Relationship between priming and recognition in deterministic and probabilistic sequence learning

Exposure to a repeating sequence of target stimuli in a speeded localization task can support both priming of sequence-consistent responses and recognition of sequence components. In 3 experiments with both deterministic and probabilistic sequences, the authors used a novel procedure in which measures or priming and recognition were taken concurrently and asked whether these measures can be dissociated. In all of these experiments, both measures were above chance at the group level and no evidence of dissociation was found. Item-level analyses of the data in Experiment 3 did reveal dissociations in that (a) recognition judgments were affected by response speed independently of old-new status and (b) items that were not discriminated in recognition nonetheless showed priming. However, the authors show that these data, together with the group-level results, are compatible with a formal model in which priming and recognition are based on a single common memory variable.     

Abstractionist and processing accounts of implicit learning

Five experiments evaluated the contributions of rule, exemplar, fragment, and episodic knowledge in artificial grammar learning using memorization versus hypothesis-testing training tasks. Strings of letters were generated from a biconditional grammar that allows different sources of responding to be unconfounded. There was no evidence that memorization led to passive abstraction of rules or encoding of whole training exemplars. Memorizers instead used explicit fragment knowledge to identify the grammatical status of test items, although this led to chance performance. Successful hypothesis-testers classified at near-perfect levels by processing training and test stimuli according to their rule structure. The results support the episodic-processing account of implicit and explicit learning.     

The procedural learning deficit hypothesis of language learning disorders: we see some problems

Impaired procedural learning has been suggested as a possible cause of developmental dyslexia (DD) and specific language impairment (SLI). This study examined the relationship between measures of verbal and non‐verbal implicit and explicit learning and measures of language, literacy and arithmetic attainment in a large sample of 7 to 8‐year‐old children. Measures of verbal explicit learning were correlated with measures of attainment. In contrast, no relationships between measures of implicit learning and attainment were found. Critically, the reliability of the implicit learning tasks was poor. Our results show that measures of procedural learning, as currently used, are typically unreliable and insensitive to individual differences. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YnvV-BvNWSo     

The Effect of Mental Practice on Performance in a Sequential Reaction Time Task

The effect of mental practice on performance in a dot-location RT task was investigated. Participants (N = 40) were required either to mentally practice, physically practice, or do no practice on an RT task in which the signals appeared in a repeating sequence. Correct mental practice, as opposed to incorrect mental practice and no practice, was predicted to have a positive (enhancing) effect on performance of the RT task. Despite previous evidence that mental rehearsal does enhance performance in many perceptual-motor tasks, neither correct nor incorrect mental rehearsal affected subsequent sequence learning; that is, no mental practice effect was observed. That surprising result is discussed in terms of motivational, psychoneuromuscular, separate memory systems, and transfer-appropriate processing explanations of mental practice.     

Recognising what you like: Examining the relation between the mere-exposure effect and recognition

The perceptual fluency/attributional model of the mere-exposure effect proposed by R. F. Bornstein and P. D'Agostino (1992) predicts that when recognition of a previously presented stimulus is above chance, feelings of fluency associated with that stimulus are discounted and thus the amount of fluency (mis)attributed to liking is reduced. This correction process results in smaller mere-exposure effects for supraliminal stimuli than for “subliminal” stimuli because when recognition is below chance participants are unaware of the source of fluency and they do not engage in correction. We tested this prediction in three experiments by presenting photographs of faces (Experiments 1 and 2) and polygons (Experiment 3) at varying exposure frequencies for 40 ms and 400 ms durations. Contrary to the prediction of the model, a significant mere-exposure effect was only found when recognition performance was at its highest level. Furthermore, across the three experiments liking and recognition were positively correlated.     

Judgement of act-outcome contingency: The role of selective attribution

In the first experiment subjects were presented with a number of sets of trials on each of which they could perform a particular action and observe the occurrence of an outcome in the context of a video game. The contingency between the action and outcome was varied across the different sets of trials. When required to judge the effectiveness of the action in controlling the outcome during a set of trials, subjects assigned positive ratings for a positive contingency and negative ratings for a negative contingency. Furthermore, the magnitude of the ratings was related systematically to the strength of the actual contingency. With a fixed probability of an outcome given the action, judgements of positive contingencies decreased as the likelihood that the outcome would occur without the action was raised. Correspondingly, the absolute value of ratings of negative contingencies was increased both by an increment in the probability of the outcome in the absence of the action and by a decrement in the probability of the outcome following the action. A systematic bias was observed, however, in that positive judgements were given under a non-contingent relationship when the outcome frequency was relatively high. However, this bias could be reduced by giving extended exposure to the non-contingent schedule (Experiment 2).

This pattern of contingency judgements can be explained if it is assumed that a process of selective attribution operates, whereby people are less likely to attribute an outcome to some potential target cause if another effective cause is present. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated the operation of this process by showing that initially establishing another agent as an effective cause of the outcome subsequently reduced or blocked the extent to which the subjects attributed the outcome to the action.

Finally, we argue that the pattern and bias in contingency judgements based upon interactions with a causal process can be explained in terms of contemporary conditioning models of associative learning.     

Underpowered samples,false negatives,and unconscious learning

The scientific community has witnessed growing concern about the high rate of false positives and unreliable results within the psychological literature, but the harmful impact of false negatives has been largely ignored. False negatives are particularly concerning in research areas where demonstrating the absence of an effect is crucial, such as studies of unconscious or implicit processing. Research on implicit processes seeks evidence of above-chance performance on some implicit behavioral measure at the same time as chance-level performance (that is, a null result) on an explicit measure of awareness. A systematic review of 73 studies of contextual cuing, a popular implicit learning paradigm, involving 181 statistical analyses of awareness tests, reveals how underpowered studies can lead to failure to reject a false null hypothesis. Among the studies that reported sufficient information, the meta-analytic effect size across awareness tests was d _z = 0.31 (95 % CI 0.24–0.37), showing that participants’ learning in these experiments was conscious. The unusually large number of positive results in this literature cannot be explained by selective publication. Instead, our analyses demonstrate that these tests are typically insensitive and underpowered to detect medium to small, but true, effects in awareness tests. These findings challenge a widespread and theoretically important claim about the extent of unconscious human cognition.     

Awareness in contextual cuing with extended and concurrent explicit tests

The term contextual cuing refers to improved visual search performance with repeated exposure to a configuration of objects. Participants use predictive cues-derived from learned associations between target locations and the spatial arrangement of the surrounding distractors in a configuration--to efficiently guide search behavior. Researchers have claimed that contextual cuing can occur implicitly. The present experiments examined two explicit measures--generation and recognition. In Experiment 1, we found that contextual cuing information was consciously retrievable when the number of trials used in a generation test was increased, and the results also suggested that the shorter tests that were used previously were not statistically powerful enough to detect a true awareness effect. In Experiment 2, concurrent implicit and explicit (generation and recognition) tests were employed. At a group level, learning did not precede awareness. Although contextual cuing was evident in participants who were selected post hoc as having no explicit awareness, and for specific configurations that did not support awareness, we argue that awareness may nevertheless be a necessary concomitant of contextual cuing. These results demonstrate that contextual cuing knowledge is accessible to awareness.     

Models of covariation-based causal judgment: A review and synthesis

Causal judgment is assumed to play a central role in prediction, control, and explanation. Here, we consider the function or functions that map contingency information concerning the relationship between a single cue and a single outcome onto causal judgments. We evaluate normative accounts of causal induction and report the findings of an extensive meta-analysis in which we used a cross-validation model-fitting method and carried out a qualitative analysis of experimental trends in order to compare a number of alternative models. The best model to emerge from this competition is one in which judgments are based on the difference between the amount of confirming and disconfirming evidence. A rational justification for the use of this model is proposed.