When a subset of list items is strengthened, the discriminability of the nonstrengthened items is unaffected. This regularity has been dubbed the null list strength effect (LSE), and despite its many replications in item recognition, little research has investigated whether an LSE occurs in associative recognition. We conducted two experiments in which a set of pairs were studied once and a set of interference pairs were studied either once (pure-weak-list condition) or four times (mixed-list condition). Equivalent levels of performance for the nonstrengthened pairs were observed in both the pure-weak and mixed conditions using both yes–no and two-alternative forced choice testing. Additionally, equivalent false alarm rates were observed between rearranged pairs composed of weak and strong items. Both sets of results were found to be consistent with a matrix model that has no overlap among its item representations. 相似文献
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - The paper defends the position that phenomenological interviews can provide a rich source of knowledge and that they are in no principled way less... 相似文献
The aim of this cross-sectional study was to use an extended common sense model (CSM) to evaluate the impact of fear of COVID-19 on quality of life (QoL) in an international inflammatory bowel disease cohort. An online study involving 319 adults (75% female, mean (SD) 14.06 (15.57) years of symptoms) completed the Gastrointestinal Symptom Rating Scale, Brief Illness Perceptions Questionnaire, Fear of Contracting COVID-19 Scale, Brief-COPE, Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale, and the EUROHIS-QOL. The extended CSM had an excellent fit (χ2 (9)?=?17.06, p?=?.05, χ2/N?=?1.90, RMSEA?=?0.05, SRMR?=?0.04, CFI?=?.99, TLI?=?.97, GFI?=?0.99), indicating the influence of gastrointestinal symptoms on QoL was mediated by illness perceptions, fear of COVID-19, adaptive and maladaptive coping, and psychological distress. Interventions targeting the fear of COVID-19 in the context of an individual’s perceptions will likely enhance QoL during the pandemic.
To whom do we owe obligations of distributive justice? In the last decade a number of distinguished political theorists — such as David Miller and Yael Tamir — have defended a nationalist account of our distributive obligations. This paper examines their account of distributive justice. In particular, it analyses their contention (a) that individuals owe special obligations to fellow-nationals, (b) that these obligations are obligations of distributive justice and (c) that these obligations are enforceable. Miller and Tamir's justifications, I argue, do not support these claims. Moreover, I argue, (a) and (c) should only be accepted in a greatly qualified form and (b) should be rejected altogether. The paper thus concludes that the nationalists' preferred account of distributive justice is untenable. 相似文献