The relationship between recognition and cued recall in memory of enacted and nonenacted information

Summary An experiment was conducted to determine whether the processes underlying memory for enacted and nonenacted events are the same or different. The experimental paradigm used was that of recognition failure of recallable information. At study subjects were given verbal commands (e.g., break the match, roll the ball), that they were to remember or enact and remember. At test subjects were first asked to recognize the noun in each command in the absence of the verb and then to recall the noun with the verb present as cue. Half the subjects were given the two tests in the reverse order. The results demonstrate that enactment and nonenactment differ with respect to the degree of dependence/independence between recognition and recall. In the enactment condition recognition and cued recall are completely independent and in the nonenactment condition they are almost completely dependent.     

Motivated memory: Dissociation between performance data and subjective reports

Summary Three experiments are reported to test a claim by previous subjects that lack of motivation for performing well in memory experiments yielded less than optimal performance. In each experiment the subjects of one group were informed of monetary incentives prior to study; in a second group they were informed of these incentives after study but prior to the test; no mention of incentives was made to the subjects of a third group. Recall and recognition procedures were used to assess memory performance. The data of all three experiments demonstrated no differences between the three groups with respect to performance. The claim that subjects in regular memory experiments would typically perform less than optimally is thus rejected. Subjective reports, however, revealed that incentives had affected the amount of effort put into the memory tasks. This dissociation between performance data and subjective reports is discussed in relation to the concept of motivation.     

Scepticism About Scepticism or the Very Idea of a Global ‘Vat-Language’

This paper aims to motivate a scepticism about scepticism in contemporary epistemology. I present the sceptic with a dilemma: On one parsing of the BIV (brain-in-a-vat) scenario, the second premise in a closure-based sceptical argument will turn out false, because the scenario is refutable; on another parsing, the scenario collapses into incoherence, because the sceptic cannot even save the appearances. I discuss three different ways of cashing out the BIV scenario: ‘Recent Envatment’ (RE), ‘Lifelong Envatment’ (LE) and ‘Nothing But Envatment’ (NBE). I show that RE scenarios are a kind of ‘local’ sceptical scenario that does not pose a significant threat to the possibility of perceptual knowledge as such. I then go on to consider the more radical (or global) LE and NBE scenarios, which do undermine the possibility of perceptual knowledge of an ‘external’ world by positing that it is conceivable that one has always been envatted and, hence, trapped in a ‘global’ illusion. I start by assuming that we could be in such a scenario (LE or NBE) and then spell out what we would need to presuppose for such scenarios to be capable of being actual. Drawing on some central insights from Wittgenstein’s anti-private language considerations, I show that the truth of a global scepticism would presuppose the possibility of a private ‘vat-language’, a notion that cannot be rendered coherent. But, if so, then neither can the sceptical scenarios that presuppose such a conception.

     

Some new results on factor indeterminacy

Some relations between maximum likelihood factor analysis and factor indeterminacy are discussed. Bounds are derived for the minimum average correlation between equivalent sets of correlated factors which depend on the latent roots of the factor intercorrelation matrix . Empirical examples are presented to illustrate some of the theory and indicate the extent to which it can be expected to be relevant in practice.     

Negation of Park's transformations

Zusammenfassung Parks Kritik beruht, meiner Ansicht nach, auf einem entscheidenden Mißverständnis meiner Intentionen: es geht mir überhaupt nicht um eine Argumentation gegen eine Transformationsgrammatik à la Chomsky, und nicht einmal in erster Linie gegen die Absicht mancher Psycholinguisten, eine derartige Theorie in ihren psychischen Funktionen aufzuzeigen. Ich möchte lediglich dafür plädieren, daß die Psycholinguistik in erster Linie psychologische (und nicht linguistische) Überlegungen und Modellvorstellungen als Leitlinien verwendet.     

A method for sensation scaling based on an analogy between perception and judgment

Two techniques for studying judgment are discussed. In the first of these one assumes invariance of perception over different judgment processes and conceives of the properties of one judgment process as known. Then, perceptions may be estimated under this process and utilized in the study of other judgment processes of interest. A second technique disposes of the reliance up on a basic, “known” process and instead suggests that perception be treated as free parameters to be estimated from data. The paper then proceeds to show how this second technique may be used under certain conditions on perception themselves. A concept of sensation is introduced which is thought of as generating percepts in formally the same manner as percepts are thought of as generating judgments. The idea is tried out on the perception of movement time. A simple perception process appears to give a good fit to data.