential connectives were examined. In Experiment 1, the participants’ task was to justify their evaluations, and it showed that they used counterexamples more often than any other strategy. Experiment 2 showed that they were more likely to use counterexamples to refute invalid conclusions consistent with the premises than to refute invalid conclusions inconsistent with the premises. In Experiment 3, no reliable difference was detected in the results between participants who wrote justifications and participants who did not.     

Stories and metaphors as interventions with headache sufferers

Stories and metaphors can serve as an effective intervention with chronic headache sufferers. Stories and metaphors can serve as an effective intervention with chronic headache sufferers. The aim of the intervention is to promote sufferers' self confidence, increased resiliency, improved communication with others in the family, and the identification of previous promises, pledges, or commitments made to others in their family system.     

A Defense of a Particularist Research Program

What makes some acts morally right and others morally wrong? Traditionally, philosophers have thought that in order to answer this question we must find and formulate exceptionless moral principles—principles that capture all and only morally right actions. Utilitarianism and Kantianism are paradigmatic examples of such attempts. In recent years, however, there has been a growing interest in a novel approach—Particularism—although its precise content is still a matter of controversy. In this paper I develop and motivate a new formulation of particularism as a research program and I show that my formulation is not vulnerable to the most common objections to particularism. Moreover, I argue that the particularist research program shows enough promise to warrant further exploration.     

Direct Risk Aversion: Evidence From Risky Prospects Valued Below Their Worst Outcome

ABSTRACT— Why would people pay more for a $50 gift certificate than for the opportunity to receive a gift certificate worth either $50 or $100, with equal probability? This article examines three possible mechanisms for this recently documented uncertainty effect (UE): First, awareness of the better outcome may devalue the worse one. Second, the UE may have arisen in the original demonstration of this effect because participants misunderstood the instructions. Third, the UE may be due to direct risk aversion, that is, actual distaste for uncertainty. In Experiment 1 , the UE was observed even though participants in the certainty condition were also aware of the better outcome; this result eliminates the first explanation. Experiment 2 shows that most participants understand the instructions used in the original study and that the UE is not caused by the few who do not. Overall, the experiments demonstrate that the UE is robust, large (prospects are valued at 65% of the value of the worse outcome), and widespread (at least 62% of participants exhibit it).     

Moral advice and moral theory

Monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about the structure of the best explanation of the rightness (wrongness) of actions. In this paper I argue that the availability of good moral advice gives us reason to prefer particularist theories and pluralist theories to monist theories. First, I identify two distinct roles of moral theorizing—explaining the rightness (wrongness) of actions, and providing moral advice—and I explain how these two roles are related. Next, I explain what monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about. Finally, I argue that particularists and pluralists are better situated than monists to explain why it is a good idea to think before we act, and that this gives us reason to favor particularism and pluralism over monism.     

Diehard singles: Bachelorhood as a terror management strategy among avoidant men

This research examines the motivational underpinnings of late bachelorhood through the lens of terror management and attachment theory. It was hypothesized that, although close relationships reduce existential concerns for most people, for avoidantly attached singles, thoughts of marriage may increase existential concerns. These hypotheses were tested in two studies among Israeli men. In Study 1, thoughts about getting married increased death thought accessibility (DTA) among avoidant singles compared to thoughts about being alone or a neutral control condition. For nonavoidant singles, thinking about future marriage reduced DTA. In Study 2, mortality salience reduced motivations for being in a relationship among avoidant singles and increased such motivation among those low in avoidant attachment. Results suggest that marriage may cause angst among avoidant single men.     

Brief consultation with headache sufferers

Abstract

This paper describes the author's efforts at involving chronic headache sufferers in brief consultations with individual, family, and group therapy programs in an inpatient medical treatment facility. A variety of difficult issues facing chronic headache sufferers are presented, including the rationale for utilizing each therapeutic modality and the role and strategies that the therapist undertakes in each program. The author provides some case vignettes and discusses the importance of communication between the therapist, the primary physician, and the medical staff members.