When knowledge matters—differential effects of available knowledge in standard and basic anchoring tasks

The present research examines whether anchoring effects—the assimilation of a numeric estimate towards a previously considered standard—depend on judges' available knowledge in the target domain. Based on previous research, I distinguish two types of anchoring effects. Standard anchoring is obtained if judges are explicitly asked to compare the anchor to the target. Basic anchoring results if the accessibility of the anchor is increased prior to judgments about the target. I expected that only basic but not standard anchoring is reduced by providing judges with judgment‐relevant knowledge. Using a standard versus basic anchoring paradigm, 112 participants were confronted with a high versus low anchor before estimating the average price of a German midsize car. Prior to this task, participants were provided with information about prices of cars (relevant knowledge) versus kitchens (irrelevant knowledge). Results demonstrate that this knowledge only influenced the magnitude of basic but not standard anchoring effects. This finding demonstrates that knowledge has differential effects in different types of anchoring. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Methodological and empirical issues when dissociating cue-related from task-related processes in the explicit task-cuing procedure

In the explicit cuing version of the task-switching paradigm, each individual task is indicated by a unique task cue. Consequently, a task switch is accompanied by a cue switch. Recently, it has been proposed that priming of cue encoding contributes to the empirically observed switch costs. This proposal was experimentally supported by using a 2:1 mapping of cues to tasks, so that a cue switch does not necessarily imply a task switch. The results indeed suggested a substantial contribution of “cue-switch costs” to task-switch costs. Here we argue that the 2:1 mapping potentially leads to an underestimation of “pure” task-switch costs. To support this argument, we report the results of a new study in which we used “transition cues” that indicate the identity of the current task based on the identity of the preceding task. This new type of cue allows a full factorial manipulation of cue switches and task switches because it includes the condition in which a cue repetition can also indicate a task switch (i.e., when the “switch” cue is repeated). We discuss the methodological implications and argue that the present approach has merits relative to the previously used 2:1 mapping of cues to tasks.     

May I have your attention please: Binding of attended but response-irrelevant features

The feature codes of stimuli and responses can be integrated, and if a stimulus is repeated it can retrieve the previously integrated response. Furthermore, even irrelevant features can be integrated and, upon repetition, retrieve the response. Yet the role of attention in feature integration and retrieval is not clearly understood. Some theories assume a central role of attention (e.g., Logan, 1988; Treisman & Gelade, 1980), but other studies have shown no influence of attention on feature binding (e.g., Hommel, 2005). In the present experiments the effect of attention on the integration of two different response-irrelevant features of the same stimulus was examined. In two experiments, participants responded to the color (response feature) of word stimuli, while two irrelevant features of the words (word type and valence) were systematically varied. Participants’ attention was directed to either one or the other of the response-irrelevant features by asking participants to report that feature at the end of the trial. Feature–response binding effects in the color task were observed to be stronger for the attended response-irrelevant feature. These results indicate that feature binding is not only very flexible but also sensitive to the distribution of attention. It is also automatic, in the sense that as long as attention is available, feature binding occurs irrespective of the task-specific demands.     

To help or not to help an outgroup member: The role of the target's individual attributes in resolving potential helpers' motivational conflict

When people are faced with the decision of whether or not to help an outgroup member, they often experience conflicting motivational tendencies due to the concurrent presence of factors prompting help and factors prompting non‐help. We argue that one way of how people deal with this conflict is by taking a closer look at the target's individual attributes, especially at those indicating the target's benevolence. Findings of Experiment 1 (N = 96), in which we manipulated intercultural dissimilarity between participants and a (fictitious) recipient of help and normative pressure to help as two factors affecting motivational conflict, support this basic assumption. Specifically, response latencies analyses confirmed that participants assigned a culturally highly dissimilar target spent more time on inspecting target‐related information when normative pressure, and thus motivational conflict, was high than when it was low. Experiment 2 (N = 141) extended these findings by demonstrating that providing potential helpers with explicit information about an outgroup member's benevolence increased helping intentions through reducing their negative interaction expectancies (and thus motivational conflict). As expected, this mediational relationship could only be observed for participants assigned a culturally highly dissimilar target. Experiment 3 (N = 46) replicated these mediation findings in a within‐subjects design. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Proactive interference in aging: A model-based study

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Proactive interference occurs when previously learned information interrupts the storage or retrieval of new information. Congruent with previous reports,...     

Auditory distractor processing in sequential selection tasks

In this review, we analyze the cognitive processes contributing to selection in audition. In particular, we focus on the processing of auditory distractors in sequential selection paradigms in which target stimuli are accompanied by distractors. We review the evidence from two established tasks, namely the auditory negative priming and the auditory distractor–response binding task, and discuss the cognitive mechanisms contributing to the results typically observed in these tasks. In fact, several processes have been suggested as to explain how distractors are processed and handled in audition; that is, auditory distractors can be inhibited, encoded with a do-not-respond-tag, integrated into a stimulus–response episode containing the response to the target, or upheld in working memory and matched/mismatched with the following distractor. In addition, variables possibly modulating these cognitive processes are discussed. Finally, auditory distractor processing is compared with distractor processing in vision.     

Attention meets binding: Only attended distractors are used for the retrieval of event files

Response-irrelevant stimuli can be encoded with, and later on retrieve, a response given to a relevant stimulus, an effect that is called distractor–response binding. In three experiments using a prime–probe design, we investigated whether the allocation of attention modulates the processes contributing to distractor–response binding. Participants identified letters via keypresses while attending to one of two sets of simultaneously presented but response-irrelevant number stimuli. In different experiments, both spatial attention and feature-based attention were allocated to the response-irrelevant stimuli. The results showed that only attended response-irrelevant stimuli elicited effects of distractor–response binding. In particular, while the encoding of response-irrelevant stimuli and responses was not particularly affected by attention during prime processing, only attended response-irrelevant stimuli in the probe retrieved previous responses. Hence, we show that attention affects action regulation due to modulating the influence of stimulus–response binding on behavior.     

Playing dice with criminal sentences: the influence of irrelevant anchors on experts' judicial decision making

Judicial sentencing decisions should be guided by facts, not by chance. The present research however demonstrates that the sentencing decisions of experienced legal professionals are influenced by irrelevant sentencing demands even if they are blatantly determined at random. Participating legal experts anchored their sentencing decisions on a given sentencing demand and assimilated toward it even if this demand came from an irrelevant source (Study 1), they were informed that this demand was randomly determined (Study 2), or they randomly determined this demand themselves by throwing dice (Study 3). Expertise and experience did not reduce this effect. This sentencing bias appears to be produced by a selective increase in the accessibility of arguments that are consistent with the random sentencing demand: The accessibility of incriminating arguments was higher if participants were confronted with a high rather than a low anchor (Study 4). Practical and theoretical implications of this research are discussed.     

Early evidence affects later decisions: Why evidence accumulation is required to explain response time data

Models of decision making differ in how they treat early evidence as it recedes in time. Standard models, such as the drift diffusion model, assume that evidence is gradually accumulated until it reaches a boundary and a decision is initiated. One recent model, the urgency gating model, has proposed that decision making does not require the accumulation of evidence at all. Instead, accumulation could be replaced by a simple urgency factor that scales with time. To distinguish between these fundamentally different accounts of decision making, we performed an experiment in which we manipulated the presence, duration, and valence of early evidence. We simulated the associated response time and error rate predictions from the drift diffusion model and the urgency gating model, fitting the models to the empirical data. The drift diffusion model predicted that variations in the evidence presented early in the trial would affect decisions later in that same trial. The urgency gating model predicted that none of these variations would have any effect. The behavioral data showed clear effects of early evidence on the subsequent decisions, in a manner consistent with the drift diffusion model. Our results cannot be explained by the urgency gating model, and they provide support for an evidence accumulation account of perceptual decision making.     

Retrieval of event files can be conceptually mediated

Distractor-based retrieval of event files was assessed with a sequential priming experiment using a four-choice identification task. Pictures or sounds of four different animals (frog, chicken, lamb, singing bird) had to be categorized by pressing one of four keys. On each trial, a target and a distractor stimulus were presented simultaneously in different modalities. The relevant modality switched randomly between trials. Distractor repetition effects were modulated by the response relation between the prime and probe: Repeating the prime distractor in the probe produced facilitation if the response repeated, but not if a different response had to be given in the prime and probe. Repeating the prime distractor in the probe led to an automatic retrieval of the prime response. Importantly, this distractor-based response retrieval effect also emerged for those sequences in which the modality of the repeated distractor was switched between the prime and probe. This cross-modal priming effect indicates that distractors were integrated into event files on a conceptual level and that response retrieval processes were mediated by conceptual codes of the distractor stimuli.