How do we evaluate future gambles? Experimental evidence on path dependency in risky intertemporal choice

This study reports three experiments which demonstrate path dependency in risky intertemporal choice. Consider a lottery to be resolved and paid in a future time period. One can obtain the present value of this lottery in three different ways: (1) eliciting directly the present certainty equivalent (CE) of the future lottery (direct path); (2) eliciting the future CE and then discounting this amount to the present (risk‐time path); and (3) eliciting the present value of the risky prospect and then determining the CE of this current lottery (time‐risk path). Standard rational choice models such as the discounted expected utility model, assume a multiplicative model, where all three methods mentioned above would yield the same value. We conducted three studies to examine if this is the case: Experiments 1 and 2 were based on a set of matching‐task questions and Experiment 3 used a process‐tracing design to analyze the natural sequence of decision making by the subjects. These three studies show that the evaluation of future gambles is path‐dependent. The present values elicited under the time‐risk and direct paths are, on average, higher than those reported under the risk‐time path. In addition, we found evidence for a two‐stage evaluation of risky future prospects: When evaluating a future gamble, individuals first assess the present value of the gamble (time discounting) and then they determine a certainty equivalent (probability discounting). Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mental representations of attachment figures facilitate recovery following upsetting autobiographical memory recall

A growing literature shows that even the symbolic presence of an attachment figure facilitates the regulation of negative affect triggered by external stressors. Yet, in daily life, pernicious stressors are often internally generated--recalling an upsetting experience reliably increases negative affect, rumination, and susceptibility to physical and psychological health problems. The present research provides the first systematic examination of whether activating the mental representation of an attachment figure enhances the regulation of affect triggered by thinking about upsetting memories. Using 2 different techniques for priming attachment figure representations and 2 types of negative affect measures (explicit and implicit), activating the mental representation of an attachment figure (vs. an acquaintance or stranger) after recalling an upsetting memory enhanced recovery--eliminating the negative effects of the memory recall (Studies 1-3). In contrast, activating the mental representation of an attachment figure before recalling an upsetting memory had no such effect (Studies 1 and 2). Furthermore, activating the mental representation of an attachment figure after thinking about upsetting memories reduced negative thinking in a stream of consciousness task, and the magnitude of the attachment-induced affective recovery effects as assessed with explicit affect measures predicted mental and physical health in daily life (Study 3). Finally, a meta-analysis of the 3 studies (Study 4) showed that the regulatory benefits conferred by the mental representation of an attachment figure were weaker for individuals high on attachment avoidance. The implications of these findings for attachment, emotion regulation, and mental and physical health are discussed.