Motor execution affects action prediction

Previous studies provided evidence of the claim that the prediction of occluded action involves real-time simulation. We report two experiments that aimed to study how real-time simulation is affected by simultaneous action execution under conditions of full, partial or no overlap between observed and executed actions. This overlap was analysed by comparing the body sides and the movement kinematics involved in the observed and the executed action. While performing actions, participants observed point-light (PL) actions that were interrupted by an occluder, followed by a test pose. The task was to judge whether the test pose depicted a continuation of the occluded action in the same depth angle. Using a paradigm proposed by Graf et al., we independently manipulated the duration of the occluder and the temporal advance of the test pose relative to occlusion onset (occluder time and pose time, respectively). This paradigm allows the assessment of real-time simulation, based on prediction performance across different occluder time/pose time combinations (i.e., improved task performance with decreasing time distance between occluder time and pose time is taken to reflect real-time simulation). The PL actor could be perceived as from the front or back, as indicated by task instructions. In Experiment 1 (front view instructions), evidence of action simulation was obtained for partial overlap (i.e., observed and performed action corresponded either in body side or movement kinematics), but not for full or no overlap conditions. The same pattern was obtained in Experiment 2 (back view instructions), ruling out a spatial compatibility explanation for the real-time pattern observed. Our results suggest that motor processes affect action prediction and real-time simulation. The strength of their impact varies as a function of the overlap between observed and executed actions.     

The role of threat,emotions, and prejudice in promoting collective action against immigrant groups

In two studies we assessed the role of distinctiveness threat, group‐based emotions (angst, fear, and anger), and prejudice on people's willingness to engage in collective action against immigrant groups. In Study 1 (N = 222) White British participants were either informed that in the next 40 years the proportion of immigrants in the UK is unlikely to change (control condition) or that there will be more immigrants than White British people living in Britain (threat condition). We obtained support for a sequential multiple mediator model in which threat predicted British people's willingness to engage in collective action via the emotions first and then prejudice. This finding was replicated in Study 2 with an Italian sample (N = 283). These results enhance understanding of when and why advantaged groups undertake collective action against disadvantaged groups by demonstrating that distinctiveness threats and emotions promote such actions.     

Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions

Common-sense folk psychology and mainstream philosophy of action agree about decisions: these are under an agent's direct control, and are thus intentional actions for which agents can be held responsible. I begin this paper by presenting a problem for this view. In short, since the content of the motivational attitudes that drive deliberation and decision remains open-ended until the moment of decision, it is unclear how agents can be thought to exercise control over what they decide at the moment of deciding. I note that this problem might motivate a non-actional view of deciding—a view that decisions are not actions, but are instead passive events of intention acquisition. For without an understanding of how an agent might exercise control over what is decided at the moment of deciding, we lack a good reason for maintaining commitment to an actional view of deciding. However, I then offer the required account of how agents exercise control over decisions at the moment of deciding. Crucial to this account is an understanding of the relation of practical deliberation to deciding, an understanding of skilled deliberative activity, and the role of attention in the mental action of deciding.     

For God (or) country: the hydraulic relation between government instability and belief in religious sources of control

It has been recently proposed that people can flexibly rely on sources of control that are both internal and external to the self to satisfy the need to believe that their world is under control (i.e., that events do not unfold randomly or haphazardly). Consistent with this, past research demonstrates that, when personal control is threatened, people defend external systems of control, such as God and government. This theoretical perspective also suggests that belief in God and support for governmental systems, although seemingly disparate, will exhibit a hydraulic relationship with one another. Using both experimental and longitudinal designs in Eastern and Western cultures, the authors demonstrate that experimental manipulations or naturally occurring events (e.g., electoral instability) that lower faith in one of these external systems (e.g., the government) lead to subsequent increases in faith in the other (e.g., God). In addition, mediation and moderation analyses suggest that specific concerns with order and structure underlie these hydraulic effects. Implications for the psychological, sociocultural, and sociopolitical underpinnings of religious faith, as well as system justification theory, are discussed.     

On the Perceptual Control of Bimanual Performance

The author compares some critical findings of F. Mechsner and his colleagues with related results from other laboratories to point out that when higher levels of representation are available, those levels might come to be the focus of attention and control motor actions by overriding constraints at lower levels of the system.     

A Test of Order-Constrained Hypotheses for Circular Data With Applications to Human Movement Science

Researchers studying the movements of the human body often encounter data measured in angles (e.g., angular displacements of joints). The evaluation of these circular data requires special statistical methods. The authors introduce a new test for the analysis of order-constrained hypotheses for circular data. Through this test, researchers can evaluate their expectations regarding the outcome of an experiment directly by representing their ideas in the form of a hypothesis containing inequality constraints. The resulting data analysis is generally more powerful than one using standard null hypothesis testing. Two examples of circular data from human movement science are presented to illustrate the use of the test. Results from a simulation study show that the test performs well.     

Introduction: The Role of Process Metaphysics in Our World of Science

This article applies the analytic rigor of philosophy to the vexed topic of business strategy, and uses the objective, public evidence of business strategy as an existence proof for the possibility of free will and purpose in the private realm of subjective intentionality. The first part distinguishes three types of intentionality in philosophy—purposive intentionality, referential intentionality, and the problematic intentionality of a godlike, miraculous “inner intender.” After rejecting this third type of intentionality, and noting that its rejection saves the first two types of intentionality from guilt by association, the second part draws parallels with three types of strategy in business: purposive, referential, and godlike. The first defines the goals and objectives of a company; the second picks out and targets consumers in market driven strategy; and the third, with the help of philosophical reflections, demands a rethinking of the function of leadership without reliance on a single, godlike leader. In the third part of this article, the existence proof from the public world of business is used to shed light on the possibility of intentionality in the private world of subjective intentionality. Finally, the article draws conclusions for its three audiences: for the philosophers, with credit to Nietzsche who saw it all, a greater clarity about intentionality and free will; for business people, greater clarity about the importance of purposiveness and strategic intent; and for business philosophers, a demonstration showing how—through strategy and intentionality—we can both create value and give meaning to the lives of our employees, ourselves, and our customers.