Confidence in masked orientation judgments is informed by both evidence and visibility

How do human observers determine their degree of belief that they are correct in a decision about a visual stimulus—that is, their confidence? According to prominent theories of confidence, the quality of stimulation should be positively related to confidence in correct decisions, and negatively to confidence in incorrect decisions. However, in a backward-masked orientation task with a varying stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), we observed that confidence in incorrect decisions also increased with stimulus quality. Model fitting to our decision and confidence data revealed that the best explanation for the present data was the new weighted evidence-and-visibility model, according to which confidence is determined by evidence about the orientation as well as by the general visibility of the stimulus. Signal detection models, postdecisional accumulation models, two-channel models, and decision-time-based models were all unable to explain the pattern of confidence as a function of SOA and decision correctness. We suggest that the metacognitive system combines several cues related to the correctness of a decision about a visual stimulus in order to calculate decision confidence.     

New Directions in the Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment of OCD: Theory,Research, and Practice

The beneficial effects of cognitive-behavioral interventions (particularly exposure and response prevention) for OCD are among the most consistent research findings in the mental health literature. Nevertheless, even after an adequate trial, many individuals experience residual symptoms, and others never receive adequate treatment due to limited access. These and other issues have prompted clinicians and researchers to search for ways to improve the conceptual and practical aspects of existing treatment approaches, as well as look for augmentation strategies. In the present article, we review a number of recent developments and new directions in the psychological treatment of OCD, including (a) the application of inhibitory learning approaches to exposure therapy, (b) the development of acceptance-based approaches, (c) involvement of caregivers (partners and parents) in treatment, (d) pharmacological cognitive enhancement of exposure therapy, and (e) the use of technology to disseminate effective treatment. We focus on both the conceptual/scientific and practical aspects of these topics so that clinicians and researchers alike can assess their relative merits and disadvantages.     

Supervision in Community Mental Health: Understanding Intensity of EBT Focus

The goal of the present study was to examine clinician, supervisor, and organizational factors that are associated with the intensity of evidence-based treatment (EBT) focus in workplace-based clinical supervision of a specific EBT, Trauma-Focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (TF-CBT). Supervisors (n = 56) and clinicians (n = 207) from mental health organizations across Washington State completed online self-report questionnaires. Multilevel modeling (MLM) analyses were used to examine the relative influence of nested clinician and supervisor factors on the intensity of EBT focus in supervision. We found that 33% of the variance in clinician report of EBT supervision intensity clustered at the supervisor level and implementation climate was the only significant factor associated with EBT supervision intensity. While individual clinician and supervisor factors may play a role in EBT coverage in supervision, our results suggest that an implementation climate that supports EBT may be the most critical factor for improving intensity of EBT coverage. Thus, implementation efforts that address the extent to which EBTs are expected, rewarded, and supported within an organization may be needed to support greater coverage of EBT during workplace-based supervision.     

Moral Emotions Toward Others at Work and Implications for Employee Behavior: a Qualitative Analysis Using Critical Incidents

We propose a theoretical framework for and, via critical incidents, inductively investigate (a) the situations that trigger moral emotions toward others at work and (b) worker responses to these situations. Critical incidents were collected from a heterogeneous sample of 423 workers. Participants described an incident that caused each of four moral emotions (gratitude, anger, admiration, and contempt) and their response. Incidents and responses were coded, and frequencies, differences across the moral emotions, and associations between incidents and responses were analyzed. Several morally relevant situations at work were found to trigger the moral emotions. Participants responded in ways that had implications for their performance and their own well-being. The incidents largely align with moral foundations theory (Haidt and Graham in Social Justice Research, 20, 98–116, 2007). Responses also show evidence for social exchange, social learning, and rational expectancy-based processes and behavior. The incidents specify several practices for managers and organizations to encourage and avoid. This was the first qualitative study of moral emotions at work and one of the few workplace studies to examine these emotions empirically. Several understudied factors and behavioral responses emerged.     

‘Of the group’ and ‘for the group’: How followership is shaped by leaders' prototypicality and group identification

Previous research has focused on the importance of leaders being seen to be of the group (i.e. to be prototypical of a group) but less on the impact of leaders' own degree of identification with the group. Also, little is known about the combined impact of leader prototypicality and leader identification on followers' responses. This paper reports two studies that address these lacunae. Study 1 shows experimentally that perceived leader identification and prototypicality interact to determine followers' personal identification with leaders and their perceptions of leader charisma. Findings indicate that high identification can compensate for low prototypicality such that high‐identified leaders are able to inspire followership when leaders are low prototypical. Study 2 replicates these findings in the field by examining followers' responses to workgroup leaders. In addition, results demonstrate that the aforementioned responses are more pronounced for highly identified followers. The present research extends social identity theorizing by demonstrating that leaders' inability to inspire followership derives as much from their failure to project a sense of ‘we’ and ‘us’ as part of their self‐concept as from a failure to exemplify group‐typical attributes. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What's Wrong with Rex? Hegel on Animal Defect and Individuality

In his Logic, Hegel argues that evaluative judgments are comparisons between the reality of an individual object and the standard for that reality found in the object's own concept. Understood in this way, an object is bad (ugly, etc.) insofar as it fails to be what it is according to its concept. In his recent Life and Action, Michael Thompson has suggested that we can understand various kinds of natural defect (i.e., defects in living things) in a similar way, and that if we do, we can helpfully see intellectual and moral badness—irrationality and vice—as themselves varieties of natural defect. In this paper, I argue that Hegel's position on animal individuality denies the claim that irrationality and vice are forms of natural defect. Hegel's account of the individuality proper to the animal organism in the Philosophy of Nature clearly disallows evaluative judgments about animals and thereby establishes a well‐defined conceptual distinction between natural defect and intellectual or ethical—i.e., broadly spiritual or geistliche—defect. Hegel thus provides a way of maintaining the difference between nature and spirit within his broader commitment to a post‐Kantian conception of substantial form.     

What is the Problem with Fundamental Moral Error?

Quasi-realists argue that meta-ethical expressivism is fully compatible with the central assumptions underlying ordinary moral practice. In a recent paper, Andy Egan has developed a vexing challenge for this project, arguing that expressivism is incompatible with central assumptions about error in moral judgments. In response, Simon Blackburn has argued that Egan's challenge fails, because Egan reads the expressivist as giving an account of moral error, rather than an account of judgments about moral error. In this paper I argue that the challenge can be reinstated, even if we focus only on the expressivist's account of judgments about moral error.