Guest Editors’ Introduction

Journal of Philosophical Logic -     

Empirical Vindication of Moral Luck

In resultant moral luck, blame and punishment seem intuitively to depend on downstream effects of a person’s action that are beyond his or her control. Some skeptics argue that we should override our intuitions about moral luck and reform our practices. Other skeptics attempt to explain away apparent cases of moral luck as epistemic artifacts. I argue, to the contrary, that moral luck is real—that people are genuinely responsible for some things beyond their control. A partially consequentialist theory of responsibility justifies moral luck. But this justification is no mere rationalization of the status quo. Recent experimental and evolutionary work on punishment and learning suggests that the very same reasons that justify moral luck have also shaped the evolution of our luck‐sensitive moral practices.     

The response-signal method reveals age-related changes in object working memory

Sixteen healthy young adults (ages 18-32) and 16 healthy older adults (ages 67-81) completed a delayed response task in which they saw the following visual sequence: memory stimuli (2 abstract shapes; 3,000 ms), a blank delay (5,000 ms), a probe stimulus of variable duration (one abstract shape; 125, 250, 500, 1,000, or 2,000 ms), and a mask (500 ms). Subjects decided whether the probe stimulus matched either of the memory stimuli; they were instructed to respond during the mask, placing greater emphasis on speed than accuracy. The authors used D. L. Hintzman & T. Curran's (1994) 3-parameter compound bounded exponential model of speed-accuracy tradeoff to describe changes in discriminability associated with total processing time. Group-level analysis revealed a higher rate parameter and a higher asymptote parameter for the young adult group, but no difference across groups in x-intercept. Proxy measures of cognitive reserve (Y. Stern et al., 2005) predicted the rate parameter value, particularly in older adults. Results suggest that in working memory, aging impairs both the maximum capacity for discriminability and the rate of information accumulation, but not the temporal threshold for discriminability.     

A comprehensive model and measure of compensation satisfaction

We describe the results of two studies designed to develop a comprehensive theoretical model and measure of compensation satisfaction. Our typology of compensation satisfaction consists of seven dimensions: four for pay (level, structure, raises, and variable pay procedures satisfaction) and three dimensions for benefits (level, determination, and administration satisfaction). We used new and existing items to develop the Comprehensive Compensation Satisfaction Questionnaire. In Study 1, we report the results of exploratory factor analysis that supports a seven‐factor structure. In Study 2, confirmatory factor analysis supported the same seven‐factor structure in a different sample. We examined relationships between the compensation satisfaction dimensions and their antecedents and consequences. Seven hypotheses regarding differential antecedents of compensation satisfaction were supported. Satisfaction with aspects of compensation procedures were related to perceived organizational support, and perceived organizational support mediated the relationships between these compensation satisfaction procedures and affective commitment and turnover intentions. Our final analysis yielded a 29‐item scale (including eight new items) which we recommend for use in future compensation satisfaction research.     

ACHIEVING A SCIENCE OF SACRED DOCTRINE*

Aquinas claims that sacred doctrine is a science, or scientia. All scientiae involve demonstrations containing principles which yield conclusions that are necessary and certain. The principles leading to sacred scientia are the articles of faith. Those articles are contained in Scripture and constitute the premises of demonstrations the conclusions of which form sacred doctrine's content. Because of those articles' divine origin, we can expect them to yield conclusions the truth of which is guaranteed. According to William Abraham, however, Aquinas must demonstrate Scripture's divine origin as a condition for achieving a sacred scientia. In the absence of such a demonstration, we cannot be certain that the articles contained in Scripture are God‐breathed, nor can we be certain that the conclusions deduced from them belong to sacred doctrine. Abraham argues that Aquinas's putative demonstration of Scripture's divine origin fails and—consequently—so does his attempt to establish a sacred scientia. In this paper, I will show that Aquinas never intended to provide such a demonstration, nor does he need to in order to secure sacred doctrine's status as a scientia. Furthermore, I will show that achieving sacred scientia is not, pace Abraham, an epistemological undertaking but a spiritual discipline that eventuates in knowledge of and love for God.     

Is Consequential Luck Morally Inconsequential? Empirical Psychology and the Reassessment of Moral Luck

Philosophical discussions of the phenomenon that has come to be known as ‘moral luck’ have either dismissed it as illusory or touted it as the evidence for doubting the probative value of our commitment to certain widely avowed views concerning interpersonal assessments of responsibility. In this discussion, we present a third, distinctive interpretation of the moral luck phenomenon. Drawing upon empirically robust results from psychological studies of judgment bias, we argue that the phenomenon of moral luck is demonstrably not illusory. What we suggest, however, is that the phenomenon ought not to be taken to countenance doubts about the standards generally taken to be regulative of assessments of interpersonal responsibility. Rather, its significance lies in foregrounding certain generally unacknowledged obstacles we face in the process of conclusively applying general valid moral standards in making specific judgments of responsibility and desert.¹     

Single versus multiple systems of category learning: Reply to Nosofsky and Kruschke (2002)

Nosofsky and Kruschke (2002) argued that the singlesystem ALCOVE model (Kruschke, 1992) can account for the dual-task category learning data reported by Waldron and Ashby (2001). In our reply, we argue that Nosofsky and Kruschke overstated the ability of ALCOVE to account for the Waldron and Ashby results. In fact, ALCOVE has difficulty with these data, and we show that the only versions of ALCOVE that actually fit the Waldron and Ashby accuracy data make incorrect predictions about other previously unreported features of that experiment. We also show that the dual-system COVIS model (Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998) naturally predicts these results.     

On Measuring Forgiveness: Implications from Smallest Space Analysis of the Forgiveness Likelihood Scale

The structure of the Rye et al.’s Forgiveness Likelihood Scale was evaluated using the principal components analysis and Guttman’s Smallest Space Analysis. Participants (n = 98) were students in Introduction to Psychology classes. While the former suggested a one-factor solution, the latter suggested differentiating the items based on the facet of ease of forgiving with three subsets: easy, medium, and difficult items. Unexpectedly, the Total Forgiveness Likelihood Scale score and the subscale based on just difficult items correlated significantly with the Fantasy subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. A mapping sentence is offered with four facets and their putative constituent elements as a way to conceptualize the development of new, or to improve upon current, forgiveness likelihood scales.     

The Token Activity: Generating Awareness of Power in Counseling Relationships

The authors present an experiential activity, the token activity, that increases student awareness of power and privilege dynamics. Student feedback is incorporated to offer perceptions and knowledge gained from their experience. Los autores presentan una actividad experiencial, la actividad simbólica, que incrementa la conciencia los estudiantes sobre poder y dinámica de privilegios. Se incluyen las reacciones de los estudiantes para ofrecer las percepciones y el conocimiento que adquirieron durante su experiencia.     

Critrial noise effects on rule-based category learning: The impact of delayed feedback

Variability in the representation of the decision criterion is assumed in many category-learning models, yet few studies have directly examined its impact. On each trial, criterial noise should result in drift in the criterion and will negatively impact categorization accuracy, particularly in rule-based categorization tasks, where learning depends on the maintenance and manipulation of decision criteria. In three experiments, we tested this hypothesis and examined the impact of working memory on slowing the drift rate. In Experiment 1, we examined the effect of drift by inserting a 5-sec delay between the categorization response and the delivery of corrective feedback, and working memory demand was manipulated by varying the number of decision criteria to be learned. Delayed feedback adversely affected performance, but only when working memory demand was high. In Experiment 2, we built on a classic finding in the absolute identification literature and demonstrated that distributing the criteria across multiple dimensions decreases the impact of drift during the delay. In Experiment 3, we confirmed that the effect of drift during the delay is moderated by working memory. These results provide important insights into the interplay between criterial noise and working memory, as well as providing important constraints for models of rule-based category learning.