The influence of gender on children's ratings of fear in self and same-aged peers

In the present study, gender differences in children's fear were examined. Nine-year-old children were asked to rate their own fears, the fears of their peers of the opposite gender, and the fears of their peers of the same gender, using the Fear Survey Schedule for Children--Revised (Ollendick, 1983). Consistent with previous investigations, the results revealed that boys rated themselves as less fearful than girls. In addition, both male and female judges rated "other boys" as less afraid than "other girls." These findings emerged whether fear was examined in terms of intensity or prevalence. Implications and suggestions for future research are discussed.     

Countertransference and the myth of the perfectly analyzed analyst

Countertransference is an inevitable feature of every psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysts are (and need to be) only human; psychoanalytic work is arduous and replete with stresses, strains, and deprivations; analysands tend to probe for vulnerabilities in their analysts that can be exploited in the interest of acting out neurotic wishes instead of analyzing them; and a training analysis cannot completely immunize a psychoanalyst against countertransferential reactions that impede analytic progress. Psychoanalysts must be vigilant to the emergence of countertransference reactions so that they can analyze and overcome them. Two illustrative clinical examples are provided.     

Extended functionalism,radical enactivism,and the autopoietic theory of cognition: prospects for a full revolution in cognitive science

Recently, Michael Wheeler (2017) has argued that despite its sometimes revolutionary rhetoric, the so called 4E (embodied-embedded-enacted-extended) cognitive movement, even in the guise of ‘radical’ enactivism (REC), cannot achieve a full revolution in cognitive science. A full revolution would require the rejection of two essential tenets of traditional cognitive science, namely internalism and representationalism. Whilst REC might secure antirepresentationalism, it cannot do the same, so Wheeler argues, with externalism. In this paper, expanding on Wheeler’s analysis (2017), we argue that what compromises REC’s externalism is the persistence of cognitively relevant asymmetries between its purported cognitive systems and the environment. Complementarily, we argue that an antirepresentationalist ancestor of enactivism, the autopoietic theory of cognition, is able to deliver and secure externalism, thus offering the explosive combination (i.e., antirepresentationalism plus externalism) that Wheeler claims us needed for a revolution in cognitive science.