Genetic differences in response to novelty and spatial memory using a two-trial recognition task in mice

A two-trial memory task, based on a free-choice exploration paradigm in a Y-maze, was previously developed to study recognition processes in Sprague-Dawley rats. Because this paradigm avoids the use of electric shock or deprivation that may have nonspecific effects and does not require learning of a rule, it may be particularly useful for studying memory in mice. Four inbred strains (Balb/cByJ, DBA/2J, C57BL/6J, and SJL/J), an F1 hybrid (C57BL/6 x SJL/J), and one outbred strain (CD1) were used to validate this task in mice and to characterize a strain distribution in response to novelty and working memory. Exploration was measured with a short (2 min) intertrial interval (ITI) between acquisition and retrieval, while memory was examined with longer intervals (30 min, 1 h, and 2 h). A study of the time course of the response to novelty revealed varying degrees of preference and/or habituation to novelty among the different strains, with CD1 exhibiting a very high response to novelty and others showing lower (C57 x SJL hybrids) to complete absence (SJL) of exploration of novelty. Memory span, assessed with increasing ITIs, varied widely among strains from 30 min (C57 x SJL hybrids) to at least 2 h (C57 and BALB). Such demonstrated sensitivity to a wide range of behavioral phenotypes supports the use of this spatial memory task as an effective tool for the study of genetic influences on the response to novelty and recognition processes in mice.     

The freedom of the deconstructed postmodern subject

Poststructuralists have tried to deconstruct the subject, that is, demonstrate that it is constituted by the system of cultural and linguistic relations in which it is found. The result is that just at the moment when self-actualization seems for the first time to be politically possible for many hitherto marginalized subjects, they, and subjects more generally, appear to have been denatured – reduced to the cultural systems which are the condition of their possibility and consequently deprived of the freedom which is clearly necessary for any form of self-actualization. This paper, while acknowledging that subjects are indeed culturally and linguistically constituted, argues on the basis of a holistic, emergent property hypothesis that structure or form can generate content that nevertheless transcends the structure or form that constitutes it. On this view the subject is irreducibly transcendent to the system of relations from within which it arises, and the deconstructed subject thus remains capable of free choice and self-actualization.     

The overcoming of overcoming: On Dominique Janicaud

This paper aims to give an overview of the central preoccupations of the work of Dominique Janicaud. In the first part, I discuss Janicaud's basic strategy with regard to Heidegger's work, with particular reference to the question of metaphysics and its overcoming. Opposing Heidegger's alternative between the completion of metaphysics in technology (Gestell), on the one hand, and the experience of meditative thinking (Gelassenheit), on the other, Janicaud's position can be described as what I call an overcoming of all claims at overcoming, whether it concerns metaphysics, rationality or humanity. This leads, in the second part of the paper, to a discussion of Janicaud's radical and compelling reconsideration of the genealogy of rationality in his major work, La puissance du rationnel. This genealogy permits Janicaud to sketch a novel conception of reason as what he calls partage, conceived as both the shared space of dialogue and the sense of the thrown contingency of our existence. In the third part of the paper, and with reference to posthumously published work, I go on to show how this conception of partage shapes Janicaud's conception of the human condition and how this conception shows a significant debt to Pascal.     

Innocence Without Naivete,Uprightness Without Stupidity: The Pedagogical Kavannah of Emmanuel Levinas

While it is impossible to transfigurephilosophical and Judaic thought of EmmanuelLevinas into a moral agenda for education orthe programmatic regularities of a pedagogicalmethodology, this paper argues for theimportance of his work for re-openingeducational questions. These questions engagethe problem of what it could mean to livehistorically, to live within an uprightattentiveness to traces of those who haveinhabited times and places other than one'sown. In this sense, I address the problem ofremembrance as a question of and for history,as a force of inhabitation, as an inheritance weare obligated to live within, that intertwineswith our sense of limits and possibilities,hopes and fears, identities and distinctions.Substantively, this problem is manifest in howone attends to the experiences of others: howone reads, how one views, and how one listens,always historically specific normalizedpractices that in any given epoch are ingrainedin what it means to live in consort withothers, to live as though the lives of otherpeople mattered. The paper seeks to display thefecundity of the thought of Levinas forre-thinking such issues.     

The Continuity Strategy,Human Behavior,and Behavior Analysis

The Psychological Record - In behavior analysis, continuity refers to the assumption of a similarity of behavioral principles or processes between nonhumans and humans, which is often considered to...     

Epistemic Unities

I bring together social ontology and social epistemology by consideringsocial entities (``epistemic unities') that are constituted by the holdingof epistemic relations between their members. In particular, I focus onthe relation of taking someone as an expert. Among the types of structuresexamined are ones with a single expert and one or more non-experts whomay or may not know of each other's situation; and ones with more thanone expert, including cases in which the relation between the experts ishierarchical and cases in which it is symmetrical. These structures modela variety of social situations which can thus be given a unified treatment.Among the cases I discuss are persons, which I argue are multiple-expertunities of persons at times. Taking a person as a social unity like this offersa clear sense in which some groups can also be person-like.     

Satisfying the Demands of Reason: Hegel's Conceptualization of Experience

Hegel had taken the Kantian categories of thought to be merely formal, without content, since, he argued, Kant abstracted the conditions of thought from the world. The Kantian categories can, as such, only be understood subjectively and so are unable to secure a content for themselves. Hegel, following Fichte, tried to provide a content for the logical categories. In order to reinstate an objective status for logic and conceptuality he tries to affirm the unity of thought and being. The idea that this unity is established by reinstating a pre-Kantian metaphysics has in most of the recent Hegel literature been discredited. In the wake of this non-metaphysical Hegel there is a concern that the architectonic of concepts which is taken as the organizing principle of consciousness offers an account of experience which is too schematic. While Hegel disputes the intuition/concept distinction as it is played out in Kant and Fichte, he does nevertheless retain some residue of a notion of intuition in his theory of the Concept. This is central to understanding his notion of experience as it can't simply be equated with rule governed conceptuality. Satisfying the demands of reason for Hegel requires more than conceiving our experience solely as judgments. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.