Konzepte der Identifizierung

The authors investigate primary, hysterical, narcissistic identification, and introjection as conceptualised by Freud, Melanie Klein’s projective identification, and Anna Freud’s identification with the aggressor and altruistic surrender. It is pointed out that hysterical identification, narcissistic identification, and introjection are unconscious processes leading into a state of primary identification, and that they can be distinguished on a clinical level as regards the emotional meaning the object has for the subject. In hysterical identification the aspects of an object with which one identifies and all its other aspects retain their emotional meaning, in narcissistic identification these other aspects also keep their emotional meaning, but in this case the aspects with which one identifies lose their emotional meaning, and in introjection all aspects of an object lose their emotional meaning. Furthermore, it is shown that hysterical or narcissistic identifications are the mechanisms underlying the identification with the aggressor, and that—along with projections—hysterical re-identification also plays a decisive role in projective identification and altruistic surrender, whereby in these latter processes the object identifies himself unconsciously with the contents projected onto him in a hysterical or narcissistic manner.     

Recognizing faces from ethnic in‐groups and out‐groups: Importance of outer face features and effects of retention interval

People recognize faces from their own ethnic group more accurately than faces from other ethnic groups. White German (WG) and Turkish participants living in Germany performed an old/new recognition test with faces from several ethnic groups. The presence or absence of external features (hair, face contour) and retention interval (immediate versus 3 weeks) were manipulated. Own‐ethnicity effects (OEEs) were found, with recognition accuracy and response bias varying across the different stimulus sets. The 3‐week retention interval reduced accuracy for in‐group faces but not for out‐group faces, while the removal of outer features was more harmful to out‐group faces than to in‐group faces. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Universes of Fuzzy Sets and Axiomatizations of Fuzzy Set Theory. Part I: Model-Based and Axiomatic Approaches

For classical sets one has with the cumulative hierarchy of sets, with axiomatizations like the system ZF, and with the category SET of all sets and mappings standard approaches toward global universes of all sets. We discuss here the corresponding situation for fuzzy set theory.Our emphasis will be on various approaches toward (more or less naively formed)universes of fuzzy sets as well as on axiomatizations, and on categories of fuzzy sets. What we give is a (critical)survey of quite a lot of such approaches which have been offered in the last approximately 35 years. The present Part I is devoted to model based and to axiomatic approaches; the forth-coming Part II will be devoted to category theoretic approaches. This paper is a version of the invited talk given by the author at the conference Trends in Logic III, dedicated to the memory of A. MOSTOWSKI, H. RASIOWA and C. RAUSZER, and held in Warsaw and Ruciane-Nida from 23rd to 25th September 2005. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

Is this a question? Not for long. The statement bias

Four experiments demonstrate a fundamental ‘statement bias’: questions are more often misremembered as statements than vice versa. The bias increases with increasing item comprehensibility (Experiment 1) and is related to depth of processing at encoding (Experiment 2). When sentences are simply comprehended, the bias is not affected by the truth of the statement underlying the sentence (Experiment 3). The statement bias generalizes to contexts in which people have to express consent with the content of the sentence (Experiment 4) but is somewhat reduced when they are not sure what the correct answer is. Our findings are consistent with the idea that during processing of a sentence the content of the sentence is represented similar to a statement.     

Explicit Persuasive Intent and Its Impact on Success at Persuasion—The Determining Roles of Attractiveness and Likeableness

The effect on the impact of a message of explicitly stating a desire to persuade can depend on the communicator's physical attractiveness. Experiment 1 confirmed this possibility. Attractive male and female salespersons induced more positive attitudes and stronger intentions to purchase a product when they explicitly stated their desire to influence potential buyers. In contrast, unattractive salespersons were less likely to induce a favorable attitude toward the product under these conditions. Experiment 2 replicated these effects and provided evidence that they are mediated by the attribution of self‐serving motives to the salesperson. A 2‐step process of impression formation and attribution was used to describe the mechanisms underlying these effects.     

Cognitive modeling with spreadsheets

Spreadsheet implementations of two different types of cognitive models—a neural network model and a statistical model—are presented. The two examples illustrate how to employ the facilities of spreadsheets, the spreadsheet data structure, array functions, the built-in function library, and the integrated optimizer, for building cognitive models. The two presented models are new extensions of existing models. They are used for simulating data from experiments illustrating that the extended versions are able to explain experimental results that could not be simulated by the original models. The whole simulation study demonstrates that spreadsheets are a handy tool, especially for researchers without programming knowledge who want to build cognitive models and for instructors teaching cognitive modeling.     

Modeling associative recognition: a comparison of two-high-threshold, two-high-threshold signal detection, and mixture distribution models

A 2-high-threshold signal detection (HTSDT) model, a mixture distribution (SON) model, and 2-high-threshold (HT) models with responses distributed over 1 or several response categories were fit to results of 6 experiments from 2 studies on associative recognition: R. Kelley and J. T. Wixted (2001) and A. P. Yonelinas (1997). HTSDT assumes that associative recognition is based on conscious recollection and familiarity assessment, whereas according to SON and HT, associative information results in a shift of familiarity. The modeling results cast doubt on the prominent role of conscious recollection, and as far as models are valid, parameter estimation suggests 2 processes in associative recognition: a shift in familiarity that is due to associative information and the determination of the source of familiarity of pairs.