Economic Envy

Envy of others' material possessions is a potent motivator of consumerism. This makes it a prudentially and morally hazardous emotional response. After outlining these hazards, I present an analysis of the emotion of envy. Envy, I argue, presents things in the following way: the envier lacks some good that her rival possesses; this difference between them is bad for the envier; this difference reflects poorly on the envier's worth; and this difference is undeserved. I then discuss the conditions under which these presentations can be satisfied by differences in material possessions. My conclusion is that no difference in material possessions can simultaneously be all the ways envy presents it as being. Consequently, economic envy is systematically irrational: it is never a warranted response to the distribution of material wealth. Recognising this bolsters the prudential and moral case for reducing the degree to which we feel it and for resisting the inclinations it gives rise to when we do.     

Selectionist Thought and Methodological Orthodoxy in Psychological Science

The Psychological Record - Selectionist theory in psychology conceptualizes behavior as a dynamic phenomenon subject to a variation and selection process similar to that characterizing biological...     

The relationship between expressed social fears and assertiveness and its treatment implications

Behavior therapists have speculated about the relationship between social fears or social anxieties and lack of assertive behavior. Wolpe (1958) perhaps most clearly suggested such a relationship. “If he [the patient] has been ineffectual in such situations—unable, for instance, to return a faulty garment—I explain how unadaptive fears are at the bottom of this ineffectualness. … p. 116.” Wolpe further assumed that engaging in assertive behavior reciprocally inhibited fear in these same social situations and that assertive responses can be programmed for use in overcoming these fears.In later writings (Wolpe. 1969; Wolpe and Lazarus, 1966) Wolpe seems to have broadened his position concerning the cause of non-assertive behavior. Specifically, he now allows that an individual also may be non-assertive, “… not because of anxiety but because they have never had the opportunity of acquiring the necessary habits. p. 40” (Wolpe and Lazarus, 1966). For these individuals direct efforts in assertive training such as behavior rehearsal, operant conditioning or direct instruction are in order. For these individuals whose lack of assertiveness is due to a ‘phobic reaction’ or strong extrinsic fears, systematic desensitization is recommended in addition to assertive training.Despite this apparent change in position, the intuitively appealing notion that the more socially fearful an individual is the more non-assertive he is likely to be has not received the empirical attention it deserves. Rathus (1973) seems to have provided some indirect evidence pertaining to the relationship between social fears and assertiveness. In the context of evaluating the efficacy of an assertive training method he administered both the 100-item Temple Fear Survey Inventory (TFSI) (Braun and Reynolds, 1969) and the Rathus Assertiveness Schedule (RAS) (Rathus, 1973) to groups of female students receiving either assertive training, a placebo treatment or no treatment. He found that at post-test the assertive training group scored significantly higher than either the placebo or no treatment groups on the RAS and that there were no significant differences in post-test Full Scale TSFI Scores. Fear of Social Criticism Factor Scores or Fear of Social Incompetence Factor Scores although in each case the mean changes toward less fear were greater for the group receiving assertive training. This finding gives little support to the reciprocal relationship between social fears and assertiveness. What is needed is a direct determination of the degree to which social fears and assertiveness are related in a sizeable sample of subjects.     

Acoustic confusion of digits in memory and recognition

It has been shown that, contrary to current opinion, digits do not confuse arbitrarily and that similar patterns of confusion are observed in memory and auditory recognition tasks. Two alternative measures of stimulus similarity are compared.     

Do rats like to work for their food?

Rats were given a choice in a two-compartment box between response-dependent and response-independent schedules of food presentation. In general, the response-independent schedule was preferred, but the preference was not exclusive and considerable amounts of time were spent on the “work” (response-dependent) side. Food deprivation caused an increased preference for the response-independent schedule when the schedules were fixed, but not when they were variable. Addition of a signal to the work side, indicating the availability of reinforcement, increased preference for that side. In general, the relative numbers of reinforcements obtained on the response-independent side exceeded the relative time spent there; when the relative reinforcements were equated by adding delays to the response-independent side, indifference between the schedules resulted. Latencies of food collection were higher on the response-independent side than on the lever side, and it is suggested that this gives a clue to the factors maintaining “work” in this situation.     

Different paths to protest: predictors of collective action in the Occupy Movement

This study investigated the variables that shaped people's willingness to engage in collective action in the context of the Occupy Movement. Data were collected in 2011 from nonprotesting supporters at the New York City Occupy encampment and active occupiers at the New York and Atlanta encampments. Participants distinguished between different kinds of collective action based on cost. Furthermore, different predictors motivated distinct kinds of collective action. Identity and anger predicted low‐cost collective action. Efficacy predicted relatively costly collective action and mediated the link between identity and costly collective action. This study provides evidence that people draw distinctions between different actions based on cost and that, when it comes to predicting collective action, these distinctions matter.