Relaxation-induced anxiety: mechanisms and theoretical implications

Literature evidence documenting the occurrence of relaxation-induced anxiety is reviewed, and several hypothesized mechanisms to explain the phenomenon are discussed. Possible avenues for circumventing the problem in therapy are offered. Finally, a theoretical model is presented wherein the phenomenon is viewed with a broader framework designed to explain the development and maintenance of the more generalized anxiety disorders. That framework emphasizes the emergence of fear of somatic anxiety cues and fear of loss of control from more fundamental interpersonal anxieties.     

Time course of visual information utilization during fixations in reading

College students read short texts from a cathode-ray tube as their eye movements were being monitored. During selected fixations, the text was briefly masked and then it reappeared with one word changed. Subjects often were unaware that the word had changed. Sometimes they reported seeing the first presented word, sometimes the second presented word, and sometimes both. When only one word was reported, two factors were found to determine which one it was: the length of time a word was present during the fixation and the predictability of a word in its context. The results suggested that visual information is utilized for reading at a crucial period during the fixation and that this crucial period can occur at different times on different fixations. The pattern of responses suggested that the first letter of a word is not utilized before other letters and that letters are not scanned from left to right during a fixation.     

Objects, parts, and categories

Concepts may be organized into taxonomies varying in inclusiveness or abstraction, such as furniture, table, card table or animal, bird, robin. For taxonomies of common objects and organisms, the basic level, the level of table and bird, has been determined to be most informative (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Psychology, linguistics, and anthropology have produced a variety of measures of perception, behavior, and communication that converge on the basic level. Here, we present data showing that the basic level differs qualitatively from other levels in taxonomies of objects and of living things and present an explanation for why so many measures converge at that level. We have found that part terms proliferate in subjects' listings of attributes characterizing category members at the basic level, but are rarely listed at a general level. At a more specific level, fewer parts are listed, though more are judged to be true. Basic level objects are distinguished from one another by parts, but members of subordinate categories share parts and differ from one another on other attributes. Informants agree on the parts of objects, and also on relative "goodness" of the various parts. Perceptual salience and functional significance both appear to contribute to perceived part goodness. Names of parts frequently enjoy a duality not evident in names of other attributes; they refer at once to a particular appearance and to a particular function. We propose that part configuration underlies the various empirical operations of perception, behavior, and communication that converge at the basic level. Part configuration underlies the perceptual measures because it determines the shapes of objects to a large degree. Parts underlie the behavioral tasks because most of our behaviors is indirect toward parts of objects. Labeling appears to follow the natural breaks of perception and behavior; consequently, part configuration also underlies communication measures. Because elements of more abstract taxonomies, such as scenes and events, can also be decomposed into parts, this analysis provides a bridge to organization in other domains of knowledge. Knowledge organization by parts (partonomy) is contrasted to organization by kinds (taxonomy). Taxonomies serve to organize numerous classes of entities and to allow inference from larger sets to sets included in them. Partonomies serve to separate entities into their structural components and to organize knowledge of function by components of structure. The informativeness of the basic level may originate from the availability of inference from structure to function at that level.     

Two issues concerning tonal hierarchies: comment on Castellano, Bharucha, and Krumhansl

First, because tonal hierarchies exist in the music of long-established traditions, we may assume that they confer certain processing advantages. Such hierarchies capitalize on certain properties of the pitch memory system that do not require a tonal setting for demonstration. Furthermore, they facilitate the generation of hierarchical representations of sequential patterns of pitches, and such representations enable considerable parsimony of encoding. Second, the listener's establishment of a tonal hierarchy involves a process of key attribution. This process draws not only on the identities of the notes presented but also draws on their orderings. Certain sequential grouping factors are involved here that can also be shown to exist outside a tonal setting. We are therefore dealing with an elaborate bootstrapping operation, through which both a key and a sequential representation are arrived at by the listener.     

Integrating pictorial information across eye movements

Six experiments are reported dealing with the types of information integrated across eye movements in picture perception. A line drawing of an object was presented in peripheral vision, and subjects made an eye movement to it. During the saccade, the initially presented picture was replaced by another picture that the subject was instructed to name as quickly as possible. The relation between the stimulus on the first fixation and the stimulus on the second fixation was varied. Across the six experiments, there was about 100-130 ms facilitation when the pictures were identical compared with a control condition in which only the target location was specified on the first fixation. This finding clearly implies that information about the first picture facilitated naming the second picture. Changing the size of the picture from one fixation to the next had little effect on naming time. This result is consistent with work on reading and low-level visual processes in indicating that pictorial information is not integrated in a point-by-point manner in an integrated visual buffer. Moreover, only about 50 ms of the facilitation for identical pictures could be attributed to the pictures having the same name. When the pictures represented the same concept (e.g., two different pictures of a horse), there was a 90-ms facilitation effect that could have been the result of either the visual or conceptual similarity of the pictures. However, when the pictures had different names, only visual similarity produced facilitation. Moreover, when the pictures had different names, there appeared to be inhibition from the competing names. The results of all six experiments are consistent with a model in which the activation of both the visual features and the name of the picture seen on the first fixation survive the saccade and combine with the information extracted on the second fixation to produce identification and naming of the second picture.     

Awareness of the response after feedback training for changes in heart rate and sudomotor laterality

What is the relation between the ability to control visceral responding on a biofeedback task and the ability to report behaviors actually contributing to this performance? Subjects received biofeedback training for unidentified visceral responses and then gave written reports about what they had done to control the feedback displays. Independent judges were given these reports and, on the basis of knowledge about activities known to contribute to visceral activity, were asked to determine the visceral responses for which the subjects had been trained. The reports of subjects who succeeded at bidirectional control of heart rate (Experiment 1) or sudomotor laterality (Experiment 2) showed awareness of behaviors related to feedback as assessed by this procedure, whereas the reports of subjects who failed at bidirectional control did not. Subsequent experiments indicated that these results did not depend on a learning strategy that might have been specific to the initial studies. These findings call into question the view that people are unaware of what they have done to produce the response after training on biofeedback tasks. Earlier studies reporting lack of awareness in biofeedback are discussed in light of factors that affect the measurement of biofeedback learning and response awareness.     

Individual differences in loudness processing and loudness scales

Parameters of the psychophysical function for loudness (a 1000-Hz tone) were assessed for individual subjects in three experiments: (a) binaural loudness summation, (b) temporal loudness summation, and (c) judgments of loudness intervals. The loudness scales that underlay the additive binaural summation closely approximated S. S. Stevens's (1956) sone scale but were nonlinearly related to the scales that underlay the subtractive interval judgments, the latter approximating Garner's (1954) lambda scale. Interindividual differences in temporal summation were unrelated to differences in scaling performance or in binaural summation. Although the exponents of magnitude-estimation functions and the exponents underlying interval judgments varied considerably from subject to subject, exponents computed on the basis of underlying binaural summation varied less. The results suggest that interindividual variation in the exponent of magnitude-estimation functions largely reflects differences in the ways that subjects use numbers to describe loudnesses and that the sensory representations of loudness are fairly uniform, though probably not wholly uniform, among people with normal hearing. The magnitude of individual variation in at least one measure of auditory intensity processing, namely, temporal summation, seems at least as great as the magnitude of the variation in the underlying loudness scale.     

Uncontrollable shock proactively increases sensitivity to response-reinforcer independence in rats

Learned helplessness theory predicts that animals exposed to inescapable shock acquire an expectancy of response-reinforcer independence, which proactively interferes with learning of response-reinforcer dependence. The theory also predicts that this expectancy can increase sensitivity to subsequent instances of response-reinforcer independence. These experiments test the latter prediction in a paradigm that minimizes the confounding effects of shock-induced activity deficits. Rats were trained to respond for food, then given either escapable, inescapable, or no shock. Subsequently, they received two sessions of response-contingent food followed by sessions of noncontingent food deliveries. During this phase, inescapably shocked animals decreased responding faster than did controls. Experiment 2 replicated this finding with a different schedule of food delivery and a procedure that more directly minimized the possibility that the outcome is due to either direct or indirect shock-induced activity changes. These results support the prediction that uncontrollable aversive events can increase an animal's sensitivity to noncontingent response-reinforcer relationships.