Testing joint attention, imitation, and play as infancy precursors to language and theory of mind

Various theoretical accounts propose that an important developmental relation exists between joint attention, play, and imitation abilities, and later theory of mind ability. However, very little direct empirical evidence supports these claims for putative “precursor” theory of mind status. A small sample (N=13) of infants, for whom measures of play, joint attention, and imitation had been collected at 20 months of age, was followed-up longitudinally at 44 months and a battery of theory of mind measures was conducted. Language and IQ were measured at both timepoints. Imitation ability at 20 months was longitudinally associated with expressive, but not receptive, language ability at 44 months. In contrast, only the joint attention behaviours of gaze switches between an adult and an active toy and looking to an adult during an ambiguous goal detection task at 20 months were longitudinally associated with theory of mind ability at 44 months. It is argued that joint attention, play, and imitation, and language and theory of mind, might form part of a shared social–communicative representational system in infancy that becomes increasingly specialised and differentiated as development progresses.     

Comprehensive community-based education and neurorehabilitation for children and adolescents with traumatic brain injury

Children and adolescents who experience a traumatic brain injury (TBI) typically have sensory, cognitive, behavioral, and functional skill challenges that must be addressed in acute and post-acute rehabilitation settings. This article describes a community-based school that combines educational, medical, nursing, family, residential-living, and psychological services in a comprehensive program of pediatric neurorehabilitation. The operational, administrative, and clinical features of these service components are presented. A critical aspect of the program is an emphasis on applied behavior analysis procedures for purposes of assessment, treatment formulation, and evaluation. Data are reviewed to demonstrate demographics, patterns of service delivery, and outcome. The school program represents an educational alternative for students with TBI who are discharged from acute-care settings and require comprehensive support services to facilitate their transition and re-entry to public school and community living. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

God is not a person (an argument via pantheism)

This paper transforms a development of an argument against pantheism into an objection to the usual account of God within contemporary analytic philosophy (’Swinburnian theism’). A standard criticism of pantheism has it that pantheists cannot offer a satisfactory account of God as personal. My paper will develop this criticism along two lines: first, that personhood requires contentful mental states, which in turn necessitate the membership of a linguistic community, and second that personhood requires limitation within a wider context constitutive of the ’setting’ of the agent’s life. Pantheism can, I argue, satisfy neither criterion of personhood. At this point the tables are turned on the Swinburnian theist. If the pantheist cannot defend herself against the personhood-based attacks, neither can the Swinburnian, and for instructively parallel reasons: for neither doctrine is God in the material world; in the pantheist case God is identical with the world, in the Swinburnian case God transcends it. Either way both the pantheist and the Swinburnian are left with a dilemma: abandon divine personhood or modify the doctrine of God so as to block the move to personhood.

     

The Informational Fallacy in the Philosophy of Consciousness

This article argues that theories which regard the mind as merely a form of information processing are guilty of a fallacious conflation of the informational contents of consciousness with consciousness itself, with the consciousness of those contents. Such theories lie behind the thought that a consciousness could be transferred or uploaded onto a substrate other than the brain it initially occurred in. It is argued here that the ontology of information is that of a formal structure that can be instantiated in physical reality innumerable times, whereas the ontology of consciousness is that of an irreducibly singular subjective experience of being alive.     

INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND APOCALYPTICISM

This is an introduction to the Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Apocalypticism, which resulted from a conference hosted by the Centre for the Critical Study of Apocalyptic and Millenarian Movements (CenSAMM) in Bedford, UK. The introduction provides a brief history of scholarly work in the intersections of apocalypticism and artificial intelligence and of the emergence of CenSAMM from a millenarian religious community, the Panacea Society. It concludes by pointing toward the contributions of the symposium's essays.     

Kant on the bounds of promise making: A Mendelssohnian account

In this essay, I argue that Kant holds one of the following two theses: A promise to do something that violates the moral law (a) is impossible or (b) can be conscientiously broken. On this issue, I put Kant in dialogue with Moses Mendelssohn in order to show, against recent suggestions, that Kant's account is distinctly Mendelssohnian.