BEHAVIORAL CUSPS: A DEVELOPMENTAL AND PRAGMATIC CONCEPT FOR BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS

Most concepts of development explain certain behavior changes as products or markers of the invariable succession of emerging periods, stages, refinements, or achievements that define and order much of an individual's life. A different but comparable concept can be derived from the most basic mechanisms of behavior analysis, which are its environmental contingencies, and from its most basic strategy, which is to study behavior as its subject matter. From a behavior-analytic perspective, the most fundamental developmental questions are (a) whether these contingencies vary in any systematic way across the life span, and thus make behavior change in a correspondingly systematic way; and (b) whether some of these contingencies and their changes have more far-reaching consequences than others, in terms of the importance to the organism and others, of the behavior classes they change. Certain behavior changes open the door to especially broad or especially important further behavior change, leading to the concept of the behavioral cusp. A behavioral cusp, then, is any behavior change that brings the organism's behavior into contact with new contingencies that have even more far-reaching consequences. Of all the environmental contingencies that change or maintain behavior, those that accomplish cusps are developmental. Behavior change remains the fundamental phenomenon of development for a behavior-analytic view; a cusp is a special instance of behavior change, a change crucial to what can come next.     

Probabilistic inferences,discrimination, and stimulus interference in comparative judgement

Comparative judgements of successive stimuli involve constant errors. Here, two theories of these errors are considered. For the wave theory of discrimination, constant errors directly originate from discrimination operations. For the inferential theory, the same errors are due to probabilistic inferences drawn after discrimination. Previous studies suggest that the second of two successively compared stimuli has more influence on the comparative response. The results of the present experiment, in which successive lines as comparison stimuli were used, confirm this suggestion. The wave theory does not explain these results, while the inferential theory explains them in terms of probabilistic inferences. Analysis of response frequencies and response times indicates that there was a response bias in favour of the longer response. Interfering lines appearing before the first comparison line significantly affected response frequency, response time, and discriminability, whereas interpolated lines significantly affected only response frequency and response time. The inferential theory does not explain these effects on response time, while the wave theory explains them as due to modifications of response bias. These results suggest the possibility that the two theories describe independent sources of constant errors.     

A note on the ω-incompleteness formalization

The paper studies two formal schemes related to -completeness.LetS be a suitable formal theory containing primitive recursive arithmetic and letT be a formal extension ofS. Denoted by (a), (b) and (c), respectively, are the following three propositions (where (x) is a formula with the only free variable x): (a) (for anyn) ( _T (n)), (b) _{T x} Pr _T (^–(x)^–) and (c) _T x(x) (the notational conventions are those of Smoryski [3]). The aim of this paper is to examine the meaning of the schemes which result from the formalizations, over the base theoryS, of the implications (b) (c) and (a) (b), where ranges over all formulae. The analysis yields two results overS : 1. the schema corresponding to (b) (c) is equivalent to ¬Cons _T and 2. the schema corresponding to (a) (b) is not consistent with 1-CON _T. The former result follows from a simple adaptation of the -incompleteness proof; the second is new and is based on a particular application of the diagonalization lemma.Presented byMelvin Fitting     

Axiomatic justifications of the utility principle: A formal investigation

It is argued that existing axiomatic theories of utility do not provide the utility principle or the principle of maximising expected utility with a formal justification. It is also argued that these theories only put mild constraints on a decision-maker in a decision-context. Finally, it is argued that the prospects are not particularly bright for finding formal non-circular arguments for the utility principle that do not rely on the law of large numbers.     

Cut-free sequent and tableau systems for propositional Diodorean modal logics

We present sound, (weakly) complete and cut-free tableau systems for the propositional normal modal logicsS4.3, S4.3.1 andS4.14. When the modality is given a temporal interpretation, these logics respectively model time as a linear dense sequence of points; as a linear discrete sequence of points; and as a branching tree where each branch is a linear discrete sequence of points.Although cut-free, the last two systems do not possess the subformula property. But for any given finite set of formulaeX the superformulae involved are always bounded by a finite set of formulaeX* _L depending only onX and the logicL. Thus each system gives a nondeterministic decision procedure for the logic in question. The completeness proofs yield deterministic decision procedures for each logic because each proof is constructive.Each tableau system has a cut-free sequent analogue proving that Gentzen's cut-elimination theorem holds for these latter systems. The techniques are due to Hintikka and Rautenberg.Presented byDov M. Gabbay     

Local and global factors of similarity in visual search

Effects of the similarity between target and distractors in a visual search task were investigated in several experiments. Both familiar (numerals and letters) and unfamiliar (connected figures in a 5 × 5 matrix) stimuli were used. The observer had to report on the presence or absence of a target among a variable number of homogeneous distractors as fast and as accurately as possible. It was found that physical difference had the same clear effect on processing time far familiar and for unfamiliar stimuli: processing time decreased monotonically with increasing physical difference. Distractors unrelated to the target and those related to the target by a simple transformation (180° rotation, horizontal or vertical reflection) were also compared, while the physical difference was kept constant. For familiar stimuli, transformational relatedness increased processing time in comparison with that fort unrelated stimulus pairs. It was further shown in a scaling experiment that this effect could be accounted for by the amount of perceived similarity of the target-distractor pairs. For unfamiliar stimuli, transformational relatedness did have a smaller and less pronounced effect. Various comparable unrelated distractors resulted in a full range of processing times. Results from a similarity scaling experiment correlated well with the outcome of the experiments with unfamiliar stimuli. These results are interpreted in terms of an underlying continuum of perceived similarity as the basis of the speed of visual search, rather than a dichotomy of parallel versus serial processing.