What Drives Support for Transgender Rights? Assessing the Effects of Biological Attribution on U.S. Public Opinion of Transgender Rights

Sex Roles - Scholars have a limited understanding of what drives opinion on transgender rights. The present study begins to fill this gap by applying attribution theory to data from a national...     

WHAT MAKES A QUANTUM PHYSICS BELIEF BELIEVABLE? MANY-WORLDS AMONG SIX IMPOSSIBLE THINGS BEFORE BREAKFAST

An extraordinary, if circumscribed, positive shift has occurred since the mid-twentieth century in the perceived status of Hugh Everett III's 1956 theory of the universal wave function of quantum mechanics, now widely called the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI). Everett's starkly new interpretation denied the existence of a separate classical realm, contending that the experimental data can be seen as presenting a state vector for the whole universe. Since there is no state vector collapse, reality as a whole is strictly deterministic. Explained jointly by the dynamical variables and the state vector, “this reality is not the reality we customarily think of, but is a reality composed of many worlds,” wrote Everett's colleague Bryce DeWitt. In this essay, I account briefly for the change of status in conventional scientific terms, yet chiefly in extended terms of three sets of ideas that I argue can be understood to affect believability in both scientific and religious contexts, illuminating helpfully the MWI phenomenon, and its engagement with theology: orthodoxy and heresy, language and reference, and faith and agnosticism. One's orientation relative to the variable content of these dynamic, socially oriented categories helps to make belief in ideas as metaphysically challenging as Everettian Quantum Mechanics, or particular ideas about God, either more or less believable. The categories will have the same function in a theology engaging Everett's theory, and in any theology at all written in a society deeply marked by what I further argue is a subtle, powerful, and pervasive mode of quasi-scientific thinking we can call societal constructive agnosticism, of which anyone doing theology today must be aware.     

The development of bystander intentions and social–moral reasoning about intergroup verbal aggression

A developmental intergroup approach was taken to examine the development of prosocial bystander intentions among children and adolescents. Participants as bystanders (N = 260) aged 8–10 and 13–15 years were presented with scenarios of direct aggression between individuals from different social groups (i.e., intergroup verbal aggression). These situations involved either an ingroup aggressor and an outgroup victim or an outgroup aggressor and an ingroup victim. This study focussed on the role of intergroup factors (group membership, ingroup identification, group norms, and social–moral reasoning) in the development of prosocial bystander intentions. Findings showed that prosocial bystander intentions declined with age. This effect was partially mediated by the ingroup norm to intervene and perceived severity of the verbal aggression. However, a moderated mediation analysis showed that only when the victim was an ingroup member and the aggressor an outgroup member did participants become more likely with age to report prosocial bystander intentions due to increased ingroup identification. Results also showed that younger children focussed on moral concerns and adolescents focussed more on psychological concerns when reasoning about their bystander intention. These novel findings help explain the developmental decline in prosocial bystander intentions from middle childhood into early adolescence when observing direct intergroup aggression.     

Children's prosocial behavioural intentions towards outgroup members

When will children decide to help outgroup peers? We examined how intergroup competition, social perspective taking (SPT), and empathy influence children's (5–10 years, N = 287) prosocial intentions towards outgroup members. Study 1 showed that, in a minimal group situation, prosociality was lower in an intergroup competitive than in a non‐competitive or interpersonal context. Study 2 revealed that, in a real groups situation involving intergroup competition, prosociality was associated with higher empathy and lower competitive motivation. In a subsequent non‐competitive context, there were age differences in the impact of SPT and competitive motivation. With age, relationships strengthened between SPT and prosociality (positively) and between competitiveness and prosociality (negatively). Among older children, there was a carry‐over effect whereby feelings of intergroup competitiveness aroused by the intergroup competitive context suppressed outgroup prosociality in the following non‐competitive context. Theoretical and practical implications for improving children's intergroup relationships are discussed.