Notes towards a description of Social Representations

The theory of social representations occupies a place apart in social psychology both by the problems it raises and the scale of the phenomena with which it deals. This provokes many a criticism and misunderstanding. Such a theory may not correspond with the model of social psychology as it is defined at present. One attempts however to show that it answers important social and scientific questions, in what it differs from the classical conception of collective representations and, from the very beginning, adopts a constructivist perspective which has spread in social psychology since. Several trends of research have confirmed its vision of the relations between social and cognitive phenomena, communication and thought. More detailed remarks aim at outlining the nature of social representations, their capacity to create information, their function which is to familiarize us with the strange, according to the categories of our culture. Going farther, one insists on the diversity of methodological approaches. If the experimental method is useful to understand how people should think, higher mental and social processes must be approached by different methods, including linguistic analysis and observation of how people think. No doubt, social representations have a relation with the more recent field of social cognition. But inasmuch as the former depend on content and context, i.e. subjectivity and sociability of people, they approach the phenomena differently from the latter. Referring to child psychology and anthropology, one can contend, despite appearances, that it is also a more scientific approach. There is however much to be learned from criticisms and there is still a long way to go before we arrive at a satisfactory theory of social thinking and communication.     

Cohérence et vérité. Le rôle des modalisateurs épistémiques dans l'établissement de la vérité propositionnelle

We proposed that the condition truth be understood as the result of a decision about the values taken on by the conditions for fulfilment of the act of referencing in a mental model. Our cognitive model of propositional truth attribution (Baudet, Jhean-Larose, & Legros, 1994) is built on the assumption that the truth value of a proposition is determined by the ability of that proposition to fit into the theory of the field to which it refers. The experimental results proved to be compatible with the proposed model. They validate the first phase of our model: the selection of incoherent subset of truth candidates. This selection is operated thanks to the attribution of plausibility value. This value is determined by explicit index of the pledging of the sender as for the truth of proposals contained in the text sentences. According to these results, the epistemic modalisers of the type “I know” and the type “I believe”, commit the transmitter in different ways as to the truth of propositions. They determine degrees of plausibility and relative coherence between assertions and the mental model in operation. The main function of the enunciation operators such as “I know” in a text, is:

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Studies in social influence: II. Instrumental and symbolic influence

In this article we have dealt with a critical analysis pertaining to the notion of the informational influence. We hereby show that in every inter-actionary situation, the judgments emitted by the source (influence agent) appear to contain informations on the judged objects from their elementary content and, at the same time, from their organisation, like indications on the source itself, on its purpose. In this manner, we have come to distinguish the instrumental influence from the symbolical influence. An experiment where the subjects have to judge the number of points appearing on the slides shows that this distinction reveals what happens in the process of influence.     

Age trends in early behavioral predictors of serious antisocial behaviors

A risk group of disruptive boys (N=65) identified in kindergarten was assessed using the same procedures at ages 6–7, 8–9, and 10–11. Criteria used to define the predictors and criterion variable were the same at all assessment times. Severity was addressed by comparing different forms of behaviors, considering the extent of harmful consequences to others (aggressiveness was considered as most harmful, whereas inattention was considered as least harmful), manifestation in multiple settings, and extreme scores (manipulation of cutoff scores). Different assessment strategies (direct observations, ratings) and different informants (trained observers, mothers and teachers) were used. Aggressiveness as rated by mothers was highly stable from age 6 to age 11. Inattention as rated by teachers was stable only from age 6 to age 9, whereas no stability was found for observations of task inappropriate behaviors. Taskinappropriate behaviors observed in mother-child interactions and in multiple settings at age 6–7 were significant predictors of self-reported antisocial behaviors at age 12, but this prediction was not repeated at ages 8–9 and 10–11. Teacher ratings of inattention at ages 6–7 and 8–9 were also significant predictors of self-reported antisocial behaviors at age 12. The predictive power was much lower when mothers' ratings of aggressiveness were used. Findings from the present study support the hypothesis that some antisocial behavior precursors are age dependent, in that they are more characteristic of certain age groups than of others. Implications for the selection of assessment screening procedures are discussed.     

Compétence cognitive,capacités d'apprentissage,et métacognition

Suite à la recension de travaux empiriques sur l'entraînement cognitif, sur l'évaluation de la zone de développement proximal et sur le développement de l'expertise, les auteurs mettent en lumière l'existence d'une relation entre la qualité des efforts fournis au moment de l'apprentissage de connaissances ou de stratégies nouvelles et les performances cognitives ultérieures des individus. Plus particulièrement, les auteurs posent l'hypothèse que les individus doués intellectuellement seraient caractérisés surtout par l'efficacité de leurs stratégies d'apprentissage, lesquelles leur permettraient d'acquérir des connaissances et des habiletés nouvelles plus rapidement que leurs pairs et de transférer plus souvent ces acquisitions à des domaines nouveaux. L'interprétation des données sur l'apprentissage dans un cadre théorique métacognitif suggère que les capacités supérieures d'apprentissage des individus doués intellectuellement, comparativement à leurs pairs de compétences moyennes, seraient le résultat de l'utilisation spontanée de mécanismes autorégulateurs adéquats. Peu de travaux empiriques ont vérifié cette hypothèse d'une supériorité métacognitive des individus doués intellectuellement associée à des habiletés d'apprentissage plus développées. Les quelques résultats disponibles favorisent toutefois cette interprétation. Pour terminer, les auteurs discutent des implications pédagogiques qui découlent d'un modèle de la compétence cognitive où les habiletés métacognitives et les habiletés d'apprentissage interagissent pour favoriser l'émergence de l'autonomie intellectuelle.     

Independent effects of relevance and arousal on deductive reasoning

Emotional content can have either a deleterious or a beneficial impact on logicality. Using standard deductive-reasoning tasks, we tested the hypothesis that the interplay of two factors – personal relevance and arousal – determines the nature of the effect of emotional content on logicality. Arousal was assessed using measures of skin conductance. Personal relevance was manipulated by asking participants to reason about semantic contents linked to an emotional event that they had experienced or not. Findings showed that (1) personal relevance exerts a positive effect on logicality while arousal exerts a negative effect, and that (2) these effects are independent of each other.     

Psychological Similarities and Differences between Women and Men across Cultures

Most research looking at psychological similarities and differences between women and men has been carried out in North America and Western Europe. In this paper, I review a body of cross‐cultural evidence showing that it is precisely in these Western countries that women and men differ the most in terms of personality, self‐construal, values, or emotions. Much less‐pronounced gender differences are observed, if at all, in Asian and African countries. These findings are unexpected from the perspectives of the two most influential frameworks applied to sex differences coming from evolutionary psychology and social role theory. However, recent research related to social comparison and self‐categorization theories suggests a promising approach to explain why more egalitarian societies can paradoxically create greater psychological differences between women and men.