Memory for emotionally arousing events over time in Autism Spectrum Disorder

Emotionally arousing events are typically better remembered and more resistant to forgetting than neutral events. Findings from word list paradigms suggest that this may not hold for individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), who also tend to be less accurate as eyewitnesses under some circumstances. To test whether attenuated effects of arousal on memory may be responsible for poorer eyewitness testimonies in ASD, we asked adults with and without the disorder to view either arousing or neutral versions of a narrated slide sequence (Experiment 1) or video clip (Experiment 2) before assessing their memory for the material. Both groups exhibited increases in psychophysiological arousal during the arousing compared with the neutral version of the narratives, and both groups also demonstrated a memory advantage for the arousing events. Contrary to predictions, these observations indicate that stimulus induced arousal modulates memory for naturalistic events relatively typically in ASD. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Mirror neurons are not evidence for the Simulation Theory

Recently, there as been a resurgence of interest in theories of mindreading. New discoveries in neuroscience have revitalized the languishing debate. The discovery of so-called mirror neurons has revived interest particularly in the Simulation Theory (ST) of mindreading. Both ST proponents and theorists studying mirror neurons have argued that mirror neurons are strong evidence in favor of ST over Theory Theory (TT). In this paper I argue against the prevailing view that mirror neurons are evidence for the ST of mindreading. My view is that on an appropriate construal of their function, mirror neurons do not operate like simulation theorists claim. In fact, mirror neurons are more appropriately understood as one element in an information-rich mindreading process. As such, mirror neurons fit in better with some sort of TT account of mindreading. I offer a positive account, the Model TT, which better explains the role of mirror neurons in social cognition.     

Does Complex or Simple Rhetoric Win Elections? An Integrative Complexity Analysis of U.S. Presidential Campaigns

Research suggests that the integrative complexity of political rhetoric tends to drop during election season, but little research to date directly addresses if this drop in complexity serves to increase or decrease electoral success. The two present studies help fill this gap. Study 1 demonstrates that, during the Democratic Party primary debates in 2003–2004, the eventual winners of the party nomination showed a steeper drop in integrative complexity as the election season progressed than nonwinning candidates. Study 2 presents laboratory evidence from the most recent presidential campaign demonstrating that, while the complexity of Obama's rhetoric had little impact on college students' subsequent intentions to vote for him, the complexity of McCain's rhetoric was significantly positively correlated with their likelihood of voting for him. Taken together, this research is inconsistent with an unqualified simple is effective view of the complexity‐success relationship. Rather, it is more consistent with a compensatory view: Effective use of complexity (or simplicity) may compensate for perceived weaknesses. Thus, appropriately timed shifts in complexity levels, and/or violations of negative expectations relevant to complexity, may be an effective means of winning elections. Surprisingly, mere simplicity as such seems largely ineffective.     

The role of negative affectivity and negative reactivity to emotions in predicting outcomes in the unified protocol for the transdiagnostic treatment of emotional disorders

The present study aimed to understand the contributions of both the trait tendency to experience negative emotions and how one relates to such experience in predicting symptom change during participation in the Unified Protocol (UP), a transdiagnostic treatment for emotional disorders. Data were derived from a randomized controlled trial comparing the UP to a waitlist control/delayed-treatment condition. First, effect sizes of pre- to post-treatment change for frequency of negative emotions and several variables measuring reactivity to emotional experience (emotional awareness and acceptance, fear of emotions, and anxiety sensitivity) were examined. Second, the relative contributions of change in negative emotions and emotional reactivity in predicting symptom (clinician-rated anxiety, depression, and severity of principal diagnosis) reductions were investigated. Results suggested that decreases in the frequency of negative emotions and reactivity to emotions following participation in the UP were both large in magnitude. Further, two emotional reactivity variables (fear of emotions and anxiety sensitivity) remained significantly related to symptom outcomes when controlling for negative emotions, and accounted for significant incremental variance in their prediction. These findings lend support to the notion that psychological health depends less on the frequency of negative emotions and more on how one relates to these emotions when they occur.     

Offline improvement occurs for temporal stability but not accuracy following practice of integer and non-integer rhythms

Procedural learning benefits from memory processes occurring outside practice resulting in offline learning. Offline gains have been demonstrated almost exclusively for the ordinal structure of sequential motor tasks. Many skills also demand that the correct serial order of events be appropriately timed. Evidence indicates that the temporal aspect of a procedural skill can be encoded independent of serial order knowledge and governed by at least two distinct neural circuits. The present experiment determined if (a) offline gains emerge for temporal learning, and (b) if such gains occur for timing supervised by distinct timing systems. Participants experienced 216 practice trials of a 7-key press sequence that involved integer- or non-integer timing rhythms. Twenty-four hours after training 30 test trials were administered. Results revealed robust offline enhancement for timing performance of the non-integer based temporal sequences. This improvement was localized to stabilization of the required relative but not absolute time profiles. The neural circuitry central to supporting the performance of non-integer timing sequences is also a principal constituent of what is described as the "cognitive" timing system. Timing governed by this system appears most susceptible to offline gains via consolidation.     

The motor side of emotions: investigating the relationship between hemispheres, motor reactions and emotional stimuli

The aim of the present study was to analyze if the left hemisphere preferentially controls flexion responses toward positive stimuli, while the right hemisphere is specialized toward extensor responses to negative pictures. To this end, right-handed subjects had to pull or push a joystick subsequent to seeing a positive or a negative stimulus in their left or right hemifield. Flexion responses were faster for positive stimuli, while negative stimuli were associated with faster extensions responses. Overall, performance was fastest when emotional stimuli were presented to the left visual hemifield. This right hemisphere superiority was especially clear for negative stimuli, while reaction times toward positive pictures showed no hemispheric difference. We did not find any interaction between hemifield and response type. Neither was there a triple interaction between valence, hemifield and response type. We suppose that response dichotomies in humans are not as tightly linked to a hemisphere- and valence-bound reaction type as previously assumed.     

The Patient–Doctor Relationship Questionnaire (PDRQ-9) in Primary Care: A Validity Study

This study assessed the validity of the Patient–Doctor Relationship Questionnaire-9 (PDRQ-9) in a primary care sample (N = 180). Convergent validity was assessed through a correlation between the patient-rated PDRQ-9 and the physician-rated Difficult Doctor Patient Relationship Questionnaire-10 (DDPRQ-10). Discriminant validity was assessed through correlations between the PDRQ-9 and patient age, patient- and physician-reported health and psychological distress. To determine if the PDRQ-9 could discriminate between groups, patient PDRQ-9 ratings were compared between patients who were treated by faculty physicians versus those who were treated by residents. An exploratory factor analysis confirmed that the PDRQ-9 was made up of a single factor. The PDRQ-9 scale was internally consistent (α = .96) and significantly and negatively correlated with the DDPRQ-10 (r = ?.22, p = .003) and was not significantly correlated with patient age, health, or psychological distress. PDRQ-9 ratings were statistically greater in patients who were treated by faculty physicians than those who were treated by residents (p = .01). This study provides additional support for the reliability and validity of the PDRQ-9 as a measure of the doctor–patient relationship in a primary care sample.     

Intentional transaction

The second person is often set in contrast to the first person. And there is a contrast. It does not reside in a difference of what is thought as I from what is thought as you. For that is not different. The contrast is that of monadic and dyadic predication, action and transaction. It is the contrast, not of I and You, but of I and I–You. The second person does not add a You to an I. It divides the I and makes it a relation. We consider, first, the form of predication that is common to first- and second-person thought. Then, we define the second person as a species of this form of thought. Last, we find the source and condition of this form of thought in a thought of this very form. This thought, being the source of its own form, is one of which one cannot be conscious from outside it. It is a last word, or, better, a first word.¹1. Compare Thomas Nagel's notion of a last word (Nagel 2001 Nagel, Thomas. 2001. The Last Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]). Nagel's development of the notion reveals no reason why he should call what is last a word. From what he writes in the book, one would think its title to be “The Last Thought”. (Indeed, chapter 2 bears the title “Why We Can't Understand Thought from the Outside”.) However, if the last thought is I–You, then the last thought is a word; indeed, it is the word. In reaching for “The Last Word”, Nagel may express an inchoate appreciation of this.     

Lunacy and Scepticism: Notes on the Logic of Doubt Concerning the Existence of an External World

This article develops a logical (or semantic) response to scepticism about the existence of an external world. Specifically, it is argued that any doubt about the existence of an external world can be proved to be false, but whatever appears to be doubt about the existence of an external world that cannot be proved to be false is nonsense, insofar as it must rely on the assertion of something that is logically impossible. The article further suggests that both G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein worked towards the same solution but left their work unfinished.