A processing fluency explanation of bias against migrants

This research investigated whether people are biased against migrants partly because they find migrants more difficult to cognitively process than nonmigrants. In Study 1, 181 undergraduate students evaluated migrant and nonmigrant members of two minimal groups and reported the difficulty that they experienced in thinking about each type of target. Participants rated migrants less positively than nonmigrants, and difficulty ratings partially mediated this effect. Study 2 (N = 191) replicated these findings and demonstrated similar findings for individuals who had been excluded from minimal groups. This evidence implies that migrant bias can be explained partly in terms of the difficulty that people have in processing information about migrants, and that it is related to migrants’ exclusion from their original group.     

Knowledge: Value on the Cheap

We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome these challenges. To a first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is that of understanding how the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than does the property of being true. The Secondary Value Problem is one of understanding how, for instance, the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than does the property of being jointly true and justified. We argue that attending to the fact that beliefs are continuing states reveals that there is no difficulty in appreciating how knowledge might ordinarily have more epistemic value than mere true belief or mere justified true belief. We also explore in what ways ordinary cases of knowledge might be of distinctive epistemic value. In the end, our proposal resembles the original Platonic suggestion in the Meno that knowledge is valuable because knowledge is somehow tied to the good of truth.     

Knowledge and the value of cognitive ability

We challenge a line of thinking at the fore of recent work on epistemic value: the line (suggested by Kvanvig in The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003 and others) that if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of mere true belief, then we have good reason to doubt its theoretical importance in epistemology. We offer a value-driven argument for the theoretical importance of knowledge—one that stands even if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of true belief. Specifically, we contend that even if knowledge itself has no special epistemic value, its relationship to other items of value—cognitive abilities—gives ample reason to locate the concept at the very core of epistemology.     

A Situational Model of Sexual Assault Prevention through Bystander Intervention

Bystander intervention is a potentially potent tool in the primary prevention of sexual assault but more information is needed to guide prevention programs (Banyard 2008). Undergraduates (378 women and 210 men, primarily White) at a central coast California university completed an anonymous questionnaire measuring five barriers identified by the situational model of bystander intervention (Latane and Darley 1970) and bystander intervention behavior. As expected, the barriers were negatively correlated with intervention, were greater for men than for women, and intervention likelihood was affected by perceptions of victim worthiness, especially for men. Hypotheses predicting a positive relationship between having a relationship with the potential victim or perpetrator and intervention were supported. Implications for sexual assault bystander intervention programming are provided.     

When bad stress goes good: increased threat reactivity predicts improved category learning performance

The way in which we respond to everyday stressors can have a profound impact on cognitive functioning. Maladaptive stress responses in particular are generally associated with impaired cognitive performance. We argue, however, that the cognitive system mediating task performance is also a critical determinant of the stress-cognition relationship. Consistent with this prediction, we observed that stress reactivity consistent with a maladaptive, threat response differentially predicted performance on two categorization tasks. Increased threat reactivity predicted enhanced performance on an information-integration task (i.e., learning is thought to depend upon a procedural-based memory system), and a (nonsignificant) trend for impaired performance on a rule-based task (i.e., learning is thought to depend upon a hypothesis-testing system). These data suggest that it is critical to consider both variability in the stress response and variability in the cognitive system mediating task performance in order to fully understand the stress-cognition relationship.     

Explaining intra-individual variability in social behavior through idiographic assessment: The case of humor

Much variability in social behavior is intra-individual; people vary their actions strategically across contexts. Yet most personality assessment methods are inter-individual; they chart between-person differences in average behavioral tendencies. The present research advanced novel idiographic assessment methods to predict intra-individual variability in a behavioral domain of long-standing interest to personality psychologists: humor. Individuals participated in three assessment sessions. Personal beliefs about reasons for using humor were assessed either idiographically or with respect to a nomothetic system of humor-related reasons for action. The subjective relevance of nomothetically- and idiographically-identified reasons to everyday social situations was assessed. Subsequently, participants reported their perceived likelihood of using humor in specific social contexts. As predicted, likelihood of humor use varied substantially as a function of the relevance of situations to idiographically-identified reasons, but did not vary as a function of the relevance of situations to reasons identified nomothetically. Implications for personality and assessment are discussed.     

Genomic Counseling in the Newborn Period: Experiences and Views of Genetic Counselors

As newborn screening (NBS) technology expands, genetic counselors will become more involved in counseling for NBS results, including those potentially generated from whole exome sequencing (WES) and eventually whole genome sequencing (WGS). Members of the National Society of Genetic Counselors (NSGC) responded to an online survey (n?=?208) regarding genomic counseling in the context of NBS. The majority of participants (82.1 %) did not feel prepared to counsel for WGS results from NBS. Counselors with previous WES/WGS counseling experience felt more prepared (p?=?0.005) to counsel for WGS results from NBS than those without WES/WGS experience. Overall, counselors expressed ethical and practical concerns regarding WGS in NBS, as well as a need for additional training regarding this application of the technology before it is implemented. Based on the results of this study, genetic counselors voice caution to the larger genetics community regarding expansion of NBS to incorporate genomic sequencing and advocate for additional education prior to initiating WGS into NBS.     

On methodological standards in training and transfer experiments

The past two decades have seen a tremendous surge in scientific interest in the extent to which certain types of training—be it aerobic, athletic, musical, video game, or brain trainer—can result in general enhancements in cognitive function. While there are certainly active debates regarding the results in these domains, what is perhaps more pressing is the fact that key aspects of methodology remain unsettled. Here we discuss a few of these areas including expectation effects, test–retest effects, the size of the cognitive test battery, the selection of control groups, group assignment methods, difficulties in comparing results across studies, and in interpreting null results. Specifically, our goal is to highlight points of contention as well as areas where the most commonly utilized methods could be improved upon. Furthermore, because each of the sub-areas above (aerobic training through brain training) share strong similarities in goal, theoretical framework, and experimental approach, we seek to discuss these issues from a general perspective that considers each as members of the same broad “training” domain.     

Proof Theory for Functional Modal Logic

We present some proof-theoretic results for the normal modal logic whose characteristic axiom is \(\mathord {\sim }\mathord {\Box }A\equiv \mathord {\Box }\mathord {\sim }A\). We present a sequent system for this logic and a hypersequent system for its first-order form and show that these are equivalent to Hilbert-style axiomatizations. We show that the question of validity for these logics reduces to that of classical tautologyhood and first-order logical truth, respectively. We close by proving equivalences with a Fitch-style proof system for revision theory.