A Muscle Awareness Model for Changes in Rorschach Human Movement Responses

The present series of studies sought to provide evidence that M would increase under any conditions which make an S more aware of his muscles. The studies demonstrated that at least in women, M increased over a variety of conditions involving heightened muscle awareness. Specifically M increased in conditions utilizing muscle activation, deactivation, hypnosis, and focusing thoughts on the body musculature. The muscle awareness model unlike the sensory-tonic model accounts for increases in M following hyperactivity as well as inhibition.     

Cracking the Code: Using Personal Narratives in Research

The use of personal narratives in research across the field of psychology has dramatically increased in recent years. In studies spanning a wide range of topics, personal event narratives have provided especially valuable insights into the processes and products of cognitive development. This article offers a guide for researchers who might use personal narratives in research currently or in the future. Issues and best practices surrounding collecting, transcribing, and coding personal narratives are presented. Practical challenges, commonly used methods, and recommended guidelines are described. Illustrations of different types of personal narrative coding systems are offered. The article also highlights benefits of and resources for conducting personal narrative research.     

Small subitizing range in people with Williams syndrome

Recent evidence suggests that the rapid apprehension of small numbers of objects—often called subitizing—engages a system which allows representation of up to 4 objects but is distinct from other aspects of numerical processing. We examined subitizing by studying people with Williams syndrome (WS), a genetic deficit characterized by severe visuospatial impairments, and normally developing children (4–6.5 years old). In Experiment 1, participants first explicitly counted displays of 1 to 8 squares that appeared for 5 s and reported “how many”. They then reported “how many” for the same displays shown for 250 ms, a duration too brief to allow explicit counting, but sufficient for subitizing. All groups were highly accurate up to 8 objects when they explicitly counted. With the brief duration, people with WS showed almost perfect accuracy up to a limit of 3 objects, comparable to 4-year-olds but fewer than either 5- or 6.5-year-old children. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to report “how many” for displays that were presented for an unlimited duration, as rapidly as possible while remaining accurate. Individuals with WS responded as rapidly as 6.5-year-olds, and more rapidly than 4-year-olds. However, their accuracy was as in Experiment 1, comparable to 4-year-olds and lower than older children. These results are consistent with previous findings, indicating that people with WS can simultaneously represent multiple objects, but that they have a smaller capacity than older children, on par with 4-year-olds. This pattern is discussed in the context of normal and abnormal development of visuospatial skills, in particular those linked to the representation of numerosity.     

Entailment and Bivalence

My purpose in this paper is to argue that the classical notion of entailment is not suitable for non-bivalent logics, to propose an appropriate alternative and to suggest a generalized entailment notion suitable to bivalent and non-bivalent logics alike. In classical two valued logic, one can not infer a false statement from one that is not false, any more than one can infer from a true statement a statement that is not true. In classical logic in fact preserving truth and preserving non-falsity are one and the same thing. They are not the same in non-bivalent logics however and I will argue that the classical notion of entailment that preserves only truth is not strong enough for such a logic. I will show that if we retain the classical notion of entailment in a logic that has three values, true, false and a third value in between, an inconsistency can be derived that can be resolved only by measures that seriously disable the logic. I will show this for a logic designed to allow for semantic presuppositions, then I will show that we get the same result in any three valued logic with the same value ordering. I will finally suggest how the notion of entailment should be generalized so that this problem may be avoided. The strengthened notion of entailment I am proposing is a conservative extension of the classical notion that preserves not only truth but the order of all values in a logic, so that the value of an entailed statement must alway be at least as great as the value of the sequence of statements entailing it. A notion of entailment this strong or stronger will, I believe, be found to be applicable to non-classical logics generally. In the opinion of Dana Scott, no really workable three valued logic has yet been developed. It is hard to disagree with this. A workable three valued logic however could perhaps be developed however, if we had a notion of entailment suitable to non-bivalent logics.     

Divergent effects of healthy ageing on semantic knowledge and control: Evidence from novel comparisons with semantically impaired patients

Effective use of semantic knowledge requires a set of conceptual representations and control processes which ensure that currently relevant aspects of this knowledge are retrieved and selected. It is well-established that levels of semantic knowledge increase across the lifespan. However, the effects of ageing on semantic control processes have not been assessed. I addressed this issue by comparing the performance profiles of young and older people on a verbal comprehension test. Two sets of variables were used to predict accuracy and RT in each group: (1) the psycholinguistic properties of words probed in each trial and (2) the performance on each trial by two groups of semantically impaired neuropsychological patients. Young people demonstrated poor performance for low-frequency and abstract words, suggesting that they had difficulty processing words with intrinsically weak semantic representations. Indeed, performance in this group was strongly predicted by the performance of patients with semantic dementia, who suffer from degradation of semantic knowledge. In contrast, older adults performed poorly on trials where the target semantic relationship was weak and distractor relationships strong – conditions which require high levels of controlled processing. Their performance was not predicted by the performance of semantic dementia patients, but was predicted by the performance of patients with semantic control deficits. These findings indicate that the effects of ageing on semantic cognition are more complex than has previously been assumed. While older people have larger stores of knowledge than young people, they appear to be less skilled at exercising control over the activation of this knowledge.