Identification of risk factors for suffering fear of hypoglycemia in type 1 Diabetes Mellitus patients

Hypoglycemia is one of the main burdens for type I Diabetes Mellitus (DM I) patients. The consequences of hypoglycemia can be quite unpleasant due to the variety of disagreeable physical and psychological symptoms it triggers. The patient's previous experience with hypoglycemia episodes will condition his psychological reaction to future episodes, promoting behavioral modifications that associate with poor glycemic control and worse prognosis, and even with developing psychological disorders, leading to fear of hypoglycemia (FH). To be able to provide tailored prevention and treatment of patients with FH it is necessary to identify the risk factors in DM I patients. We developed and validated the FH‐15 scale, a novel instrument to assess FH, which showed good concurrent and predictive validity in DM I patients. In this work we aim to identify the risk factors for suffering FH by detecting DM I patients with FH using the FH‐15 scale and then analyzing the association of clinical and sociodemographic variables. We found that age, needing help to resolve an episode of hypoglycemia, and a perceived lack of social support are risk factors for suffering FH.     

Prose Reading in Neglect

Prose reading has been shown to be a very sensitive measure of Unilateral Spatial Neglect. However, little is known about the relationship between prose reading and other measures of neglect and its severity, or between prose reading and single word reading. Thirty participants with a first stroke in the right hemisphere and clear symptoms of spatial neglect in everyday life were assessed with tests of prose reading (text in one column book-like, and in two columns magazine-like), single words reading, and a battery of 13 tests investigating neglect. Seventy percent of these participants omitted words at the beginning of the text (left end), showing Prose Reading Neglect (PRN). The participants showing PRN differed from those not showing PRN only for the overall severity of neglect, and had a lesion centred on the insula, putamen and superior temporal gyrus. Double dissociations emerged between PRN and single word reading neglect, suggesting different cognitive requirements between the two tests: parallel processing in single word reading vs. serial analysis in text reading. Notably, the pattern of neglected text varied dramatically across participants presenting with PRN, including dissociations between reading performance of one and two columns text. Prose reading proved a complex and unique task which should be directly investigated to predict the effects of unilateral neglect. The outcome of this study should also inform clinical assessment and advises given to patients and care-givers.     

Inhibitory mechanism of the matching heuristic in syllogistic reasoning

A number of heuristic-based hypotheses have been proposed to explain how people solve syllogisms with automatic processes. In particular, the matching heuristic employs the congruency of the quantifiers in a syllogism — by matching the quantifier of the conclusion with those of the two premises. When the heuristic leads to an invalid conclusion, successful solving of these conflict problems requires the inhibition of automatic heuristic processing. Accordingly, if the automatic processing were based on processing the set of quantifiers, no semantic contents would be inhibited. The mental model theory, however, suggests that people reason using mental models, which always involves semantic processing. Therefore, whatever inhibition occurs in the processing implies the inhibition of the semantic contents.     

Reward anticipation enhances brain activation during response inhibition

The chance to achieve a reward starts up the required neurobehavioral mechanisms to adapt our thoughts and actions in order to accomplish our objective. However, reward does not equally reinforce everybody but depends on interindividual motivational dispositions. Thus, immediate reward contingencies can modulate the cognitive process required for goal achievement, while individual differences in personality can affect this modulation. We aimed to test the interaction between inhibition-related brain response and motivational processing in a stop signal task by reward anticipation and whether individual differences in sensitivity to reward (SR) modulate such interaction. We analyzed the cognitive–motivational interaction between the brain pattern activation of the regions involved in correct and incorrect response inhibition and the association between such brain activations and SR scores. We also analyzed the behavioral effects of reward on both reaction times for the “go” trials before and after correct and incorrect inhibition in order to test error prediction performance and postinhibition adjustment. Our results show enhanced activation during response inhibition under reward contingencies in frontal, parietal, and subcortical areas. Moreover, activation of the right insula and the left putamen positively correlates with the SR scores. Finally, the possibility of reward outcome affects not only response inhibition performance (e.g., reducing stop signal reaction time), but also error prediction performance and postinhibition adjustment. Therefore, reward contingencies improve behavioral performance and enhance brain activation during response inhibition, and SR is related to brain activation. Our results suggest the conditions and factors that subserve cognitive control strategies in cognitive motivational interactions during response inhibition.     

An adaptive linear filter model of procedural category learning

Cognitive Processing - We use a feature-based association model to fit grouped and individual level category learning and transfer data. The model assumes that people use corrective feedback to...     

Forming and updating vaccination beliefs: does the continued effect of misinformation depend on what we think we know?

Cognitive Processing - People may cling to false facts even in the face of updated and correct information. The present study confronted misconceptions about the measles, mumps and rubella vaccine...     

The Guise of the Guise of the Bad

It is undeniable that human agents sometimes act badly, and it seems that they sometimes pursue bad things simply because they are bad. This latter phenomenon has often been taken to provide counterexamples to views according to which we always act under the guise of the good (GG). This paper identifies several distinct arguments in favour of the possibility that one can act under the guise of the bad. GG seems to face more serious difficulties when trying to answer three different, but related, arguments for the possibility of acting under the guise of the bad. The main strategies available to answer these objections end up either undermining the motivation for GG or failing to do full justice to the nature of perverse motivation. However, these difficulties turn out to be generated by focusing on a particular version of GG, what I call the “content version”. But we have independent reasons to prefer a different version of GG; namely, the “attitude version”. The attitude version allows for a much richer understanding of the possibility of acting on what we conceive to be bad. Drawing on an analogy with theoretical akrasia and theoretical perversion, I try to show how the attitude version can provide a compelling account of perverse actions.     

Development of rule-based eye-hand-decoupling in children and adolescents

In the present study, we characterize how the ability to decouple guiding visual information from a motor action emerges during childhood and adolescence. Sixty-two participants (age range 8–15 yrs.) completed two eye-hand coordination tasks. In a direct interaction task, vision and motor action were in alignment, and participants slid their finger along a vertical touch screen to move a cursor from a central target to one of four peripheral targets. In an eye-hand-decoupled task, eye and hand movements were made in different planes and cursor feedback was 180° reversed. We analyzed whether movement planning, timing and trajectory variables differed across age in both task conditions. There were no significant relationships between age and any movement planning, timing, or execution variables in the direct interaction task. In contrast, in the eye-hand-decoupled task, we found a relationship between age and several movement planning and timing variables. In adolescents (13–15 yrs.), movement planning and timing was significantly shorter than that of young children (8–10 yrs.). Eye-hand-decoupled maturation emerged mainly during late childhood (11–12 yrs.). Notably, we detected performance differences between young children and adolescents exclusively during the eye-hand decoupling task which required the integration of rule-based cognitive information into the motor action. Differences were not observed during the direct interaction task. Our results quantify an important milestone for eye-hand-decoupling development in late childhood, leading to improved rule-based motor performance in early adolescence. This eye-hand-decoupling development may be due to frontal lobe development linked to rule-based behavior and the strengthening of fronto-parietal networks.     

Eye movements disrupt episodic future thinking

Remembering the past and imagining the future both rely on complex mental imagery. We considered the possibility that constructing a future scene might tap a component of mental imagery that is not as critical for remembering past scenes. Whereas visual imagery plays an important role in remembering the past, we predicted that spatial imagery plays a crucial role in imagining the future. For the purpose of teasing apart the different components underpinning scene construction in the two experiences of recalling episodic memories and shaping novel future events, we used a paradigm that might selectively affect one of these components (i.e., the spatial). Participants performed concurrent eye movements while remembering the past and imagining the future. These concurrent eye movements selectively interfere with spatial imagery, while sparing visual imagery. Eye movements prevented participants from imagining complex and detailed future scenes, but had no comparable effect on the recollection of past scenes. Similarities between remembering the past and imagining the future are coupled with some differences. The present findings uncover another fundamental divergence between the two processes.