Transparency About Painkillers: A Remedy for the Evaluativist's Headache

The paradox of pain is that pain is in some ways like a bodily state and in other ways like a mental state. You can have a pain in your shin, but there is no denying that you are in pain if it feels like you are. How can a state be both in your shin and in your mind? Evaluativism is a promising answer. According to evaluativism, an experience of pain in your shin represents that there is a disturbance in your shin, and that it is bad that this disturbance is there. Thus, the experience brings you to tend to your shin by telling you something about the state of your shin. But the paradox of pain still confronts evaluativism in the form of the killing the messenger objection: The evaluativist has a nice story about our body‐directed responses to pain, like tending to wounds, but this story does not explain responses to pain, like taking painkillers, that seem to be experience‐directed. Evaluativists have offered accounts of experience‐directed responses to pain, but I will argue that these accounts conflict with the Transparency thesis—the claim that we can only access our experiences inferentially. Evaluativism and Transparency are natural bedfellows, so this is a problem for evaluativists. Having argued as much, I will go on to develop a new evaluativist account of taking painkillers, which does not conflict with Transparency. I call it naïve evaluativism. According to naïve evaluativism, we experience painkillers as making tissue damage or disruption less bad, and absent further reflection, that is, why we take them.     

Time,Quantum Mechanics,and Probability

A variety of ideas arising in decoherence theory, and in the ongoing debate over Everett's relative-state theory, can be linked to issues in relativity theory and the philosophy of time, specifically the relational theory of tense and of identity over time. These have been systematically presented in companion papers (Saunders 1995; 1996a); in what follows we shall consider the same circle of ideas, but specifically in relation to the interpretation of probability, and its identification with relations in the Hilbert Space norm. The familiar objection that Everett's approach yields probabilities different from quantum mechanics is easily dealt with. The more fundamental question is how to interpret these probabilities consistent with the relational theory of change, and the relational theory of identity over time. I shall show that the relational theory needs nothing more than the physical, minimal criterion of identity as defined by Everett's theory, and that this can be transparently interpreted in terms of the ordinary notion of the chance occurrence of an event, as witnessed in the present. It is in this sense that the theory has empirical content.     

Integrating the most unintuitive empirical observations of 2007 in the domain of personality and social psychology into a unified framework

Two obstacles impede the development of productive theories in personality, social, and organizational psychology. First, the distinct frameworks are seldom integrated; the various theories sometimes yield incompatible implications. Second, because many findings in these fields seem intuitive, these observations do not augment the validity of these theories. To override these issues, this paper integrates the 70 most unintuitive findings of 2007 into a unified framework, derived from personality systems interaction theory. Specifically, 10 participants extracted the most unintuitive observations from 17 scholarly journals. These findings were reconciled within a single framework that generates 41 testable propositions. The framework assumes that an associative self system, underpinned by a vast network of schemas, governs behavior as well as enhances intuition, engagement, creativity, and cooperation. When individuals experience a threat, this system is inhibited, unless the requisite defense mechanisms to accommodate potential hazards have been developed. Furthermore, individuals attempt to distance themselves from unassailable threats, which activate an analytical system that formulates plans that could accommodate future contingencies. These plans are retained in memory or executed if individuals have acquired sufficient confidence.