A tutorial introduction to Bayesian models of cognitive development

We present an introduction to Bayesian inference as it is used in probabilistic models of cognitive development. Our goal is to provide an intuitive and accessible guide to the what, the how, and the why of the Bayesian approach: what sorts of problems and data the framework is most relevant for, and how and why it may be useful for developmentalists. We emphasize a qualitative understanding of Bayesian inference, but also include information about additional resources for those interested in the cognitive science applications, mathematical foundations, or machine learning details in more depth. In addition, we discuss some important interpretation issues that often arise when evaluating Bayesian models in cognitive science.     

Children's imitation of causal action sequences is influenced by statistical and pedagogical evidence

Children are ubiquitous imitators, but how do they decide which actions to imitate? One possibility is that children rationally combine multiple sources of information about which actions are necessary to cause a particular outcome. For instance, children might learn from contingencies between action sequences and outcomes across repeated demonstrations, and they might also use information about the actor’s knowledge state and pedagogical intentions. We define a Bayesian model that predicts children will decide whether to imitate part or all of an action sequence based on both the pattern of statistical evidence and the demonstrator’s pedagogical stance. To test this prediction, we conducted an experiment in which preschool children watched an experimenter repeatedly perform sequences of varying actions followed by an outcome. Children’s imitation of sequences that produced the outcome increased, in some cases resulting in production of shorter sequences of actions that the children had never seen performed in isolation. A second experiment established that children interpret the same statistical evidence differently when it comes from a knowledgeable teacher versus a naïve demonstrator. In particular, in the pedagogical case children are more likely to “overimitate” by reproducing the entire demonstrated sequence. This behavior is consistent with our model’s predictions, and suggests that children attend to both statistical and pedagogical evidence in deciding which actions to imitate, rather than obligately imitating successful action sequences.     

Facebook addiction: concerns, criticism, and recommendations--a response to Andreassen and colleagues

This paper provides a brief critique of the Facebook addiction research field in relation to the Bergen Facebook Addiction Scale developed by Andreaessen and colleagues (2012). Just like the term "Internet addiction," the term "Facebook addiction" may already be obsolete because there are many activities that a person can engage in on the Facebook website (e.g., messaging friends, playing games like Farmville, and gambling). What is needed is a new psychometric scale examining potential addiction to a particular online application (i.e., social networking) rather than activity on a particular website (i.e., Facebook).     

Measuring rail passenger crowding: Scale development and psychometric properties

Research on rail passenger crowding often tacitly subscribes to a measurement of crowding based on density (i.e. physical conditions involving space limitations) and rarely considers the possible role psychological factors may play in measuring this construct. This paper describes the development of an instrument that captures the dimensionality of rail passenger crowding and its relationship to the experience of stress and feelings of exhaustion. The proposed instrument is a 20-item self-rating questionnaire consisting of three sub-scales designed to assess subjective crowding experiences among rail users (n = 525). Findings from the factor analyses generally support the hypothesised three-factor structure of the measurement model (evaluation of the psychosocial aspects of the crowded situation, evaluation of the ambient environment of the crowded situation, and affective reactions to the crowded situation). All sub-scales demonstrate excellent internal consistency and construct validity as well as good convergent and discriminant validity values. The instrument was further tested using structural equation modelling to examine the impact of crowding on commuters’ stress and feelings of exhaustion. With the addition of the “passenger density” variable as an indicator of objective measurement of crowding operating in tandem with the crowding sub-scales, the results reveal that: (1) commuters’ evaluations of the psychosocial aspects of the crowded situation and of its ambient environment, alongside their rating of passenger density, significantly predict affective reactions to the crowded situation; (2) these affective reactions, in turn, significantly predict stress and feelings of exhaustion; and (3) evaluations of the psychosocial aspects of the crowded situation and of its ambient environment as well as passenger density do not directly predict stress and feelings of exhaustion. The link between rail passenger crowding and the negative outcomes therefore does not appear as a simple, direct relationship, but is mediated by affective feelings of crowdedness. Overall, these results provide satisfactory psychometric properties for the proposed instrument and support its use as an assessment tool for measuring crowding experience in the rail setting.     

Active versus passive maintenance of visual nonverbal memory

Forgetting over the short term has challenged researchers for more than a century, largely because of the difficulty of controlling what goes on within the memory retention interval. But the “recent-negative-probe” procedure offers a valuable paradigm, by examining the influences of (presumably) unattended memoranda from prior trials. Here we used a recent-probe task to investigate forgetting for visual nonverbal short-term memory. The target stimuli (two visually presented abstract shapes) on a trial were followed after a retention interval by a probe, and participants indicated whether the probe matched one of the target items. Proactive interference, and hence memory for old trial probes, was observed, whereby participants were slowed in rejecting a nonmatching probe on the current trial that nevertheless matched a target item on the previous trial (a recent-negative probe). The attraction of the paradigm is that, by uncovering proactive influences of past-trial probe stimuli, it can be argued that active maintenance in memory of those probes is unlikely. In two experiments, we recorded such proactive interference of prior-trial items over a range of interstimulus (ISI) and intertrial (ITI) intervals (between 1 and 6 s, respectively). Consistent with a proposed two-process memory conception (the active–passive memory model, or APM), actively maintained memories on current trials decayed, but passively “maintained,” or unattended, visual memories of stimuli on past trials did not.     

Reinflating Logical Consequence

Shapiro (Philos Q 61:320–342, 2011) argues that, if we are deflationists about truth, we should be deflationists about logical consequence. Like the truth predicate, he claims, the logical consequence predicate is merely a device of generalisation and more substantial characterisation, e.g. proof- or model-theoretic, is mistaken. I reject his analogy between truth and logical consequence and argue that, by appreciating how the logical consequence predicate is used as well as the goals of proof theory and model theory, we can be deflationists about truth but not logical consequence.     

Meditation Awareness Training (MAT) for Improved Psychological Well-being: A Qualitative Examination of Participant Experiences

Mindfulness-based interventions are reported as being efficacious treatments for a variety of psychological and somatic conditions. However, concerns have arisen relating to how mindfulness is operationalized in mindfulness-based interventions and whether its ‘spiritual essence’ and full potential treatment efficacy have remained intact. This qualitative study used interpretative phenomenological analysis to examine participant experiences regarding the acceptability and effectiveness of a newly designed secularized intervention called meditation awareness training (MAT) that follows a more traditional Buddhist approach to meditation. Participants (with issues of stress and low mood) reported experiencing improvements in psychological well-being due to receiving MAT. The wider implications are discussed.     

One and Done? Optimal Decisions From Very Few Samples

In many learning or inference tasks human behavior approximates that of a Bayesian ideal observer, suggesting that, at some level, cognition can be described as Bayesian inference. However, a number of findings have highlighted an intriguing mismatch between human behavior and standard assumptions about optimality: People often appear to make decisions based on just one or a few samples from the appropriate posterior probability distribution, rather than using the full distribution. Although sampling‐based approximations are a common way to implement Bayesian inference, the very limited numbers of samples often used by humans seem insufficient to approximate the required probability distributions very accurately. Here, we consider this discrepancy in the broader framework of statistical decision theory, and ask: If people are making decisions based on samples—but as samples are costly—how many samples should people use to optimize their total expected or worst‐case reward over a large number of decisions? We find that under reasonable assumptions about the time costs of sampling, making many quick but locally suboptimal decisions based on very few samples may be the globally optimal strategy over long periods. These results help to reconcile a large body of work showing sampling‐based or probability matching behavior with the hypothesis that human cognition can be understood in Bayesian terms, and they suggest promising future directions for studies of resource‐constrained cognition.     

Predictive gaze cues affect face evaluations: The effect of facial emotion

When we see someone change their direction of gaze, we spontaneously follow their eyes because we expect people to look at interesting objects. Bayliss and Tipper (2006) examined the consequences of observing this expectancy being either confirmed or violated by faces producing reliable or unreliable gaze cues. Participants viewed different faces that would consistently look at the target, or consistently look away from the target: The faces that consistently looked towards targets were subsequently chosen as being more trustworthy than the faces that consistently looked away from targets. The current work demonstrates that these gaze contingency effects are only detected when faces create a positive social context by smiling, but not in the negative context when all the faces held angry or neutral expressions. These data suggest that implicit processing of the reward contingencies associated with gaze cues relies on a positive emotional expression to maintain expectations of a favourable outcome of joint attention episodes.     

Negative priming reduces affective ratings

The mere exposure effect is the commonly observed increase in pleasantness ratings of stimuli that have been given prior exposure. According to the fluency attribution account of the mere exposure effect, repeated presentations of a stimulus lead to increased ease of processing, which in turn is attributed to pleasantness. If so, processing fluency manipulated by means other than repetition should influence liking. In the present experiment, processing fluency was manipulated using a negative priming procedure, and its influence on affective judgement was examined. Previously ignored stimuli were responded to slower (negative priming) and were rated as less pleasant than controls. It was concluded that decreased processing fluency decreases liking of previously ignored stimuli.