Why American conservatives and individuals from traditionalist cultures may share a preference for group uniformity

American culture is known for its emphasis on freedom‐promoting values such as self‐determination and autonomy. Yet, a large segment of American society endorses a conservative ideology that seems to go against these values. In this article, we empirically show that conservatives’ weaker endorsement of autonomy values predicts a preference to be an amorphous entity in a tight, uniform group (Study 1A). We do so by implementing a novel measure of sociocultural tightness that is not based on self‐report items. We subsequently show that cultural (East–West) differences in this preference can be explained through a similar mechanism (Study 1B). Hence, we show that some cognitive processes of American conservatives are similar to those of individuals coming from more collectivist, non‐Western societies.     

The effects of physical contact and decision type on moral decision making: A study of harm to save moral behavior

This study examined the relationship between physical contact and decision type in predicting “harm to save” behavior. Participants were assigned to making either a judgment or a choice involving moral dilemmas. All participants were presented with dilemmas that either required or did not require having physical contact with potential victims. Participants were asked to decide whether to sacrifice fewer people to save more (utilitarian responses) or not to do so and thus more people would die (deontological responses). The study sample included 345 participants who completed a set of self‐report measures. Results indicated an interaction between physical contact and decision type. In the choice condition only, participants reported significantly less utilitarian responses to the dilemmas that required having physical contact with the person to be harmed than to dilemmas that did not require physical contact. This difference was not found in the judgment condition. These results contribute to a greater understanding of the nature and potential malleability of human morality.     

From negative reactivity to empathic responding: Infants high in negative reactivity express more empathy later in development,with the help of regulation

Empathy has great effect on human well‐being, promoting healthy relationships and social competence. Although it is increasingly acknowledged that infants show empathy toward others, individual differences in infants’ empathy from the first year of life have rarely been investigated longitudinally. Here we examined how negative reactivity and regulation, two temperament traits that predict empathic responses in older children and adults, relate to infants’ empathy. Infants were studied at the ages of nine (N = 275) and 18 (N = 301) months (194 infants were studied at both ages). Empathic responses were assessed by infants’ observed reactions to an experimenter's simulated distress. Negative reactivity (fear, sadness, and distress to limitations) and regulation (soothability and effortful control) were assessed by parental reports. Negative reactivity was also examined by infants’ observed reactions to an adult stranger (fear) and during interaction with their mothers (displays of sadness/distress). When examined cross‐sectionally, infants’ fear and distress to limitations associated with self‐distress in response to others’ distress. In contrast, when examined longitudinally, early sadness and distress to limitations, but not fear, associated with later empathic concern and inquisitiveness. Moreover, this longitudinal relation was moderated by infants’ soothability and was evident only for children that had high soothability by the later time‐point. Our findings suggest that infants who at an earlier age show negative reactivity, react later in development with more empathy if they achieve sufficient regulation abilities. By that, the findings stress the developmental nature of temperament–empathy relations during infancy.     

Bilingual toddlers’ comprehension of mixed sentences is asymmetrical across their two languages

In bilingual language environments, infants and toddlers listen to two separate languages during the same key years that monolingual children listen to just one and bilinguals rarely learn each of their two languages at the same rate. Learning to understand language requires them to cope with challenges not found in monolingual input, notably the use of two languages within the same utterance (e.g., Do you like the perro? or ¿Te gusta el doggy?). For bilinguals of all ages, switching between two languages can reduce the efficiency in real‐time language processing. But language switching is a dynamic phenomenon in bilingual environments, presenting the young learner with many junctures where comprehension can be derailed or even supported. In this study, we tested 20 Spanish–English bilingual toddlers (18‐ to 30‐months) who varied substantially in language dominance. Toddlers’ eye movements were monitored as they looked at familiar objects and listened to single‐language and mixed‐language sentences in both of their languages. We found asymmetrical switch costs when toddlers were tested in their dominant versus non‐dominant language, and critically, they benefited from hearing nouns produced in their dominant language, independent of switching. While bilingualism does present unique challenges, our results suggest a united picture of early monolingual and bilingual learning. Just like monolinguals, experience shapes bilingual toddlers’ word knowledge, and with more robust representations, toddlers are better able to recognize words in diverse sentences.     

Early executive functioning in a global context: Developmental continuity and family protective factors

This study extends the methodological and theoretical understanding of executive functions (EFs) in preschoolers from low‐ and middle‐income countries (LMIC). First, the authors describe a rigorous process of adapting and evaluating six EF tasks to produce a culturally and developmentally appropriate measure of emerging EFs in a large sample of at‐risk children in rural Pakistan. Next, the authors identify critical developmental and family factors that relate to preschoolers’ EFs over the first 4 years of life. Direct assessment of children's general cognitive skills at age two showed developmental continuity with EFs at age four, and these early cognitive skills mediated the effect of an antecedent parenting intervention on EFs as well as associations of targeted individual and family factors with EFs. Furthermore, directly assessed maternal cognitive capacities and observed maternal scaffolding uniquely predicted EFs in preschoolers. This study is also the first to demonstrate a significant overlap between direct assessments of IQ and EFs in young children from LMIC. Children's general intelligence mediated the associations of EFs with antecedent physical growth and cognitive skills as well as concurrent family factors (maternal verbal intelligence, maternal scaffolding, and home stimulation). After controlling for shared variance between preschoolers’ general intelligence and EFs, three factors emerged as unique predictors of EFs: exposure to an early parenting intervention, physical growth status at age two, and number of older siblings. The findings have important implications for the design of interventions that aim to improve EFs in young children in LMIC. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://vimeo.com/316329544/5abde94cd7     

Metacognitive scaffolding boosts cognitive and neural benefits following executive attention training in children

Interventions including social scaffolding and metacognitive strategies have been used in educational settings to promote cognition. In addition, increasing evidence shows that computerized process‐based training enhances cognitive skills. However, no prior studies have examined the effect of combining these two training strategies. The goal of this study was to test the combined effect of metacognitive scaffolding and computer‐based training of executive attention in a sample of typically developing preschoolers at the cognitive and brain levels. Compared to children in the regular training protocol and an untrained active control group, children in the metacognitive group showed larger gains on intelligence and significant increases on an electrophysiological index associated with conflict processing. Moreover, changes in the conflict‐related brain activity predicted gains in intelligence in the metacognitive scaffolding group. These results suggest that metacognitive scaffolding boosts the influence of process‐based training on cognitive efficiency and brain plasticity related to executive attention.     

Relationship of religiosity to mental health literacy,stigma, social distance,and occupational restrictiveness in Ningxia Province,China

Little research has assessed the relationship between religiosity and mental health awareness in low- and middle-income countries. This study identified a representative sample of 2,425 community-dwelling adults in Ningxia, China and administered the Duke University Religion Index, the Mental Health Knowledge Questionnaire, the Mental Health Attitude Questionnaire, the Social Distance – Personal Questionnaire and the Social Restrictiveness – Occupational Questionnaire. Religious affiliation per se was not associated with mental health literacy or attitudes, but higher levels of religiosity were associated with better awareness of mental health issues and less social distance and occupational restrictiveness of those with mental health conditions. However, these relationships were substantially different in Hui ethnicity respondents (85% of whom were practicing Islam) and Han ethnicity respondents (15% of whom practiced Buddhism, Taoism or Confucianism).     

Knowledge,safety, and Gettierized lottery cases: Why mere statistical evidence is not a (safe) source of knowledge

The lottery problem is the problem of explaining why mere reflection on the long odds that one will lose the lottery does not yield knowledge that one will lose. More generally, it is the problem of explaining why true beliefs merely formed on the basis of statistical evidence do not amount to knowledge. Some have thought that the lottery problem can be solved by appeal to a violation of the safety principle for knowledge, i.e., the principle that if S knows that p, not easily would S have believed that p without p being the case. Against the standard safety‐based solution, I argue that understanding safe belief as belief that directly covaries with the truth of what is believed in a suitably defined set of possible worlds forces safety theorists to make a series of theoretical choices that ultimately prevent a satisfactory solution to the problem. In this way, I analyze several safety principles that result from such choices—the paper thus gives valuable insights into the nature of safety—and explain why none solves the lottery problem, including their inability to explain away Gettierized lottery cases. On a more positive note, I show that there is a viable solution in terms of safety if we get rid of the unquestioned assumption that safe beliefs directly track the truth. The alternative is a conception of safe belief according to which what safe beliefs directly track is the appropriateness of the circumstances and, indirectly, the truth. The resulting safety principle, I argue, explains why mere statistical evidence is not a safe source of knowledge.