Memory for emotionally arousing events over time in Autism Spectrum Disorder

Emotionally arousing events are typically better remembered and more resistant to forgetting than neutral events. Findings from word list paradigms suggest that this may not hold for individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), who also tend to be less accurate as eyewitnesses under some circumstances. To test whether attenuated effects of arousal on memory may be responsible for poorer eyewitness testimonies in ASD, we asked adults with and without the disorder to view either arousing or neutral versions of a narrated slide sequence (Experiment 1) or video clip (Experiment 2) before assessing their memory for the material. Both groups exhibited increases in psychophysiological arousal during the arousing compared with the neutral version of the narratives, and both groups also demonstrated a memory advantage for the arousing events. Contrary to predictions, these observations indicate that stimulus induced arousal modulates memory for naturalistic events relatively typically in ASD. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Offline improvement occurs for temporal stability but not accuracy following practice of integer and non-integer rhythms

Procedural learning benefits from memory processes occurring outside practice resulting in offline learning. Offline gains have been demonstrated almost exclusively for the ordinal structure of sequential motor tasks. Many skills also demand that the correct serial order of events be appropriately timed. Evidence indicates that the temporal aspect of a procedural skill can be encoded independent of serial order knowledge and governed by at least two distinct neural circuits. The present experiment determined if (a) offline gains emerge for temporal learning, and (b) if such gains occur for timing supervised by distinct timing systems. Participants experienced 216 practice trials of a 7-key press sequence that involved integer- or non-integer timing rhythms. Twenty-four hours after training 30 test trials were administered. Results revealed robust offline enhancement for timing performance of the non-integer based temporal sequences. This improvement was localized to stabilization of the required relative but not absolute time profiles. The neural circuitry central to supporting the performance of non-integer timing sequences is also a principal constituent of what is described as the "cognitive" timing system. Timing governed by this system appears most susceptible to offline gains via consolidation.     

The motor side of emotions: investigating the relationship between hemispheres, motor reactions and emotional stimuli

The aim of the present study was to analyze if the left hemisphere preferentially controls flexion responses toward positive stimuli, while the right hemisphere is specialized toward extensor responses to negative pictures. To this end, right-handed subjects had to pull or push a joystick subsequent to seeing a positive or a negative stimulus in their left or right hemifield. Flexion responses were faster for positive stimuli, while negative stimuli were associated with faster extensions responses. Overall, performance was fastest when emotional stimuli were presented to the left visual hemifield. This right hemisphere superiority was especially clear for negative stimuli, while reaction times toward positive pictures showed no hemispheric difference. We did not find any interaction between hemifield and response type. Neither was there a triple interaction between valence, hemifield and response type. We suppose that response dichotomies in humans are not as tightly linked to a hemisphere- and valence-bound reaction type as previously assumed.     

Intentional transaction

The second person is often set in contrast to the first person. And there is a contrast. It does not reside in a difference of what is thought as I from what is thought as you. For that is not different. The contrast is that of monadic and dyadic predication, action and transaction. It is the contrast, not of I and You, but of I and I–You. The second person does not add a You to an I. It divides the I and makes it a relation. We consider, first, the form of predication that is common to first- and second-person thought. Then, we define the second person as a species of this form of thought. Last, we find the source and condition of this form of thought in a thought of this very form. This thought, being the source of its own form, is one of which one cannot be conscious from outside it. It is a last word, or, better, a first word.¹1. Compare Thomas Nagel's notion of a last word (Nagel 2001 Nagel, Thomas. 2001. The Last Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]). Nagel's development of the notion reveals no reason why he should call what is last a word. From what he writes in the book, one would think its title to be “The Last Thought”. (Indeed, chapter 2 bears the title “Why We Can't Understand Thought from the Outside”.) However, if the last thought is I–You, then the last thought is a word; indeed, it is the word. In reaching for “The Last Word”, Nagel may express an inchoate appreciation of this.     

Lunacy and Scepticism: Notes on the Logic of Doubt Concerning the Existence of an External World

This article develops a logical (or semantic) response to scepticism about the existence of an external world. Specifically, it is argued that any doubt about the existence of an external world can be proved to be false, but whatever appears to be doubt about the existence of an external world that cannot be proved to be false is nonsense, insofar as it must rely on the assertion of something that is logically impossible. The article further suggests that both G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein worked towards the same solution but left their work unfinished.

     

Cognitive-Behavioral Processes Based on Using the ABC Analysis by Trainees’ for Their Personal Development

As cognitive-behavior therapy (CBT) has proven to be an evidence-based intervention for many mental health problems, the requirement for training programs has increased. Although there is promising data on the skills outcomes of such programs, trainees’ affective/behavioral changes mechanisms and in their faulty thinking patterns during the personal development of such training are unknown. The aim of this study is to investigate which are the most common irrational/dysfunctional beliefs of trainees during a cognitive-behavioral intervention training and their maladaptive consequences, as well as the methods of restructuring that they prefer to change these beliefs into rational/functional ones and achieve more adaptive consequences. 94 participants in a cognitive-behavioral interventions training program filled out 340 ABC, forms related to negative events at work and in personal life, as part of the personal development component in the training program. The obtained qualitative data was coded by three trained ratters in accordance to the current cognitive model of CBT. Contingencies analysis showed that demandingness, awfulizing and global evaluation (GE) are most frequently associated with anxiety, while low frustration tolerance is associated with anger. Comfort, affiliation, achievement themes were most frequently associated with anxiety, while fairness was most frequently associated with anger. Pragmatic cognitive restructuring was the most frequently used by trainees. We found evidence that confirmed many of the theoretical predictions form the cognitive model of CBT in respect to the associations between irrational/dysfunctional cognitions and dysfunctional emotions as well as some particularities for this specific population.     

Learning efficient visual search for stimuli containing diagnostic spatial configurations and color-shape conjunctions

Visual search is often slow and difficult for complex stimuli such as feature conjunctions. Search efficiency, however, can improve with training. Search for stimuli that can be identified by the spatial configuration of two elements (e.g., the relative position of two colored shapes) improves dramatically within a few hundred trials of practice. Several recent imaging studies have identified neural correlates of this learning, but it remains unclear what stimulus properties participants learn to use to search efficiently. Influential models, such as reverse hierarchy theory, propose two major possibilities: learning to use information contained in low-level image statistics (e.g., single features at particular retinotopic locations) or in high-level characteristics (e.g., feature conjunctions) of the task-relevant stimuli. In a series of experiments, we tested these two hypotheses, which make different predictions about the effect of various stimulus manipulations after training. We find relatively small effects of manipulating low-level properties of the stimuli (e.g., changing their retinotopic location) and some conjunctive properties (e.g., color-position), whereas the effects of manipulating other conjunctive properties (e.g., color-shape) are larger. Overall, the findings suggest conjunction learning involving such stimuli might be an emergent phenomenon that reflects multiple different learning processes, each of which capitalizes on different types of information contained in the stimuli. We also show that both targets and distractors are learned, and that reversing learned target and distractor identities impairs performance. This suggests that participants do not merely learn to discriminate target and distractor stimuli, they also learn stimulus identity mappings that contribute to performance improvements.     

Confidence in masked orientation judgments is informed by both evidence and visibility

How do human observers determine their degree of belief that they are correct in a decision about a visual stimulus—that is, their confidence? According to prominent theories of confidence, the quality of stimulation should be positively related to confidence in correct decisions, and negatively to confidence in incorrect decisions. However, in a backward-masked orientation task with a varying stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), we observed that confidence in incorrect decisions also increased with stimulus quality. Model fitting to our decision and confidence data revealed that the best explanation for the present data was the new weighted evidence-and-visibility model, according to which confidence is determined by evidence about the orientation as well as by the general visibility of the stimulus. Signal detection models, postdecisional accumulation models, two-channel models, and decision-time-based models were all unable to explain the pattern of confidence as a function of SOA and decision correctness. We suggest that the metacognitive system combines several cues related to the correctness of a decision about a visual stimulus in order to calculate decision confidence.     

‘Of the group’ and ‘for the group’: How followership is shaped by leaders' prototypicality and group identification

Previous research has focused on the importance of leaders being seen to be of the group (i.e. to be prototypical of a group) but less on the impact of leaders' own degree of identification with the group. Also, little is known about the combined impact of leader prototypicality and leader identification on followers' responses. This paper reports two studies that address these lacunae. Study 1 shows experimentally that perceived leader identification and prototypicality interact to determine followers' personal identification with leaders and their perceptions of leader charisma. Findings indicate that high identification can compensate for low prototypicality such that high‐identified leaders are able to inspire followership when leaders are low prototypical. Study 2 replicates these findings in the field by examining followers' responses to workgroup leaders. In addition, results demonstrate that the aforementioned responses are more pronounced for highly identified followers. The present research extends social identity theorizing by demonstrating that leaders' inability to inspire followership derives as much from their failure to project a sense of ‘we’ and ‘us’ as part of their self‐concept as from a failure to exemplify group‐typical attributes. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.