Epistemic constraints on practical normativity

What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent ought to do depends on his beliefs. This paper defends the need for, and explicates, a third category of ‘ought’: ‘warranted oughts’. Section 1 introduces the distinction between objective and subjective ‘oughts’. Sections 2–3 draw attention to some serious problems with each. Section 4 examines, though rejects, a recent attempt to replace subjective ‘oughts’ with objective ‘wide-scope oughts’ operating on belief-action combinations. Section 5 explicates the notion of a warranted ‘ought’ and defends the account against some possible objections. The resulting a picture is one in which an adequate analysis of practical normativity requires both objective and warranted ‘oughts’. Section 6 concludes by responding to a worry about countenancing both.

     

Ratings of Orally Presented Verbal Expressions of Probability by a Heterogeneous Sample

Verbal expressions of probability are used in daily conversations, physician-physician and physician-patient communications, and questionnaire and interview responses. To assess the degree of agreement among English-speaking Australian adults in allocating numerical probabilities to these verbal expressions of probability, 966 interviewees provided estimates for 60 isolated expressions of probability and a sequence of seven items placed in a sequence. Means and median scores appeared to be consistent with common sense and with findings from other countries. Mirror-imaged terms were neither symmetrical nor equidistant, with the means and medians for the positive terms being closer to the mid-points of the scale than the means and medians of the negative terms. Items in a sequence of probability terms showed greater symmetry and less variability than isolated expressions. For most items, there was an unacceptably high level of within-subject and between-subject variability. Although subjects with higher levels of education and/ or mathematics education showed less variability, these factors accounted for very little of the variance. The greater variability in Australian results relative to those reported elsewhere was partly attributed to the use of interviews rather than questionnaires. There were no particular stems that yielded greater consistency. It was concluded that the use of these expressions leads to very imprecise communication.     

Why do people need self-esteem? Converging evidence that self-esteem serves an anxiety-buffering function.

Three studies were conducted to assess the proposition that self-esteem serves an anxiety-buffering function. In Study 1, it was hypothesized that raising self-esteem would reduce anxiety in response to vivid images of death. In support of this hypothesis, Ss who received positive personality feedback reported less anxiety in response to a video about death than did neutral feedback Ss. In Studies 2 and 3, it was hypothesized that increasing self-esteem would reduce anxiety among individuals anticipating painful shock. Consistent with this hypothesis, both success and positive personality feedback reduced Ss' physiological arousal in response to subsequent threat of shock. Thus, converging evidence of an anxiety-buffering function of self-esteem was obtained.     

Spatial cognition and neighborhood use: the relationship in older adults.

Measures of spatial cognition, neighborhood knowledge, and neighborhood use from the research described by Walsh, Krauss, and Regnier (1981) were examined to determine if laboratory tests of spatial cognition were significant predictors of older adults' use of their neighborhoods. The overall results show that laboratory-based measures of spatial cognition and subjects' knowledge of their neighborhoods are both significant predictors of their use of neighborhood goods and services. The ability to learn and remember the location and orientation of objects, when contextual cues were not provided at test, was more predictive of the participants' neighborhood use than either the participants' number of years in the neighborhood or their mobility. Spatial memory as measured by the Educational Testing Service Building Memory task predicted neighborhood knowledge, which was predictive of neighborhood use.     

Alternation behavior, spatial discrimination, and reversal disturbances following 6-hydroxydopamine lesions in the nucleus accumbens of the rat

The effects of dopaminergic depletion of the nucleus accumbens was tested in various behavioral tasks such as alternation, spatial discrimination, and reversal learning, and in an extinction paradigm in a T maze. Animals with lesions showed impairment of spontaneous alternation behavior, disturbances in the acquisition of spatial discrimination, and great difficulty in reversing previously learned habits. In the extinction phase, experimental animals are unable to adjust their behavior, and continue to choose the previously reinforced arm of the T maze. It is suggested that the nucleus accumbens plays an important role in the transition of motivation into action, and that dopamine has a facilitatory influence on the mediation of these processes.