Demystifying Intuition: What It Is,What It Does,and How It Does It

Definitions of intuition are discussed and two working definitions are proposed. This is followed by a list of eight unresolved problems concerning intuition. It is suggested that all of these problems can be resolved by cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST), a dual-process theory of personality according to which people process information with two systems, an experiential/intuitive system that is an associative learning system that humans share with other animals and a uniquely human verbal reasoning system. Intuition is considered to be a subsystem of the experiential/ intuitive system that operates by exactly the same principles and attributes but has narrower boundary conditions. The next section includes a presentation of the most relevant aspects of CEST with an emphasis on the operating rules and attributes of the experiential/intuitive system. This is followed by demonstrating how the operation of the experiential/intuitive system can resolve each of the unresolved problems concerning intuition. The article closes with a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the experiential/intuitive and rational/analytic systems. It is concluded that neither system is generally superior to the other, as each has important advantages and disadvantages.     

A Muscle Awareness Model for Changes in Rorschach Human Movement Responses

The present series of studies sought to provide evidence that M would increase under any conditions which make an S more aware of his muscles. The studies demonstrated that at least in women, M increased over a variety of conditions involving heightened muscle awareness. Specifically M increased in conditions utilizing muscle activation, deactivation, hypnosis, and focusing thoughts on the body musculature. The muscle awareness model unlike the sensory-tonic model accounts for increases in M following hyperactivity as well as inhibition.     

Specificity of MMPI cluster types to chronic illness

Abstract

Cluster analysis derived MMPI profile types were compared for three distinct illness populations: chronic low back pain (CLBP), mixed headache (HA), and cardiac disease (CD). Results replicated previous findings in the chronic pain and cardiac literatures. Differences between diagnostic groups and genders were found for the prevalence of the derived MMPI profile types. Results indicated that, in males, the two chronic pain groups had similar profile types and similar relative frequencies of these types, but both differed from the CD sample. The chronic pain groups tended to have a greater number of patients with pathological and distressed MMPI profile types and a lesser representation in the subclinical profile type compared to the CD sample. Similar findings were obtained for females, though the CLBP group tended to have a higher frequency of highly distressed, pathological profiles than either the HA or CD groups. Results suggested that the MMPI may be a measure of response to illness rather than reflecting predisposing personality types for any given illness and that the higher frequency of highly distressed profiles in the chronic pain samples reflects the increased suffering of those populations compared to other illnesses.     

Entailment and Bivalence

My purpose in this paper is to argue that the classical notion of entailment is not suitable for non-bivalent logics, to propose an appropriate alternative and to suggest a generalized entailment notion suitable to bivalent and non-bivalent logics alike. In classical two valued logic, one can not infer a false statement from one that is not false, any more than one can infer from a true statement a statement that is not true. In classical logic in fact preserving truth and preserving non-falsity are one and the same thing. They are not the same in non-bivalent logics however and I will argue that the classical notion of entailment that preserves only truth is not strong enough for such a logic. I will show that if we retain the classical notion of entailment in a logic that has three values, true, false and a third value in between, an inconsistency can be derived that can be resolved only by measures that seriously disable the logic. I will show this for a logic designed to allow for semantic presuppositions, then I will show that we get the same result in any three valued logic with the same value ordering. I will finally suggest how the notion of entailment should be generalized so that this problem may be avoided. The strengthened notion of entailment I am proposing is a conservative extension of the classical notion that preserves not only truth but the order of all values in a logic, so that the value of an entailed statement must alway be at least as great as the value of the sequence of statements entailing it. A notion of entailment this strong or stronger will, I believe, be found to be applicable to non-classical logics generally. In the opinion of Dana Scott, no really workable three valued logic has yet been developed. It is hard to disagree with this. A workable three valued logic however could perhaps be developed however, if we had a notion of entailment suitable to non-bivalent logics.     

Stroop interference with response,comparison, and encoding stages in a sentence-picture comparison task

The paper discusses a Stroop variant of the word-picture comparison task analyzed by Chase and Clark (1971). The locatives above or below were printed at the center of a reference square, and Ss reported “Yes” if there was a word or an array of Xs in the location specified and “No” if there was not. Under the control (Xs) conditions, above displays were classified faster than below displays and true displays faster than false displays. These effects were unaltered when the words “yes” or “no” or “right” or “wrong” were printed in place of the Xs, although there was a small overall increase in response latency under these Stroop conditions that was independent of agreement or disagreement between the distractor and the response to be made. When the locatives up and down were printed on the display, a substantial Stroop effect was observed, and the above-below and true-false effects were eliminated. These results are discussed in relation to theories about the nature of Stroop interference and processes involved in sentence-picture comparisons.