Perceived causality occurs with stroboscopic movement of one or both stimulus elements

It was shown by magnitude estimation that the perception of causality first described by Michotte (1946/1963) also occurs consistently and strongly with stroboscopic, ie apparent or phi, movement. This is so when the 'causal' movement is stroboscopic and the 'caused' movement real, when these movements are reversed, and when both movements are stroboscopic. The effect is not due to prior experience with Michotte-type displays.     

Out on a limb? On multiple cognitive systems within the octopus nervous system

The idea that there can be only one cognitive system within any single given cognitive organism is an established albeit implicit one within cognitive science and related studies of the mind. The firm foothold of this notion is due largely to the immense corpus of empirical evidence for the correlation of a high level of cognitive sophistication with a centralized nervous system. However, it must be pointed out that these findings are sourced in large part from studies on vertebrates. This paper presents a potential counterexample to the notion that only one cognitive system can be realized within any single genuine cognitive organism. This counterexample is the octopus, an invertebrate with what initially appears to be a paradoxical combination of vertebrate-like cognitive and behavioral capacities and a functionally decentralized nervous system. The extensive relegation of sensorimotor processing and control responsibilities to the peripheral nervous system which controls the arms of the octopus raises principled reasons to believe that the octopus is an organism that may house multiple independent cognitive systems.     

Sine of an illusion

In an informally observed sine-wave figure in which the vertical extent between contours was constant, apparent extent in the crest and trough (the 'turns') appeared greater than in the straight oblique sections of the figure. This observation was confirmed in two experiments in which the vertical extents were matched by two vertically arranged dots. It was found that in a turn the apparent extent was greater than the true extent, but in a straight section both extents were about equal. These outcomes were confirmed when the two sections were each separated from the figure and presented alone. The illusion is explained in terms of a perceptual compromise between the vertical extent and the greater overall dimensions of the section at the turn of the sine-wave figure and is thereby held to be the same in principle as the Müller-Lyer illusion.