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961.
Michela Massimi 《Synthese》2011,182(1):101-116
This paper investigates some metaphysical and epistemological assumptions behind Bogen and Woodward’s data-to-phenomena inferences.
I raise a series of points and suggest an alternative possible Kantian stance about data-to-phenomena inferences. I clarify
the nature of the suggested Kantian stance by contrasting it with McAllister’s view about phenomena as patterns in data sets. 相似文献
962.
James Ladyman 《Synthese》2011,178(1):87-98
van Fraassen (The empirical stance, 2002) contrasts the empirical stance with the materialist stance. The way he describes
them makes both of them attractive, and while opposed they have something in common for both stances are scientific approaches
to philosophy. The difference between them reflects their differing conceptions of science itself. Empiricists emphasise fallibilism,
verifiability and falsifiability, and also to some extent scepticism and tolerance of novel hypotheses. Materialists regard
the theoretical picture of the world as matter in motion as a true and explanatory account and insist on not taking ‘spooky’
entities or processes seriously as potential explanations of phenomena that so far lie outside the scope of successful science.
The history of science shows us that both stances have been instrumental in the achievement of progress at various times.
It is therefore plausible for a naturalist to suggest that science depends for its success on the dialectic between empiricism
and materialism. A truly naturalist approach to philosophy ought then to synthesise them. Call the synthesized empiricist
and materialist stances ‘the scientistic stance’. This paper elaborates and defends it. 相似文献
963.
Haim Gaifman 《Synthese》2011,179(3):501-502
964.
Elliott Sober 《Synthese》2011,181(1):3-21
This paper is a sympathetic critique of the argument that Reichenbach develops in Chap. 2 of Experience and Prediction for the thesis that sense experience justifies belief in the existence of an external world. After discussing his attack
on the positivist theory of meaning, I describe the probability ideas that Reichenbach presents. I argue that Reichenbach
begins with an argument grounded in the Law of Likelihood but that he then endorses a different argument that involves prior
probabilities. I try to show how this second step in Reichenbach’s approach can be strengthened by using ideas that have been
developed recently for understanding causation in terms of the idea of intervention. 相似文献
965.
Frederick Eberhardt 《Synthese》2011,181(1):125-136
Hans Reichenbach is well known for his limiting frequency view of probability, with his most thorough account given in The Theory of Probability in 1935/1949. Perhaps less known are Reichenbach’s early views on probability and its epistemology. In his doctoral thesis
from 1915, Reichenbach espouses a Kantian view of probability, where the convergence limit of an empirical frequency distribution
is guaranteed to exist thanks to the synthetic a priori principle of lawful distribution. Reichenbach claims to have given
a purely objective account of probability, while integrating the concept into a more general philosophical and epistemological
framework. A brief synopsis of Reichenbach’s thesis and a critical analysis of the problematic steps of his argument will
show that the roots of many of his most influential insights on probability and causality can be found in this early work. 相似文献
966.
Maria van der Schaar 《Synthese》2011,180(3):391-417
The notion of cognitive act is of importance for an epistemology that is apt for constructive type theory, and for epistemology
in general. Instead of taking knowledge attributions as the primary use of the verb ‘to know’ that needs to be given an account
of, and understanding a first-person knowledge claim as a special case of knowledge attribution, the account of knowledge
that is given here understands first-person knowledge claims as the primary use of the verb ‘to know’. This means that a cognitive
act is an act that counts as cognitive from a first-person point of view. The method of linguistic phenomenology is used to
explain or elucidate our epistemic notions. One of the advantages of the theory is that an answer can be given to some of
the problems in modern epistemology, such as the Gettier problem. 相似文献
967.
Douglas Walton 《Synthese》2011,179(3):377-407
This paper argues that some traditional fallacies should be considered as reasonable arguments when used as part of a properly
conducted dialog. It is shown that argumentation schemes, formal dialog models, and profiles of dialog are useful tools for
studying properties of defeasible reasoning and fallacies. It is explained how defeasible reasoning of the most common sort
can deteriorate into fallacious argumentation in some instances. Conditions are formulated that can be used as normative tools
to judge whether a given defeasible argument is fallacious or not. It is shown that three leading violations of proper dialog
standards for defeasible reasoning necessary to see how fallacies work are: (a) improper failure to retract a commitment,
(b) failure of openness to defeat, and (c) illicit reversal of burden of proof. 相似文献
968.
Hannes Leitgeb 《Synthese》2011,179(2):339-350
This is a personal, incomplete, and very informal take on the role of logic in general philosophy of science, which is aimed at a broader audience. We defend and advertise the application of logical methods in philosophy of science, starting with the beginnings in the Vienna Circle and ending with some more recent logical developments. 相似文献
969.
Peter Nilsson 《Philosophia》2011,39(1):125-144
Compassion is often described in terms of suffering. This paper investigates the nature of this suffering. It is argued that
compassion involves suffering of a particular kind. To begin with a case is made for the negative claim that compassion does
not involve an ordinary, or afflictive, suffering over something. Secondly, it is argued that the suffering of compassion
is a suffering for someone else’s sake: If you feel compassion for another person, P, then you suffer over P:s suffering for
P:s sake, and if that is all you do, then you are not affected with an afflictive suffering over something. The final section
identifies and addresses a problem concerning self-pity, and a suggestion is made on how to specify the proposed account so
as to cover both self-directed and other-directed compassion. 相似文献
970.
We show that the contemporary debate surrounding the question “What is the norm of assertion?” presupposes what we call the quantitative view, i.e. the view that this question is best answered by determining how much epistemic support is required to warrant assertion. We consider what Jennifer Lackey (2010) has called cases of isolated second-hand knowledge and show—beyond what Lackey has suggested herself—that these cases are best understood as ones where a certain type of understanding, rather than knowledge, constitutes the required epistemic credential to warrant assertion. If we are right that understanding (and not just knowledge) is the epistemic norm for a restricted class of assertions, then this straightforwardly undercuts not only the widely supposed quantitative view, but also a more general presupposition concerning the universalisability of some norm governing assertion—the presumption (almost entirely unchallenged since Williamson’s 1996 paper) that any epistemic norm that governs some assertions should govern assertions—as a class of speech act—uniformly. 相似文献