Associative recognition and the list strength paradigm

When a subset of list items is strengthened, the discriminability of the nonstrengthened items is unaffected. This regularity has been dubbed the null list strength effect (LSE), and despite its many replications in item recognition, little research has investigated whether an LSE occurs in associative recognition. We conducted two experiments in which a set of pairs were studied once and a set of interference pairs were studied either once (pure-weak-list condition) or four times (mixed-list condition). Equivalent levels of performance for the nonstrengthened pairs were observed in both the pure-weak and mixed conditions using both yes–no and two-alternative forced choice testing. Additionally, equivalent false alarm rates were observed between rearranged pairs composed of weak and strong items. Both sets of results were found to be consistent with a matrix model that has no overlap among its item representations.     

Young Offenders’ Emotion Recognition Dysfunction Across Emotion Intensities: Explaining Variation Using Psychopathic Traits,Conduct Disorder and Offense Severity

Antisocial individuals have problems recognizing negative emotions (e.g. Marsh & Blair in Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 32:454–465, 2009); however, due to issues with sampling and different methods used, previous findings have been varied. Sixty-three male young offenders and 37 age-, IQ- and socio-economic status-matched male controls completed a facial emotion recognition task, which measures recognition of happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, and surprise and neutral expressions across 4 emotional intensities. Conduct disorder (YSR), and psychopathic and callous/unemotional traits (YPI) were measured, and offenders’ offense data were taken from the Youth Offending Service’s case files. Relative to controls, offenders were significantly worse at identifying sadness, low intensity disgust and high intensity fear. A significant interaction for anger was also observed, with offenders showing reduced low- but increased high-intensity anger recognition in comparison with controls. Within the young offenders levels of conduct disorder and psychopathic traits explained variation in sadness and disgust recognition, whereas offense severity explained variation in anger recognition. These results suggest that antisocial youths show specific problems in recognizing negative emotions and support the use of targeted emotion recognition interventions for problematic behavior.     

Can we trust the phenomenological interview? Metaphysical,epistemological, and methodological objections

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - The paper defends the position that phenomenological interviews can provide a rich source of knowledge and that they are in no principled way less...     

Extending the Common Sense Model to Explore the Impact of the Fear of COVID-19 on Quality of Life in an International Inflammatory Bowel Disease Cohort

The aim of this cross-sectional study was to use an extended common sense model (CSM) to evaluate the impact of fear of COVID-19 on quality of life (QoL) in an international inflammatory bowel disease cohort. An online study involving 319 adults (75% female, mean (SD) 14.06 (15.57) years of symptoms) completed the Gastrointestinal Symptom Rating Scale, Brief Illness Perceptions Questionnaire, Fear of Contracting COVID-19 Scale, Brief-COPE, Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale, and the EUROHIS-QOL. The extended CSM had an excellent fit (χ² (9)?=?17.06, p?=?.05, χ²/N?=?1.90, RMSEA?=?0.05, SRMR?=?0.04, CFI?=?.99, TLI?=?.97, GFI?=?0.99), indicating the influence of gastrointestinal symptoms on QoL was mediated by illness perceptions, fear of COVID-19, adaptive and maladaptive coping, and psychological distress. Interventions targeting the fear of COVID-19 in the context of an individual’s perceptions will likely enhance QoL during the pandemic.

     

Illness Perceptions,Coping, Benefit Finding,and Adjustment in Individuals with Hepatitis C

Objective

To investigate the ability of illness perceptions, adaptive, and maladaptive coping strategies, and benefit finding to predict physical and psychosocial adjustment among individuals diagnosed with the hepatitis C virus (HCV), within an expanded self‐regulatory model of illness (SRM).

Method

A total of 126 participants with HCV completed an online questionnaire assessing illness perceptions, coping, benefit finding, and four adjustment outcomes, depression, physical functioning, life satisfaction and positive affect.

Results

Illness perceptions made significant contributions to the variance in adjustment outcomes across the four psychosocial and physical adjustment areas. At an individual level, personal control, identification with HCV symptoms, perceptions related to illness duration, illness coherence, and emotional responses to HCV made significant contributions to the prediction of adjustment. Similarly, the combined contributions of adaptive and maladaptive coping strategies explained significant variance across the four adjustment areas. Greater adoption of maladaptive coping strategies predicted poorer physical health, higher reported depression, greater life satisfaction, and positive affect outcomes, while increased engagement with adoptive coping strategies predicted higher positive affect. Increased benefit finding predicted greater positive affect, life satisfaction, and higher depression.

Conclusion

Results demonstrate the ability of the SRM features of illness perceptions and coping, and benefit finding to predict physical and psychosocial adjustment outcomes within the context of HCV.     

Replies to Deng,Lee, and Skow

This paper is a contribution to a book symposium on my book Experiencing Time. I reply to comments on the book by Natalja Deng, Geoffrey Lee and Bradford Skow. Although several chapters of the book are discussed, the main focus of my reply is on Chapters 2 and 6. In Chapter 2 I argue that the putative mind-independent passage of time could not be experienced, and from this I develop an argument against the A-theory of time. In Chapter 6 I offer one part of an explanation of why we are disposed to think that time passes, relating to the supposedly ‘dynamic’ quality of experienced change. Deng, Lee, and Skow’s comments help me to clarify several issues, add some new thoughts, and make a new distinction that was needed, and I acknowledge, as I did in the book, that certain arguments in Chapter 6 are not conclusive; but I otherwise concede very little regarding the main claims and arguments defended in the book.