The action-sentence compatibility effect in Japanese sentences

The action-sentence compatibility effect (ACE) is a phenomenon in which a reader's response to a sentence is made faster when there is congruity between the action described in the sentence and the action that makes up the response. Previous studies showed the ACE occurs in action-related sentences in several languages. However, all these were SVO (verb-object) languages, in which verbs are placed before object nouns; this order is reversed in SOV languages. Moreover, those studies investigated hand responses. This study assessed the existence of the ACE in Japanese, an SOV language, and in foot responses. 24 female participants judged the sensibility of Japanese sentences that described actions and responded with either their foot or hand as an effector. Reaction times were significantly faster when there was congruity between the effector described in the sentences and the effector actually used for the response. However, sentence dependency was also found in the foot responses.     

From ugly duckling to swan?: Japanese and American beliefs about the stability and origins of traits

Two studies compared the development of beliefs about the stability and origins of physical and psychological traits in Japan and the United States in three age groups: 5–6-year-olds, 8–10-year-olds, and college students. The youngest children in both cultures were the most optimistic about negative traits changing in a positive direction over development and being maintained over the aging period. The belief that individual differences in traits are inborn increased with age, and in all age groups, this belief was related to predictions of greater trait stability. In both cultures, all ages believed positive traits would be maintained over development. In addition to developmental similarities across cultures, cultural variations, consistent with the hypothesis that interdependent cultures have a more incremental view of traits, were present. Japanese participants were more optimistic than American participants about negative traits changing towards the positive and were more likely to attribute differences in trait expression to effort.     

Subjective responses to emotional stimuli during labeling, reappraisal, and distraction

Although multiple neuroimaging studies suggest that affect labeling (i.e., putting feelings into words) can dampen affect-related responses in the amygdala, the consequences of affect labeling have not been examined in other channels of emotional responding. We conducted four studies examining the effect of affect labeling on self-reported emotional experience. In study one, self-reported distress was lower during affect labeling, compared to passive watching, of negative emotional pictures. Studies two and three added reappraisal and distraction conditions, respectively. Affect labeling showed similar effects on self-reported distress as both of these intentional emotion regulation strategies. In each of the first three studies, however, participant predictions about the effects of affect labeling suggest that unlike reappraisal and distraction, people do not believe affect labeling to be an effective emotion regulation strategy. Even after having the experience of affect labels leading to lower distress, participants still predicted that affect labeling would increase distress in the future. Thus, affect labeling is best described as an incidental emotion regulation process. Finally, study four employed positive emotional pictures and here, affect labeling was associated with diminished self-reported pleasure, relative to passive watching. This suggests that affect labeling tends to dampen affective responses in general, rather than specifically alleviating negative affect.     

Young Children's Conception of the Biological World

ABSTRACT— What are the components of children's biological-knowledge system before systematic teaching at school? Can this knowledge system be called naive biology? We propose that young children's biological-knowledge system has at least two essential components—(a) the knowledge needed to identify biological entities and phenomena and (b) teleological and vitalistic causality—and that these components constitute a form of biology. We discuss how this naive biology serves as the basis for performance and learning in socially and culturally important practices, such as health practices and biology instruction.     

Young children''s naive theory of biology

This article aimed at investigating the nature of young children's naive theory of biology by reviewing a large number of studies conducted in our laboratories. More specifically, we tried to answer the following five critical questions. What components does young children's knowledge system for biological phenomena (or naive biology) have? What functions does it have in children's lives? How is it acquired in ontogenesis? How does its early version change as children grow older? Is it universal across cultures and through history? We propose that young children's biological knowledge system has at least three components, that is, knowledge needed to specify the target objects of biology, ways of inferring attributes or behaviors of biological kinds, and a non-intentional causal explanatory framework, and that these three constitute a form of biology, which is adaptive in children's lives. We also claim that the core of naive biology is acquired based on specific cognitive constraints as well as the general mechanism of personification and the resultant vitalistic causality, but it is differently instantiated and elaborated through activity-based experiences in the surrounding culture.     

Colour versus quantity as cues in reverse-reward-competent squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus)

To assess the relative salience of colour and quantity cues, squirrel monkeys previously trained to reach for the smaller of two quantities of food in a reverse-reward contingency task received colour discrimination training. After initial failure to discriminate between two colours of dots under a differential reinforcement regime, they learned the task when the S- colour was associated with zero reward. The monkeys then showed good retention on the original reverse-reward task of 1 versus 4 with pairs of dots presented in S+ or S- colours. However, on "mismatch" trials of 1S- versus 4S+ , only 2 of 4 monkeys tested showed a preference--1 monkey chose based on quantity, the other based on colour. Individual differences and the possible roles of overshadowing and blocking are discussed.