Evidence for preserved representations in change blindness

People often fail to detect large changes to scenes, provided that the changes occur during a visual disruption. This phenomenon, known as "change blindness," occurs both in the laboratory and in real-world situations in which changes occur unexpectedly. The pervasiveness of the inability to detect changes is consistent with the theoretical notion that we internally represent relatively little information from our visual world from one glance at a scene to the next. However, evidence for change blindness does not necessarily imply the absence of such a representation---people could also miss changes if they fail to compare an existing representation of the pre-change scene to the post-change scene. In three experiments, we show that people often do have a representation of some aspects of the pre-change scene even when they fail to report the change. And, in fact, they appear to "discover" this memory and can explicitly report details of a changed object in response to probing questions. The results of these real-world change detection studies are discussed in the context of broader claims about change blindness.     

Proactive and reactive aggression in delinquent adolescents: relations to aggression outcome expectancies

Investigated whether the relation between aggression and the tendency to expect positive outcomes for aggressive behavior is specific to the proactive subtype of aggression (as opposed to the reactive subtype). In a sample of 86 incarcerated adolescent boys ages 13 to 18, we measured outcome expectancies for aggression using audiotaped hypothetical vignettes. For each participant, staff members completed proactive and reactive aggression rating scales. Regression analyses revealed that the relation between aggression and outcome expectancies was indeed specific to proactive aggression. Furthermore, this finding was supported regardless of whether outcome expectancies were assessed using vignettes describing proactive-aggressive behavior or those describing reactive-aggressive behavior. We discuss these findings and argue that interventions to reduce proactive or reactive aggression should differ from each other by addressing the specific social cognitive processes involved in each type of aggression.     

What you see is what you set: sustained inattentional blindness and the capture of awareness

This article reports a theoretical and experimental attempt to relate and contrast 2 traditionally separate research programs: inattentional blindness and attention capture. Inattentional blindness refers to failures to notice unexpected objects and events when attention is otherwise engaged. Attention capture research has traditionally used implicit indices (e.g., response times) to investigate automatic shifts of attention. Because attention capture usually measures performance whereas inattentional blindness measures awareness, the 2 fields have existed side by side with no shared theoretical framework. Here, the authors propose a theoretical unification, adapting several important effects from the attention capture literature to the context of sustained inattentional blindness. Although some stimulus properties can influence noticing of unexpected objects, the most influential factor affecting noticing is a person's own attentional goals. The authors conclude that many--but not all--aspects of attention capture apply to inattentional blindness but that these 2 classes of phenomena remain importantly distinct.     

Attention capture is modulated in dual-task situations

Because some features affect the efficiency of visual search even when they are irrelevant to the task, they are thought tocapture attention in a stimulus-driven manner. If such attention shifts are stimulus driven, they should be unaffected by reduced resources. We added a concurrent auditory task to a traditional attention capture paradigm and found that capture by an irrelevant, abruptly appearing stimulus (i.e., an onset) was eliminated. In contrast, prioritization of an irrelevant color singleton—a stimulus that at most receives only mild prioritization in this paradigm—was increased under dual-task conditions. These results challenge the hypothesis that attention capture by irrelevant features is stimulus driven. Instead, prioritization depends on and is modulated by the availability of resources.     

Maladaptive conflict monitoring as evidence for executive dysfunction in children with chromosome 22q11.2 deletion syndrome

Using an adaptation of the Attentional Networks Test, we investigated aspects of executive control in children with chromosome 22q11.2 deletion syndrome (DS22q11.2), a common but not well understood disorder that produces non-verbal cognitive deficits and a marked incidence of psychopathology. The data revealed that children with DS22q11.2 demonstrated greater difficulty than controls in locating and processing target items in the presence of distracters. Importantly, children with DS22q11.2 showed a deficit in the ability to monitor and adapt to stimulus conflict. These data provide evidence of inadequate conflict adaptation in children with DS22q11.2, a problem that is also present in schizophrenia. The findings of specific executive dysfunction in this group may provide a linkage between particular genetic abnormalities and the development of psychopathology.     

Nothing compares 2 views: change blindness can occur despite preserved access to the changed information

Change blindness, the failure to detect visual changes that occur during a disruption, has increasingly been used to infer the nature of internal representations. If every change were detected, detailed representations of the world would have to be stored and accessible. However, because many changes are not detected, visual representations might not be complete, and access to them might be limited. Using change detection to infer the completeness of visual representations requires an understanding of the reasons for change blindness. This article provides empirical support for one such reason: change blindness resulting from the failure to compare retained representations of both the pre- and postchange information. Even when unaware of changes, observers still retained information about both the pre- and postchange objects on the same trial.     

Bocheński and Balance: System and History in Analytic Philosophy

Using the work of Józef Bocheski as apositive example, this paper sets out the casefor a balanced use of historical knowledge indoing analytic philosophy. Between the twoextremes of relativizing historicism, whichdenies absolute truth, and arrogant scientism,which denies any constructive role for thehistory of ideas in philosophy, lies a viamedia in which historical reflection onconcepts and their history is placed at theservice of the system of cognitive philosophy.Knowledge of the history of philosophy, whilenot a sine qua non, can empower analyticphilosophy to push forward to new and moresatisfactory solutions to old and new problems.Examples are adduced from Bocheski's oeuvreand from the author's own experience.     

A specific role for the human amygdala in olfactory memory

The medial temporal lobe is known to play a role in the processing of olfaction and memory. The specific contribution of the human amygdala to memory for odors has not been addressed, however. The role of this region in memory for odors was assessed in patients with unilateral amygdala damage due to temporal lobectomy (n = 20; 11 left, 9 right), one patient with selective bilateral amygdala damage, and in 20 age-matched normal controls. Fifteen odors were presented, followed 1 h later by an odor-name matching test and an odor-odor recognition test. Signal detection analyses showed that both unilateral groups were impaired in their memory for matching odors with names, these patients were not significantly impaired on odor-odor recognition. Bilateral amygdala damage resulted in severe impairment in both odor-name matching as well as in odor-odor recognition memory. Importantly, none of the patients were impaired on an auditory verbal learning task, suggesting that these findings reflect a specific impairment in olfactory memory, and not merely a more general memory deficit. Taken together, the data provide neuropsychological evidence that the human amygdala is essential for olfactory memory.     

Evidence for preserved emotional memory in normal older persons

Emotion has been shown to have a modulatory effect on declarative memory. Normal aging is associated with a decline in declarative memory, but whether aging might affect the influence of emotion on memory has not been established. To investigate this, we administered a task that provides a detailed assessment of emotional memory to 80 neurologically normal adults ranging in age from 35 to 85 years. Across ages, memory performance was found to be modulated by the emotional significance of stimuli in a comparable manner (improved memory for gist, compromised memory for visual detail), despite an overall decline in memory performance with increasing age. The results raise the interesting possibility that aging has a differential effect on hippocampal versus amygdala function.