Relating distinctive orthographic and phonological processes to episodic memory performance

Three experiments examined the role of three distinctive perceptual factors in recognition and recall memory. Using a subject-paced presentation rate, the first two experiments (recognition and recall) examined (1) the number of phonological-to-orthographic neighbors, (2) phonological-to-orthographic consistency, and (3) orthographic-to-phonological consistency. The third experiment (recall) reexamined the number of phonological-to-orthographic neighbors, using an experimenter-paced presentation rate of 2 sec per item. In both recognition and recall memory tasks, the number of phonological-to-orthographic neighbors influenced memory performance, whereas the two types of consistency did not. The results indicate that having fewer phonological-to-orthographic neighbors (i.e., having distinct mappings between orthography and phonology, and between phonology and orthography, e.g., pulp) relieve words from interference in episodic memory tests for such words. Furthermore, words that are indistinct in terms of these mappings (e.g., tuck) are subject to interference from words with similar representations (e.g., luck, buck, stuck), and this weakens the memory trace for a particular word.     

Attempting to avoid false memories in the Deese/Roediger—McDermott paradigm: Assessing the combined influence of practice and warnings in young and old adults

On each of five study-test trials, young and old adults attempted to memorize the same list of 60 words (e.g., bed, rest, awake), which were blocked according to their convergence on four corresponding associates. Half of the participants in each age group were given an explicit warning about the DRM paradigm prior to encoding and were asked to attempt to avoid recalling any associated but nonpresented words (e.g., sleep). Lists were presented auditorily at either a fast (1,250 msec/word) or a slow (2,500 msec/word) rate. Without a warning, the probability of veridical recall across trials increased for both age groups; however, the probability of false recall across trials decreased only for young adults. When a warning about false recall was provided, young adults virtually eliminated false recall by the second trial. Even though old adults also used warnings to reduce false recall on Trial 1, they were still unable to decrease false memories across the remaining four study-test trials. Old adults also reduced false recall more with slow than with fast presentation rates. Taken together, these findings suggest that old adults have a breakdown in spontaneous, self-initiated source monitoring as reflected by little change in false recall across study-test trials but a preserved ability to use experimenter-provided warnings or slow presentation rates to reduce false memories.     

Holography does not account for goodness: a critique of van der Helm and Leeuwenberg (1996)

P. A. van der Helm and E. L. J. Leeuwenberg (1996) outlined a holographic account of figural goodness of a perceptual stimulus. The theory is mathematically precise and can be applied to a broad spectrum of empirical data. The authors argue, however, that the account is inadequate on both theoretical and empirical grounds. The theoretical difficulties concern the internal consistency of the account and its reliance on unspecified auxiliary assumptions. The account also makes counterintuitive empirical predictions, which do not fit past data or the results of a series of new experimental studies.     

Perceptual organization influences visual working memory

Previous studies have demonstrated that top-down factors can bias the storage of information in visual working memory. However, relatively little is known about the role that bottom-up stimulus characteristics play in visual working memory storage. In the present study, subjects performed a change detection task in which the to-be-remembered objects were organized in accordance with Gestalt grouping principles. When an attention-capturing cue was presented at the location of one object, other objects that were perceptually grouped with the cued object were more likely to be stored in working memory than were objects that were not grouped with the cued object. Thus, objects that are grouped together tend to be stored together, indicating that bottom-up perceptual organization influences the storage of information in visual working memory.     

The predictive strength of personal constructs versus conventional constructs: self-image disparity and neuroticism

Idiographic personal construct (PC) measures of self-image disparity were hypothesized to be stronger than nonidiographic conventional construct (CC) measures in predicting neuroticism. Ninety-six college students completed PC and CC measures of real self, ideal self, social self, and ideal social self; the NEO Five-Factor Inventory; and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. Content analysis showed that individuals' PC measures were unique. The disparity between real self and ideal self and the disparity between social self and ideal social self were computed for PC and CC; test-retest reliabilities were .76 to .81. Results of simultaneous multiple regression analyses supported the hypothesis. Also, the two-variable PC self-image disparity scores were stronger than one-variable PC esteem scores in predicting neuroticism. Implications were discussed for research method, self-concept theory, personal construct theory, neuroticism, and psychotherapy.     

Visual marking in moving displays: feature-based inhibition is not necessary

Visual marking is a mechanism by which new visual stimuli can gain a selection advantage by the top-down attentional inhibition of stimuli already in the field. Previous work (Olivers, Watson, & Humphreys, 1999) has shown that, for moving stimuli, there must be a unique feature difference between the old items and the new items for marking to occur. The present study shows that this constraint is not necessary if the local spatial relationships between the old moving items remain constant. It is proposed that, with a fixed configuration, the old moving items can be grouped to form a single object. An inhibitory template set up to represent the object then coordinates the application of inhibition to the individual stimuli. Implications for the theory and ecological flexibility of visual marking are discussed.     

Further Support for a Hierarchical Model of Affect: Reply to Green and Salovey

Green and Salovey agree with us that happiness and sadness are strongly bipolar, and that Positive and Negative Activation are not. However, Green and Salovey subscribe to the two-dimensional circumplex, a model we find wanting. Actually, the problems they discuss arise from the limitations of the circumplex rather than from issues fundamental to affective structure. And they do not consider the evidence, reported in our target article, that supports an alternative to the circumplex: a three-level hierarchical model. In this reply, we take a closer look at the empirical findings supporting this model, and we emphasize its heuristic promise.     

Enhanced Cognitive Behavior Therapy: A Single Treatment for All Eating Disorders

Eating disorders are serious mental illnesses affecting a significant proportion of women and a smaller number of men. Approximately half of those with an eating disorder (ED) will not meet the criteria for anorexia or bulimia nervosa, and will be diagnosed with an eating disorder not otherwise specified (EDNOS). Until recently, there were no recommended treatments for EDNOS. This article provides an overview of enhanced cognitive behavior therapy, a validated treatment for all forms of EDs.     

Multiple aspects in the sense of agency

Recent significant research in a number of disciplines centers on the concept of the sense of agency. Because many of these studies cut across disciplinary lines there is good reason to seek a clear consensus on what ‘sense of agency’ means. In this paper I indicate some complexities that this consensus might have to deal with. I also highlight an important phenomenological distinction that needs to be considered in any discussion of the sense of agency, regardless of how it gets defined. Finally, I suggest that the sense of agency has an ambiguous phenomenology and I offer some critical comments on current models that fail to notice this ambiguity.